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Frequently used abbreviations 
BPA   Bisphenol A 
Danish EPA Danish Environmental Protection Agency 
DTU-Food  Technical University of Denmark, National Food Institute 
DVFA  Danish Veterinary and Food Administration 
ED  Endocrine disruptor  
EFSA  European Food Safety Authority 
EU RAR European Union Risk Assessment Report 
FCM   Food contact materials 
FHI  Norwegian Institute of Public Health (Folkehelseinstituttet) 
GLP  Good Laboratory Practice 
Klif   Climate and Pollution agency (Klima- og forurensningsdirektoratet), predecessor 
to NEA 
NEA   Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet) 
NFSA   Norwegian Food Safety Authority (Mattilsynet)  
NOAEL No Observed Adverse Effect Level 
REACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 
SFT  Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens forurensningstilsyn), predecessor 
to NEA  
TDI  Tolerable Daily Intake 
VKM  Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety (Vitenskapskomiteen for 
mattrygghet) 
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1. Introduction 
Governments worldwide have regulated the production and use of specific chemicals since the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. In regulating chemicals, policy makers and regulators have 
attempted to balance between two conflicting interests, namely maintaining a socially acceptable 
level of environmental and human health protection while harvesting all the benefits of modern 
chemistry. Traditionally, science has been the instrument that has shaped our perception and 
advanced our understanding of environmental threats, and as a consequence, it has also played a 
vital role in the mediation between environmental risks and policy making. This has led to very 
specific modes of “chemical governance” that are intimately linked to a history of techno-
scientific practices and questions of knowledge production.  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and compare the regulation of a chemical known as 
bisphenol A (BPA) in Denmark and Norway. BPA is a widely used ingredient in modern plastics 
with countless commercial applications such as food packaging, toys and water pipes. Around 4 
million tons are produced worldwide each year which makes BPA one of the highest production 
volume chemicals in the world. It has been found that it migrates from plastic under normal 
conditions of use and such leaching is believed to be the main source of human exposure. Survey 
programs worldwide have confirmed that this chemical is widespread in the general population, 
at remarkably higher concentrations in young children. BPA can act like a synthetic estrogen in 
living organisms and numerous studies have reported endocrine disrupting effects linked to 
neurobehavioral problems, cancer onset, diabetes, obesity, cardiovascular disease, ailment of 
reproductive organs and their functions (EEA, 2013; Vandenberg, Hauser, Marcus, Olea, & 
Welshons, 2007). 
Several health risk assessments of BPA have been conducted in the last decade by different 
regulatory authorities and expert groups in Europe and internationally. In all cases, the potential 
adverse health effects of BPA have been identified and evaluated, and in many cases, exposure 
levels have also been calculated in order to draw conclusions about possible health risks at 
current levels of exposure. The conclusions on whether or not BPA poses a risk to human health 
vary greatly between assessments - even among those were the scientific evidence was identical 
(Beronius, Ruden, Hakansson, & Hanberg, 2010; EEA, 2013). 
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After 15 years of intense scientific research, there is no consensus on how big is the health risk 
posed by BPA under current levels of exposure. It is a heated debate where high scientific, 
political and economic stakes are at work. The risk assessment of BPA has divided scientists, 
industry and regulatory agencies. One side attempts to undermine the studies claiming a negative 
effect on health and the other side argues that those same studies represent enough evidence to 
question the safety of BPA.  The division in opinion has resulted in different countries’ 
regulatory agencies deciding on different risk-management strategies for BPA.  
In Europe, it is the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) who has had the main role in 
assessing BPA’s risk for the European Union. In 2006, this agency concluded that under current 
conditions of usage, BPA was safe and in 2008, 2010 and 2011, it has reaffirmed that initial 
opinion. However, continuing discrepancies among member states and scientists have forced the 
agency to conduct a complete re-evaluation of the safety of this chemical. The new assessment 
has tried to address previous criticisms and has made an effort to address the remaining 
uncertainties. After three years of work, the agency concluded in January 2015 that the dietary 
exposure to the chemical was safe (EFSA, 2015d). At the national level, Denmark was the first 
European country to ban the use of BPA in baby bottles and food containers for children under 
the age of three in April 2010 based on the precautionary principle. Danish Parliament members 
have followed BPA’s case very actively and in February 2015, Danish experts were asked to 
evaluate EFSA’s latest assessment. The latter concluded that EFSA’s recommendation was not 
sufficiently protective for highly exposed individuals (DTU-Food, 2015c). In Norway the 
discussion about the safety of BPA has mainly taken place at the agency level - where the 
Norwegian food and health authorities strictly adhere to EFSA’s recommendation even when this 
goes against (national environmental objectives) and the recommendations of the Norwegian 
Environment Agency.  
1.1 What is bisphenol A? 
The exploration of the commercial uses of the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA) dates back 
to 1934, when a group of British scientists - working on the production of synthetic hormones for 
pharmaceutical purposes - identified its estrogenic properties (Dodds & Lawson, 1936). Failing 
to make a career as a drug, BPA instead began to be used by the chemical industry in 
manufacture of plastics in the 1950’s. Since then, it has been used as an essential raw material in 
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the production of polycarbonate plastic and epoxy resins. Today BPA has numerous and very 
diverse applications and is one of the world’s bestselling chemicals with one of the highest 
volume production rates world-wide and a steady annual increase of consumption (EEA, 2013).  
It is recognized that under regular conditions of use, BPA can leach in very small amounts from 
its plastic applications. Consumers are thought to be primarily exposed via food in contact with 
BPA, such as drinks and foodstuff stored in metallic cans and plastic containers made out of 
polycarbonate . However, during the last years, it has been shown that other types of exposure 
can also contribute to the total exposure (EFSA, 2015). The regulation of this chemical has 
mainly fallen under the jurisdiction of food and environmental authorities.  
1.2 The dose makes the poison 
BPA’s safety and that of most chemicals in use today has historically been defined according to 
the assumption that one can always establish a “safe” threshold value of exposure to which a 
person can be exposed for a lifetime without developing adverse health effects. This basic 
scientific principle that lies at the heart of our regulatory toxicity testing paradigm, dates back to 
the sixteenth century statement of Paracelsus “All things are poison and nothing is without poison, 
only the dose permits something not to be poisonous” (Paracelsus, 1539). However, this central 
assumption only holds true when the dose-response curve for the chemical under study is 
monotonic. That is, when the relation between the exposure dose and its corresponding response 
effect increases with increasing dose until a maximum response is reached. Based on this 
rationale high doses are expected to produce serious effects and low doses are expected to 
produce only small or no effects (Vandenberg, Maffini, Sonnenschein, Rubin, & Soto, 2009). 
These two assumptions, namely the existence of a threshold and a monotonic dose-response 
curve have important consequences for chemical regulation. Based on those assumptions, 
regulatory agencies such as EFSA, can derive a health-based guidance value on which to base 
conclusions regarding safe levels of human exposure
1
 (Beronius, 2013). 
For regulatory purposes, it is generally recommended that all relevant data should be considered 
in the risk assessment process. However, toxicological studies conducted in accordance with 
                                                     
1
 The reference standard, also known as tolerable daily intake (TDI)  for BPA it has been set by EFSA and is of 
 50 μg/kg body weight/day (EFSA 2006, 2008, 2010) and 4 μg/kg body weight/day (EFSA, 2015) 
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standardized and internationally validated test guidelines such as The Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) test guidelines and Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) 
are usually given extra weight during risk assessment. Standardized studies are considered to be 
reliable by default as they comply with quality standards for the conduct of protocols and 
reporting of data. This is thought to promote reliability since experiments can then be easily 
replicated if needed (Molander, 2015).  
1.3 Endocrine disruption and Low-dose theory 
The accidental re-discovery of BPA as a hormonally-active substance in 1993 came to challenge 
the long-held validity of the basic assumptions of toxicology. That year, a team of 
endocrinologists at Stanford University discovered that BPA leaching from the plastic equipment 
used in their laboratory was responsible for altering the results of their hormone-sensitive 
experiments (Krishnan, Stathis, Permuth, Tokes, & Feldman, 1993). Promptly after that, BPA 
became one of the most debated chemicals in the field of endocrine disruption 
Unlike the typical regulatory toxicity tests, the endocrine approach investigates the effects of 
exposure to very small levels of endocrine disruptors that have historically been deemed as “not 
toxic”. The rationale is that the physiological processes depending on hormone action are very 
efficient and responses usually take place at very low hormone concentrations. So, chemicals that 
behave like hormones should also be physiologically active at low doses - that not only fall below 
the reference standard but that also are within the range of what people are regularly exposed to 
(Vandenberg et al., 2013). 
Endocrine scientist use available evidence in this field to show that low doses of BPA can 
actually be more dangerous than bigger ones, in particular during sensitive periods of exposure 
such as fetal development. These contra-intuitive findings have been referred to as the “low-dose 
theory”, and studies on low-dose effects have indicated that for some endpoints, the experimental 
dose-response curve for BPA is rather non-monotonic or u-shaped
2
 (F. S. vom Saal & Hughes, 
2005). This is to illustrate that effects observed at high concentrations cannot always be used to 
                                                     
2
 Since instead of being linear or monotonic, the dose-response curve resemble an U (when it is said to have an U-
shape) or an upside-down U (when it is said to have an inverted U-shaped) depending on which end point is being 
studied (Vandenberg, 2009). 
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predict what could happen at intermediate and very low doses. BPA then, as many natural 
hormones is seen to produce a non-traditional dose-response curve
3
 (Vandenberg et al., 2009).  
Within the Endocrine Society
4
, there is widespread consensus on these results and concepts. 
Endocrine scientists claim that taken together, the low-dose studies challenge the safety 
assumptions made by regulatory agencies concerning BPA and call for a new regulatory testing 
paradigm based on low-dose endocrinology principles (Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., 2009).  
Most low-dose studies are non-standard. They are usually carried out at universities and research 
institutes and their quality control is based on the peer-review mechanism. They usually use 
sensitive testing approaches to investigate particular endpoints, usually represent cutting-edge 
areas and are designed to uncover and explore biological mechanism (Myers, vom Saal, et al., 
2009). However, in order to be included in health risk assessment they need to be thoroughly 
evaluated as to their adequacy (reliability and relevance). They are frequently found to have 
“methodological limitations and being poorly reported” and are thus only seldom used for 
regulatory purposes (Molander, 2015). 
1.4 BPA’s scientific controversy 
It is of course the widespread use of BPA in commercial products and the fact that it is in contact 
with food that has stirred much concern on the issue. Measured concentrations of BPA in human 
urine and blood confirm that exposure is prevalent in the human population (F. S. vom Saal & 
Hughes, 2005). Public and private money are constantly used to fund new research, making BPA 
one of the most studied chemicals in the world. In the interim, some countries – like Denmark - 
have taken precautionary steps and have already enacted total or partial bans for the use of BPA
5
 
(EEA, 2013). Others, like Norway, keep maintaining that the current exposure to BPA poses no 
health risk. Not surprisingly, this chemical has received considerable media and public attention 
over the last twenty years. However, one can say that the debate on exactly how dangerous BPA 
is; is still unresolved.  
                                                     
3
 It has even been documented that the occurrence of u-shaped dose-response curves is rather frequent.  
4
 The largest and most active medical organization in the field of basic and clinical hormone research and treatment 
of endocrine disorders. It is composed by a large diversity of sub-especialities. 
5
 Such as France, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Canada and some of the US States. 
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1.5 BPA regulation 
In this thesis it will be shown that the risk assessment of BPA involves uncertainties of many 
sorts, not all of which can be adequately be accounted for. In contrast to the situation in the 
laboratory, in real life chemical exposures, there are a multitude of factors that influence the 
health and environmental outcomes – most of which are beyond control and even identification. 
These problems are further complicated by: administrative cultures having competing 
perspectives on the management of chemical risk , the value-laden aspects of risk assessment, the 
presence of enduring uncertainties and indeterminacies, the politicization of risk, the prevalence 
of scientific controversies and strong economic interests. I will analyze how the Danish and the 
Norwegian authorities have dealt with the regulation of BPA.   
1.6 Objectives and research questions 
Objectives: 
First, study the processes that lead Denmark and Norway, which have access to the same 
scientific information, to different policy outcomes concerning bisphenol A. Second, analyze 
some of the limitations of the resulting policy outcomes.    
Research questions and sub-questions: 
1. How is the bisphenol A problem understood and framed in Denmark and in Norway? 
This question is related to the larger frame of how are the environmental and health problems 
concerning endocrine disruptors defined in each country. I will argue that this overarching frame 
has important consequences for how the “risk” of BPA is understood nationally and what is seen 
as a relevant in the policy process.  
2. What are the processes in each country, that lead to different outcomes in the 
regulation of bisphenol A? 
Based on the definition of the problem, I will identify the political and administrative processes, 
and describe how they have been played out in each country. Which processes took place in each 
country? Who was involved in those processes? How were the decisions taken? 
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3. How is scientific uncertainty addressed in each policy solution? 
This is based on the realization that different policy solutions address scientific uncertainties in 
different ways. I will analyze the policy process in light of ideal models of science-policy 
interactions and I will point to possible limitations in the way the uncertainties have been treated. 
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 will address the theoretical framework for the analysis of BPA’s case 
study and the methodological approach, respectively. Chapter 4 will present the necessary 
technical background to be able to understand the bisphenol A debate and I will summarize the 
main health risk assessments that have taken place in the European Union.  
The analysis will be presented in chapters 5-8 and will be divided in two sections – one analyzing 
the case in Denmark (chapters 5 and 6) and the other analyzing the case in Norway (chapters 7 
and 8). The analysis will be chronological and will present the main arguments and actors 
involved in each case. Chapters 5 and 7 will deal with the problem definition in Denmark and in 
Norway respectively, while chapters 6 and 8 will present the development of the BPA case in 
each country and how the particular policy decisions were taken.  
The discussion and conclusion will be in chapter 9, where I will summarize the main points of the 
thesis and review the research questions.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
The traditional way of dealing with chemical decision-making is that, in a first step, scientists are 
assigned the task of evaluating the possible risk of a given substance under fairly defined 
circumstances
6
 and of giving advice to policy-makers. In a second step, it is the political 
responsibility of policy-makers to sort out the diverse values and preferences at stake and decide 
whether the risk is acceptable or not. At the national level, policy-making usually takes place at 
the ministry level and this work is closely related to the advice given by the corresponding 
regulatory agencies. The ministries and the agencies are usually the main authorities when it 
comes to chemical regulation. These actors, in particular agency staff, depend on institutional 
thinking and practice to sort out, in a predictable way, which preferences and values should guide 
policy. But final policy outcomes also rely on more than professional (and scientific) advice and 
institutional thinking – chemical policy-making is increasingly dependent on its broader socio-
political context. This is composed of a wide variety of institutions and individuals that interact in 
several ways to influence problem framing and policy decisions to different extents and at 
different levels. Such interaction can take place at the national, the European and, to some extent, 
at the international level. Moreover, we see that current environmental and health issues are 
increasingly complex and uncertain. This not only challenges the traditional ways of evaluating 
chemical risk, but at the same time it affects decisions about policy. The latter is due to the fact 
that different actors disagree on how uncertainty should be dealt with in decision-making. The 
current debate concerning the safety of BPA illustrates all the above mentioned points. In order to 
analyze how this chemical is regulated differently in Denmark and in Norway, I will be looking 
at three different dimensions:  
 
 Institutional aspects: how the different regulatory agencies (and their associated ministries 
and scientific committees) understand and deal with chemical safety, based on their 
different administrative cultures.  
 The broader socio-political context and risk governance: how the problem is defined, 
whether actors participating in policy-decisions disagree or collaborate, and how 
European policy context and broader political decisions influence the debate. 
                                                     
6
 For example, when a substance is present in the diet, or, when workers are exposed as a result of their professional 
activities, or, when a substance is released into the environment, and so on. 
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 Complexity and scientific uncertainty at the science-policy interphase – examining the 
strengths and limitations of current practices and possible alternatives. 
 
In order to examine these dimensions, I will use, respectively, concepts from the literature on 
institutional theory, on governance and on post-normal science.  
 
I will argue that these three dimensions are in constant communication during a policy decision 
and that, in order to understand a policy outcome, we need to look at all three simultaneously.   
 
2.1 Institutional theory 
2.1.1 Institutions and rules of appropriate behavior 
The definition of an institution varies to some extent within and across the different social 
sciences. However, I propose Vatn’s (2005) broad definition as a starting point in order to explain 
the reasons behind the existence of institutions, and to show which type of situations or problems 
that institutions attempt to solve. 
 
“Institutions are the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society. They provide 
expectations, stability and meaning essential to human existence and coordination. Institutions 
regularize life, support values and produce and protect interests” (Vatn, 2005, p. 60). 
 
From this definition, we see that institutions can take the form of conventions, norms and 
sanctioned rules depending on which type of human problem they are related to. Conventions 
relate to the cognitive dimension of institutions. They tell us how something is to be done by 
combining specific situations with specific solutions. Norms and formally sanctioned rules relate 
to the normative dimension of institutions. They tell us what the appropriate or right behavior is. 
 
The second part of Vatn’s definition illustrates the different motivations behind the existence of 
institutions: institutions help us to understand what kind of situation we are in and to classify 
relevant behavior. They simplify complexity and create a common framework for action.  And 
most importantly, institutions convey meaning since they are created to produce and protect 
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particular values and interests. This is significant in policy-making, where the conflict often 
concerns whose interests should be protected or given weight. 
 
I will furthermore argue that institutions are not only embedded in structures of meaning, but also 
in structures of resources. This refers to the material and human resources that different 
institutional settings can mobilize for regulatory purposes. Resources can be financial means, 
staff competence, or benefits from a specific way of organizing resources. Available resources 
are important in ultimately defining what is doable. In this respect, the definition of an institution 
by March and Olsen (2008) complements Vatn’s broader definition:  
 
“An institution is a relatively stable collection of rules and practices, embedded in structures of 
resources that make action possible – organizational, financial and staff capabilities, and 
structures of meaning that explain and justify behavior – roles, identities and belongings, 
common purposes, and causal and normative beliefs” (March & Olsen, 2008, p. 2). 
 
Finally I want to introduce the concept of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ also developed by March 
and Olsen (2008) to illustrate how policy-making is intimately dependent on its institutional 
setting. 
 
“The logic of appropriateness is a perspective on how human action is to be interpreted. Action, 
policy making included, is seen as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, 
organized into institutions. The appropriateness of rules includes both cognitive and normative 
components. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and 
legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligation encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership 
in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions. 
Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a 
specific type of situation” (March & Olsen, 2008, p. 1) 
 
According to the logic of appropriateness, decision-making is based on a socialization process 
where agents (e.g. policy-makers) follow rules of appropriate behavior that depend on the 
association of a particular identity to a specific situation.  Rules of appropriateness are based, for 
11 
 
example, on specific ways of processing information, best practices, key interpretative traditions 
and previous experience. Those institutionalized rules facilitate interpretation of ambiguous 
situations and prescribe what the appropriate thing to do is. “To act appropriately is to proceed 
according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual and tacit 
understandings of that is true, reasonable, natural, right and good” (March & Olsen, 2008, p. 2).   
 
It follows that legitimate, stable and well-defined institutions, can provide clear prescriptions 
(structure of meaning) and adequate resources (structure of resources) that allow individuals to 
follow appropriate and doable action in an unambiguous way
7
.  
 
2.1.2 Implications for BPA policy-making 
The institutionalist view thus encompasses the idea that behavior depends on institutions. Action, 
policy-making included, is then more often based on identifying the appropriate “institutional” 
behavior rather than on calculating the return, or consequences, expected from alternative choices.  
From this perspective, meaning, values and what is considered appropriate, will depend upon the 
given institutional setting (March & Olsen, 1989). 
 
When it comes to chemical policy-making, the legislation is usually divided between several 
segments, or sectors, of the public administration, where each part belongs to a defined 
institutional setting. For example, we have the environmental authorities dealing with chemicals 
in products and emissions to the environment, the food authorities dealing with chemicals in food 
contact materials and contamination, the work authorities dealing with chemical exposure in the 
working environment, and so on. I will argue that each of these defined institutional settings have 
developed their own administrative culture and follow their own rules of appropriate behavior 
when regulating chemicals. By this I mean that each public agency
8
 has a common understanding 
and definition of the problem at hand, a common tradition for evaluating and interpreting 
scientific evidence, a common way of dealing with scientific uncertainty and a common set of 
                                                     
7
 In March and Olsen’s definition, the fact that a rule of action is defined as appropriate, does not guarantee its moral 
acceptability. It can neither be assumed that rules always dictate or guide behaviors. They just make some actions 
more likely than others (March & Olsen, 2008) 
8
 I mainly refer to public agencies since they are going to be the key actors in my analysis. However, we will see that 
the same administrative culture might also be shared with the relevant ministry and/or the scientific institutions in 
charge of regulating a particular sector.  
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acceptable solutions. Alongside this cognitive dimension, there is also a common normative 
standpoint that relates to shared goals and values. 
 
Each actor (in this case, administrative culture) develops their own rules of appropriateness based 
on the harmonization of their cognitive and normative dimensions
9
. Those institutional rules will 
define what is true, reasonable, good and right concerning chemical regulation and will provide 
clear prescriptions to policy-makers. Whereas the available resources make action possible or 
restrain it, it is these particular institutional settings that facilitate interpretation of ambiguous 
worlds and help maintain consistency in the pattern of action (March & Olsen, 2008). 
 
Such an institutionalization of knowledge, meaning and procedures might give the impression 
that public agencies are self-contained structures. However, as we will see in the next section on 
governance, we must also see a little further than individual administrative cultures and rules of 
appropriate behavior (i.e. individual actors and procedures) to fully explain policy-making. 
During the development of a specific policy, regulators have to relate to even larger 
institutionalized processes such as for example: national regulatory priorities, compliance with 
detailed legal frameworks, outcomes of superior political processes at the national and 
international level. But, most importantly, regulators must interact with several other actors (e.g. 
economic, political and civil society actors) that contribute with different perspectives to the 
same problem. Exposure to different actors and processes influence the context and the premises 
in which decisions are taken.  
 
2.2 The governance of risk  
I shall use the concept of governance as an angle to describe the totality of different actors, 
objectives and forms of interaction that are involved in policy-making. And even narrower, I look 
at risk governance, since this delimitation is naturally determined by the field of chemical 
legislation.  
 
                                                     
9
 The specific cognitive dimension in policy-making is then how the problem is perceived, whereas the normative is 
what is thought to be the best solution for society. 
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The term governance can have a variety of meanings, however I will base my analysis on an 
understanding of governance as “steering” (Vatn, 2015, p. 133).10 This notion of governance 
encompasses the multitude of structures and processes which lead to collectively binding 
decisions. By structures one can understand both the different actor constellations (e.g. experts, 
administrators, politicians, NGOs) and decision-making procedures (e.g. risk assessments, 
parliamentary debates).  And, by processes, it refers to broader activities such as defining 
regulatory objectives, framing policy problems and possible solutions and, particularly, 
coordinating action among actors (Vatn, 2015). 
  
2.2.1 Risk governance:  a descriptive and a normative concept 
In its descriptive dimension, risk governance can be seen as the “[…] increasingly multilayered 
and diversified socio-political landscape in which a multitude of actors, their perceptions and 
evaluations draw on a diversity of knowledge and evidence claims, value commitments and 
political interests in order to influence processes of risk analysis, decision-making, and risk 
management [...]” (Renn, Klinke, & van Asselt, 2011, p. 231).  
 
The multitude of actors refers here as well to the classical governmental actors such as: public 
agencies, ministries, politicians and to non-governmental actors such as NGOs, industry, experts, 
consumers, and think tanks - each of which contribute with their particular knowledge and values 
to the policy process. I will argue that these actors interact in various formal and informal ways 
that can lead to the establishment of: joint projects, common forums, alliances, collaborations, 
deliberative and learning exercises, and many more. Authority, power and the capacity to act will 
be distributed, at varying degrees, among the different actors and networks. Together, these 
actors and processes will influence how risks are perceived, defined, evaluated, communicated 
and ultimately managed. 
   
Amidst this complex web of actors and processes, the concept of risk governance also calls for 
the consideration of contextual factors, such as for example: the distribution of responsibilities 
                                                     
10
 There seems to be a baseline understanding that governance mainly refers to changing governing styles that blur 
the traditional boundaries between government and non-government actors - in particular referring to a decreased 
authoritative role of the State (Stoker, 1998). In Vatn’s (2015) definition it is recognized that there is an element of 
authority involved. 
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among actors, the legal framework, the economical context, the political culture, and many more: 
Risk governance “[…] requires consideration of the legal, institutional, social and economic 
contexts in which risk is evaluated, as well as consideration of the interests and perspectives of 
different actors and stakeholders.”(Hermans, Fox, & van Asselt, 2012, p. 1094) 
 
We can see that there are many similarities between Vatn’s (2015) definition of governance (used 
mainly in the environmental field) and that used by risk scholars such as van Asselt, et al. (2011, 
2012), in particular in relation to their analytical and descriptive dimensions. Yet the main 
contribution of risk governance for my analysis lies in its normative dimension. In this respect, a 
prominent feature of risk governance is the recognition that uncertain, complex and ambiguous 
risks should not be dealt with in the same way as we usually deal with simple risks
11
. A failure to 
do so could lead to severe problems for a policy, such as: loss of legitimacy, lengthy 
controversies and policy deadlock. Risk scholar Ulrich Beck (1992) has even introduced a term 
for those cases in which risk is inadequately addressed or managed, this has been called 
“organized irresponsibility”. To address this problem, the risk governance perspective encourages 
the development of more inclusive and deliberative governance models to deal with non-simple 
risks (those that are uncertain, complex and/or ambiguous), in order to foster robust policy 
decisions (Hermans et al., 2012; Renn et al., 2011) 
 
2.2.2 Implications for BPA governance 
The current debate on endocrine disrupting chemicals regulation is characterized by a tension of 
stability and change. On the one hand there are those who desire regulatory stability (both in 
terms of how risk is defined and acted upon). I will argue that they are most often incarnated by 
the industry and by institutionalized thinking within bureaucracy and public administration. On 
                                                     
11 Simple risks refer to situations where knowledge of the nature of the risk and its likelihood are well understood 
(Renn et al., 2011). Classical examples include: traffic accidents, routine pathogens, seasonal flooding. In these cases 
usually the causes are well understood, uncertainty is low and the interpretation of the risk is not ambiguous. 
Complexity refers to “the difficulty of identifying and quantifying causal links between a multitude of potential 
candidates and specific adverse effects” (Renn et al., 2011, p. 234). Scientific uncertainty refers to “the limitedness 
or even absence of scientific knowledge (data, information) that makes it difficult to exactly assess the probability 
and possible outcomes of undesired effects” (Renn et al., 2011, p. 234). Ambiguity refers to situations when “there 
are different legitimate viewpoints from which to evaluate whether there are or could be adverse effects and whether 
these risks are tolerable or even acceptable”(Renn et al., 2011, p. 235) 
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the other there are often academics, organizations of interests or to some degree politicians that 
call for a change. I will argue that this tension can only be captured, in all its extent, when we 
look at policy decisions from a governance perspective, and not only at single actors or 
institutions. The governance perspective serves particularly well to highlight certain features of 
the processes involved in policy-making: 1) Chemicals are used in almost all material production 
in today’s society. Hence, chemical policy-making is a field that spans over many sectors, each of 
which has its own understanding of risk and stable regulatory traditions. 2) Chemical policy is 
also dependent on very specific legal frameworks, international trade obligations and broader 
political processes. 3) We see that an increasing number of non-governmental actors are willing 
to participate in chemical decision making, such as: influential experts, NGOs, industry and 
consumers.   
 
The governance perspective offers the possibility to capture, integrate and analyze the 
contribution of all these multiple processes and divergent perspectives. Likewise, in its more 
normative dimension, it also helps to assess whether or not policy outcomes are socially robust, 
and whether or not risks have been dealt with in an adequate and responsible manner. This 
implicit aspect of governance will be further explored in the next section, on how uncertainty and 
complexity are handled in the science-policy interface.  
 
2.3 Conceptual models of the interface between science and policy – 
complexity and uncertainty in policy-making 
In order to analyze how complexity and uncertainty are dealt with during policy decisions, I will 
make use of theoretical models of science-policy interaction.  
 
These ideal
12
 models are inspired on the work of Funtowicz and Strand (2007) whose research 
has stressed some of the problems of current practices in the interface between science and policy 
of complex and uncertain environmental and health issues. There is in fact a growing literature 
calling for a rethinking of our current use of science for policy (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; 
Funtowicz & Strand, 2007; Renn et al., 2011; Stirling, 2013; Wynne, 2014). What is common to 
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 Here used in the Weberian sense, as a theoretical model – not as it is played out in reality or in practical politics 
(“realpolitik”). 
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this literature is a call to develop alternative science-policy interfaces, in which uncertainty and 
complexity are fully acknowledged and science consciously democratized.  
 
2.3.1 The modern model 
The modern model is based on the idea that science produces objective, valid and reliable 
knowledge that can inform policy. It is assumed that science gives – or can give – perfect 
knowledge and can determine correct policy. Under this technocratic view, the most important 
thing for good policy-making is to get the scientific facts right.
13
 It is usually referred as Science 
“speaking truth to power”, where the power exercised is assumed to be effective and legitimate 
since it is based on unambiguous facts (Funtowicz, 2006; Funtowicz & Strand, 2007). 
Funtowicz and Strand (2007) note there is much more at stake in the formulation of the modern 
model than the call for an efficient policy-making strategy. In particular, Funtowicz (2006) 
highlights that this model implicitly assumes that “there are no limits to the progress of our 
control over our environment, and no limits to the material and moral progress of human kind” 
(Funtowicz, 2006, p. 139).
14
     
The modern model has been very successful in managing simple risks (those that are no complex 
and uncertain). However, it meets its limitations when exposed to complex environmental and 
health problems because uncertainties cannot be controlled (quantified) or reduced, complexities 
abound and experts disagree. In the following I will present four additional models which have 
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 There are several accounts of what a technocratic model is. For example, Millstone’s (2004) description of a 
technocratic model is one in which regulatory decisions about risk are exclusively based on scientific judgements. 
Under these premises policy decision-making is a unidirectional linear process where scientific experts inform 
policy-makers. For Millstone (2004), a technocratic perspective is one that does not include other “legitimate 
factors” in the policy process (these factors are only included in a subsequent model known as the decisionist model) 
(Millstone, van Zwanenberg, Marris, Levidow, & Torgersen, 2004). However, the technocratic perspective on 
policy-making that is presented in the modern model is one in which: “to develop a policy is a matter of becoming 
informed by science and then, in a second step, sorting out values and preferences in order to formulate the correct 
and rational policy.” (Funtowicz & Strand, 2007, p. 5) 
14
 Funtowicz and Strand (2007) also argue that the central idea of the modern model is that of mutual legitimation: 
where the decisions of the modern state are justified and legitimized by the use of the privileged status of scientific 
rationality. And, at the same time, the institutions of modern science are continuously acclaimed and supported by 
the modern state - to the extent that they have achieved an influential and dominant position as official knowledge 
producers.  These scholars conclude that: “The modern model has played a crucial part in the legitimation and 
consolidation of science, governance and political institutions in modern societies. It has also worked at a deeper 
cultural level in the modern state, securing the belief in the Enlightenment, progress and the superiority of the secular, 
Western scientific-economic rationality expressed quantitatively.” (Funtowicz & Strand, 2007, p. 5). 
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been developed as an attempt to answer respectively to the limitations of the modern model: 
inconclusive information, possible conflicts of interests in scientific advice (abuse of science), 
diverging scientific advice (there is indeterminacy, multiple framing) and all of the above. 
 
2.3.2 The precautionary model 
The main idea of the precautionary model is that in case of scientific “imperfection”, policy-
decisions can be complemented with precaution. This model can be seen as a reaction to the 
uncertain and inconclusive scientific evidence that more and more often seem to characterize the 
science-policy interface of many complex risk issues. In many such cases, a call for more 
research does not ultimately resolve uncertainty. All on the contrary, uncertainties can increase 
over time due to unforeseen complexities of the systems studied (van der Sluijs, 2005). The basic 
normative spirit of precaution is that “where there are threats to human health or environment, 
scientific uncertainty is not a reason for inaction” (Stirling, 2013, p. 1).  
 
In the policy context, we are however more familiar with two more pragmatic and influential 
accounts of precaution. Namely that of the Rio Declaration and that of the EU communication on 
the precautionary principle: “Lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (UN, 1992, p. 1). On 
the same line, the EU legal version of the precautionary principle demands, among other things: 
proportionality between the measures taken and the chosen level of protection and the 
examination of the benefits and costs of action or lack of action
15
 (EC, 2000). What is common to 
these two versions is their strong emphasis on cost-effectiveness and on the proportionality 
between costs and benefits. This has led some critics to imply that these versions of the 
precautionary principle are not more than an extended cost-benefit analysis. For Funtowicz and 
Strand (2007), for example, these versions are based on the idea that one can ultimately calculate 
the truth and the good. This is due to the fact that precaution is framed and expressed in terms of 
certain quantitative science and the economic rationality of objective cost-benefit analysis.  
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 For full details please consult the EU communication on the precautionary principle at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52000DC0001 
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All things included, the precautionary model still makes a decisive difference when compared to 
a technocratic position. However, the model meets its limits when confronted with unquantifiable 
uncertainty of the type ‘Can we be precautious and ban a well-studied, problematic chemical 
when we know it is going to be substituted by much less studied substances that might turn out to 
be as risky?’, since in these cases it is clear that we cannot weight known costs (of prohibition) 
against unknown benefits. 
 
2.3.3 The demarcation model  
The main idea of the demarcation model is that of a clear separation between facts (the domain of 
science) and values (the domain of politics).  
This model can be seen as an attempt to protect science from political interference and thus from 
the possibility of abuse of science (Funtowicz & Strand, 2007). It can be argued that this model 
has its origins in the aftermath of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis (or mad 
cow disease crisis) in the late 1990s. As a result to this crisis, the level of public trust in both food 
safety and food safety institutions in Europe was seriously compromised. The BSE crisis revealed 
that powerful economic and political interests had been advanced at the expense of consumer 
protection and that scientific committees had been operating under political pressure (Vos, 2000). 
After this case, many European food safety institutions were subjected to review and reform in 
order to restore public confidence in expert advice and in European risk management. The main 
feature of the reform was the strict separation of risk assessment and risk management activities 
and responsibilities
16
. 
 
Risk assessment is the scientific activity in charge of evaluating the existence of a risk and 
assessing the likelihood and magnitude of specific effects under specified conditions of exposure. 
This scientific process should be understood as independent of the broader socio-political context. 
In this way, the resulting scientific advice is assumed to be based on facts and to give objective 
and neutral evidence to policy-making (Millstone et al., 2004). 
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 This division of responsibilities was also codified in the “General Food Law” (European Parliament and Council 
Regulation 178/2002). http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/general_food_law/principles/index_en.htm 
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Risk management is an activity in charge of the discussion of values. Risk managers are in charge 
of evaluating and incorporating other legitimate factors into policy decisions – which might 
include social, economic, cultural, political, moral or ethical concerns. It is here that scientific 
advice and other concerns are brought together. In particular, risk managers need to judge the 
social acceptability of the risk in question (and its associated uncertainties) in exchange for some 
foreseen benefits (social or economic). These trade-offs are understood as value dependent and 
thus impossible to be decided only based on scientific considerations (Millstone et al., 2004).  
 
The risk assessment/risk management demarcation is seen as a means of “protecting science from 
the ‘political’ interference that would threaten its integrity”. At the same time, it is also meant “to 
ensure that political accountability rests with policy makers and is not shifted, inappropriately, to 
the scientists” (Funtowicz, 2006, p. 140). 17   
 
Yet, it seems often to be an inherent interlinkage between the scientific and the political aspects 
of any policy-decision dealing with complex risk (Renn et al., 2011). In these situations, 
scientific activities can barely be performed in complete isolation and in a political vacuum. In 
that sense, it can be said that complexity, uncertainty and indeterminacy challenge the possibility 
of value free science (Funtowicz & Strand, 2007).  
 
2.3.4 The framing model (link with administrative cultures) 
The main idea of the framing model is that in case of scientific indeterminacy – that is, when 
there are conflicting scientific advices – values need to be made explicit and problems need to be 
co-framed by all involved stakeholders (scientists in this case). This model can be seen as an 
attempt to solve policy situations where there are different expert groups reaching differing risk 
assessments conclusions concerning the same problem. That is, this model deals with the problem 
when science speaks not one, but many conflicting truths to policy (van der Sluijs, 2005). 
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 However, designing the right level of demarcation between science and policy is not easy. Too little separation can 
compromise the different responsibilities of those dealing with “understanding risk” and those dealing with “acting” 
on risks. On the other hand, too much separation can render scientific advice insensible to policy needs. 
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In this model, scientific deliberations are seen as framed within different and divergent sets of 
assumptions and questions. Such sets of assumptions and questions can be aligned both with the 
administrative cultures in institutional thinking or even with paradigms in the Kuhnian sense, and 
have a profound effect on the scope, content and conclusion of risk assessments. Judgmental 
values – implicit in the framing – are seen as necessary part without which it would be impossible 
to undertake a risk assessment.
18
 However, when a particular framing is not shared among 
involved stakeholders, the outcome of the risk assessment can be seen as invalid or/and 
illegitimate. In order to solve this, it is necessary to call for debate and consensus among experts 
(and ideally also among all involved stakeholders).  
 
Among the variables that depend on the framing of the scientific problem, we have: 
 the establishment of the overall policy goal or the intended end-use  
 the scope of the assessment: what is to be included and what is outside (vulnerable 
groups/general population, one source of exposure/several sources of exposure)  
 the selection of what is deemed and what is not deemed as an ‘adverse effect’ 
 the selection of who is best suited for evaluating the evidence 
 the selection of what counts as relevant evidence 
 the selection of methodology to evaluate and interpret the evidence  
 the way to deal with uncertainties during the assessment 
 
The main limitation of the framing model is that it assumes that the systems studied are not 
complex. The ideal that consensual and robust science will be able to speak again with one truth 
to policy is challenged by empirical research on complex risk issues. This research has shown 
that in the absence of conclusive scientific basis to favor a particular framing over another there 
will always be several legitimate scientific descriptions of the same problem (van der Sluijs, 
2005).  
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 Even the influential Codex Alimentarius’ Committee on General Principles has explicitly articulated the 
importance of such framing in what they refer to as “risk assessment policy”. Codex acknowledges that framing 
assumptions play a decisive role in setting the agendas of scientific deliberations and in explaining why risk 
assessment conclusions can differ. In order to deal with this, they also encourage the establishment of a consensual 
framing (Millstone et al., 2004, p. 28). 
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2.3.5 The model of extended participation 
The main idea of the model of extended participation is that working deliberatively in order to 
cope with uncertainty and complexity. This model can be seen as an alternative model which was 
developed as a response to the limitations of the other models when facing scientific uncertainty 
and complexity in policy-issues. It is based on the concepts and the theory of post-normal science.    
Post-normal science situations can be defined as those where “facts are uncertain, values are in 
dispute, stakes are high, and decisions are urgent” (Ravetz, 2005, p. 349). Under these 
circumstances, scientific truth is not achievable due to the inherent uncertainty, complexity and 
indeterminacy of the problems.
19
 Post-normal science scholars propose that, in these cases, 
scientific certainty has to be replaced by scientific quality for policy: “to be sure, good scientific 
work has a product, which should be intended by its makers to correspond to Nature as closely as 
possible, and also to be public knowledge. But the working judgements of the product are of its 
quality, and not of its logical truth” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990, p. 30).  
 
In order to assure scientific quality, the model advocates for participatory approaches where open 
public dialogue can take place. Quantitative scientific evidence should not be the sole provider of 
relevant knowledge in complex, uncertain policy decisions. Instead, all involved stakeholders – 
scientists included – should engage in a deliberative process to evaluate the strength and the 
relevance for policy of a given body of scientific evidence. In this way, the “extended peer 
community” – which includes a plurality of legitimate perspectives and forms of knowing – can 
contribute to a democratic decision-making process. The goal of which will be to answer, in a 
socially robust manner, what the best solution to a given problem is, and which ideally will 
complement the technical (scientific) answer to the same question (Funtowicz, 2006). 
Today the post-normal paradigm is still in an early stage. However, some challenges might be 
anticipated. Say, if scientific uncertainty becomes so central that we actually forget or undermine 
how much we already know about the problem at hand (Udovyk, 2014). Who is to be the judge 
of what is a legitimate form of knowing, and what rationale do we have for saying that some 
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 The name post-normal science is meant to differentiate this kind of science from “normal” science. The latter can 
be described as science that aims at achieving ultimate truth. 
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choice is better than the other. There is a danger both of falling into relativism when action is 
called for, and of the so called “tyranny of the majority” against rightful expertise. 
 
2.3.6 Implications for our case study 
Risk assessment of endocrine disrupting chemicals, BPA included, involves uncertainties of 
many sorts, not all of which can be adequately be accounted for.  We cannot, on ethical grounds, 
perform experiments to test the toxicity of these chemicals in developing fetuses in statistically 
significant numbers to have a clear verdict on their safety. Neither can we assess the risk of every 
conceivable combination of chemical cocktails. In contrast to the situation in the laboratory, in 
real life chemical exposures, there are a multitude of factors that influence the health and 
environmental outcomes – most of which are beyond control and even identification. 
These problems are further complicated by: administrative cultures having competing 
perspectives concerning the adequate regulatory course of action, the value-laden aspects of risk 
assessment, the presence of enduring uncertainties and indeterminacies, the politicization of risk, 
the prevalence of scientific controversies and strong economic interests.  
I will use the introduced ideal models to analyze how the Danish and the Norwegian authorities 
have, in particular, dealt with questions of scientific uncertainty concerning BPA.  
As described in this last section, each model comes with their particular underlying assumptions, 
strengths and limitations, and no single model can be said to offer a universal solution to the 
challenges ahead. But I hope that by making evident their limitations, some of the technical 
questions concerning BPA’s safety can be opened for public debate and contribute to the ongoing 
discussion on the future regulation of endocrine disruptors in Europe.  
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3. Methods 
3.1 The choice of method and epistemological reflections 
A qualitative method 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the way in which two seemingly similar countries, with 
similar administrative structures and with access to the same scientific information end up with 
two different policy processes and consequently two different policy outcomes concerning the 
same chemical. For this purpose, I have used a qualitative research strategy. This refers to 
research that is conducted with the aim of understanding and describing social phenomenon (in 
my case, policy-making) in depth, and from a closer perspective (as opposed to quantitative 
research which aims at measuring specific aspects of social phenomenon in order to test causal 
hypothesis or draw general tendencies) (Bryman, 2008). The rationale behind choosing a 
qualitative approach is due to the nature of the case I study. Precisely because I aim at finding 
differences of study objects that are apparently alike, it is necessary to analyze the important 
documents, look at language and meaning and use interviews as a source of entering deeper in to 
the contexts of understanding  in Norway and Denmark.    
As my paper is based on a qualitative method, it means, in its most general form, that I have 
looked for concepts, words and meanings that were related to my research questions. For my 
third research question on scientific uncertainty, it was more given what I was looking for, and I 
was gathering information on how different actors used and dealt with scientific uncertainty. At 
some points such uncertainty had to be unmasked through a deeper analysis – and a thorough 
scientific understanding of the problems has been necessary, both for my investigations and to 
present to the reader. For the two first research questions, on the framing and the legislative 
processes on BPA it was a more formative process, both to define the problem precisely and to 
know what to look for. Through reading on the subject as a formative process I eventually saw 
some explanatory models that fitted best with the data. That is to say, I looked for models that 
could best explain the state of affairs in the contexts of BPA that I was looking at. These are the 
ones mentioned in the theory-part. 
Along with the theoretical approach, I have also looked at language itself as an approach to the 
texts that I have studied. I think that it would be possible to analyze parts of my problem 
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formulation – in particular how the problem of BPA is framed – through the concept of discourse. 
However, both the scope of the thesis, and the fact that Norwegian is not my mother tongue (and 
even less so Danish), has impeded such an attempt. I believe that it is also difficult to remain 
consequent to such an approach, if one is to use it as reductive to the omnipresent concept of 
power, as it is introduced by Foucault. While both concepts of power and language are indeed 
relevant to my case study, the particular constellation between them is not as interlinked as in a 
discourse analysis. A fundamental guideline, however, that is also central to discourse analysis, is 
that language has a pivotal role in the constitution and ordering of how we think about reality. 
For example, it does matter whether you call something either “miljøgift” (hazardous chemical) 
or “kjemikalie” (chemical), and it does matter whether a substance is “hormon-forstyrrende” 
(endocrine disruptor) or “hormon-hermende” (hormone active substance). An important part of 
my methodological approach is then to look at how language is used, and which 
conceptualizations set the agenda. 
Ontological and epistemological considerations 
I take no pride in declaring oaths to particular ontological or epistemological positions, however I 
will briefly address the issue here, in relevance to uncertainty in science. One could say, along the 
lines of Kant, that the thing itself we cannot know. We do not have certain knowledge of what the 
substance that we call bisphenol A is. We know it by detections on animals, human beings and 
nature, which allows us to bestow certain its characteristics upon it. We know it by how these 
characteristics are displayed in the laboratory, and we know it by how we talk about it. Our 
knowledge of BPA is delimited to our specific interest as human beings. BPA is interesting for us 
to the extent that it is affecting our lives and particular interests. You may call this an 
instrumentalist view (Okasha, 2002). 
We cannot directly observe BPA, we can merely observe detections of it. We are far from 
knowing the full extent of its interactions with nature and living organisms. Perhaps all the 
uncertainties that give shape to the case of BPA say something about the scientific enterprise 
itself. I will argue that scientific uncertainty is pivotal to operationalizing the debate on BPA.  
Uncertainty in science is something that we must acknowledge and take in account, both in how 
we interpret the world, and when we make decisions on how to deal with potentially harmful 
substances. In such an “instrumentalist” view, our interest in science should be about saving lives 
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and preventing diseases. Our concern with science should be to reveal the ways in which it is 
interpreted – whether it is to serve a particular interest or in the lens of certain sociological or 
ideological structures.       
3.2 Research design 
Why a case study? 
There are several ways of conducting research in the social sciences. I decided to use a so-called 
case study research design. A case study approach can be used when the aim is to explore in 
detail the particularities and complexities of a particular case, and possibly to find some 
explanations that could be relevant for the study of other similar cases (Bryman, 2008). It helps to 
narrow down a field of study while at the same time, through its detailed and intensive empirical 
examination, allows for an in-depth understanding of the context of the particular case and how 
different factors interact. (Baxter & Jack, 2008) 
“The case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics 
of real-life events”(Yin, 2009, p. 4). I have used the case study research design because my aim 
was to focus on a very specific real-life case, namely the processes surrounding the regulation of 
BPA and how they were played out. One could say that the regulation of BPA is the case, and the 
Norwegian and Danish situation specify the context for the case. Only by looking at the debates 
and the documents that formed part in each debate, could I compare the two cases of Denmark 
and Norway, and answer the question on how the problem of BPA has been framed and 
addressed. And through having each specific case as delimitation, it was possible case narrow 
down the scope of scientific uncertainty – by looking more at how it was dealt with in the 
regulation processes in each case. Such a research design also gave me flexibility to explore my 
research questions freely and be open for new or unexpected results.  
In the literature on case studies it has been noted that there can be different types of cases, such as 
a critical, unique, exemplifying or revelatory (Bryman, 2008, pp. 55-56). While I think that the 
case of the regulation of BPA is not a clear-cut typical case, it contains some elements of such 
types. A critical case is defined as a theory placed in a certain circumstance to see whether or not 
it will hold. The interesting dimension of such a typological approach must be to see why the 
theory holds or not. While I did not have a well-developed theory beforehand, other than a sense 
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that the regulation of BPA was problematic and perhaps insufficient – it can be useful to see my 
approach as analyzing the conditions under which regulation has been successful or unsuccessful. 
It can also be said the phenomenon of the BPA case in unique, as it has been one of very few 
chemicals that have been so extensively studied and debated in the last decades. The phenomenon 
of the BPA-case creates a space in the interplay between scientific and political debates. In this 
sense it has perhaps an intrinsic interest and opens a problematic field that needs to be addressed. 
At the same time it can be said to be examplifying, in that it – as science advances – addresses the 
increasingly common situation of having to make regulatory decision in the face of uncertainty. 
And it could serve to enlighten certain patterns of how such decisions are made. 
Why a comparative analysis? 
My paper is also a comparative analysis with the goal to investigate the differences in the 
regulation of BPA in Norway and in Denmark. A comparative analysis is broadly defined as “the 
research approach in which two or more cases are explicitly contrasted to each other with regards 
to a specific phenomenon or along a certain dimension, in order to explore parallels and 
differences among the cases.” (Azarian, 2011, p. 113) 
The motivation to conduct a comparative study was that there were two different policy outcomes 
in two countries that otherwise seems to have many things in common when it comes to chemical 
policy. They both follow the common European chemical legislation and are bounded by the 
rules of the internal market, they have a similar organization in their public administration with 
respect to chemical management, they are both countries known for strong environmental and 
chemical policies, they share a common understanding and collaboration in the chemical field 
through the work of the Nordic Council of Ministries, they share a common lifestyle and deal 
with similar public health problems, none of which have a national BPA-industry, to mention 
some. One big difference is of course their affiliations with the EU – Denmark being a member 
state, and Norway only as affiliated through the European Economic Area Agreement. However 
their mediations between the strong-armed EU-regulations and the prospects of a national 
regulation are much the same.      
Another motivation for comparing the two different policy outcomes was the opportunity to 
reveal the room in which to maneuver, so to say. What different alternatives are there when it 
comes to policy making, and is it possible to challenge the customary ways of dealing with 
27 
 
chemical risk? “[C]omparative analysis is worthwhile because, by taking into consideration 
social actions and events belonging to other contexts, it enables us to see better the implicit and 
often taken-for-granted basis of our own practices and phenomena.” (Azarian, 2011, p. 117) 
The policy process in each country is, however, distinctive. We might say that in Denmark the 
process and outcomes were much driven by a political context, whereas in Norway it took place 
in a technocratic context. Consequently, it is not a point by point analysis – as in Denmark I 
mainly follow the case in Parliament, and in Norway at the public administration level. However 
this is in itself one important finding in the comparison, and I have mainly tried to describe them, 
and understand what made two such different processes possible in the first place. One very 
important common point is of course that of scientific uncertainty. I have aimed to show how 
scientific uncertainty was dealt with in each process – also with the objective to point at possible 
shortcomings of the relevant authorities.   
Some of the limitations of conducting a comparative analysis are that there might be relevant 
variables that affect the final outcomes, which might have not been taken into consideration 
during the analysis – such as for example, cultural differences in the understanding of risk. 
Besides, there is also the issue of the “uniqueness in the process”. This idea is borrowed from the 
History field and refers to the difficulty of generalizing outcomes of historical processes (Azarian, 
2011). For my case study this means that: even if I would identify some possible factors that can 
explain the different policy-outcomes in Denmark and Norway (i.e. the different ways of dealing 
with uncertainty) – this will not necessarily mean that we, if those factors are in place again, can 
expect the same policy outcome. It is true that a particular policy-outcome is a unique event that 
depends on many different factors, such as the amount of evidence that is available, the degree of 
politization of the problem and the level of participation of influential stakeholders, among others. 
However we could expect some regularity in the policy process itself, that is, that regulatory 
decisions will take place in a predicted manner – in particular when decisions are taken at the 
public administration level.  
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3.3 Data collection 
Documents 
For this study I have used very diverse types of documents. I have used academic articles on 
different theoretical perspectives, such as risk theory, post-normal science and institutional theory. 
I have also used many natural science articles to understand the hallmarks of the explicit 
scientific debate on BPA. At the same time I also looked at more technical aspects such as 
scientific opinions and risk assessment reports. And in order to analyze the case in each country I 
have studied many policy documents – like white papers, parliamentary records, information 
published in the different websites of the public administration, as well as newspaper articles. For 
the study of the Norwegian case I also requested several documents from the electronic public 
records (Offentlig elektronisk postjournal) to reconstruct the policy debate between the agencies. 
I also participated in different seminars and conferences related to the topic in order to get a 
better understanding of what was a stake and who were the main actors.  
One limitation to fully access the quality of the data, has been language – as Norwegian and 
Danish are not my first languages. Another limitation is that the scientific field on BPA is at 
times highly technical.  
Given that a big part of the documents were on either Danish or Norwegian, I felt the necessity to 
check the same information from several sources to make sure that I had understood everything 
correctly. This was often done through the interviews (see the next section on semi-structured 
interviews). The same is true for the more technical part of the thesis: the science and the 
legislation. Most of that information was in English but given that ‘toxicology’ and ‘endocrine 
science’ represent very specialized academic areas, I felt the necessity to check if I had 
understood the concepts properly. The same was also the case when it comes to the legislation 
(for example, understanding the chemical legislation REACH).  
Semi-structured interviews 
The written material was complemented by information obtained through semi-structured 
interviews. I conducted a total of 10 semi-structured interviews, using the interview guide 
included in Appendix 1. I decided to conduct semi-structured interviews in order to cover the 
specific issues that I had identified as relevant, but particularly to be able to compare information. 
However, I also conducted several unstructured interviews beforehand in order to acquire a better 
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understanding of the topic and obtain the necessary information to develop my semi-structured 
questions. This guide contains a list of open-ended questions on the topics that I wanted to 
explore with my informants (Bryman, 2008). Yet the interviews were rather flexible, and were 
slightly modified from case to case in order to clarify particular doubts that I had, or to get more 
in-depth information about something in particular. I was also flexible with the follow-up 
questions when I received an unexpected answer, or when an interesting topic came up.     
Most importantly I used my interviews as a “triangulation” mechanism, that is, as a second 
method of data collection on the same information, in order to in order to increase the reliability 
of my findings (in particular due to language constraints and the high technicality of many of the 
documents). This is also why I have not made that much use of referring explicitly to each 
interviewee, as they have often contributed more to the background knowledge, than to specific 
points that stand alone. 
The informants were chosen due to their knowledge on the issue that I wanted to explore – such 
as to explain policy making in the food sector or the environmental sector, and also in order to 
hear the opinion of some of the main factors and actors intervening in the policy processes.  
Quality of the data 
During my interviews I sometimes encountered the problem that it was not always possible to get 
a hold of the most relevant person for the topic (some other times, it was not possible to get an 
interview at all, in particular at the ministerial and political level). Likewise, within one agency, 
different staff might have a very specialized expertise, and at times the person interviewed did 
not always have full control of what happened at the agency’s broader level, that is as an actor in 
an ongoing debate. Or the activities within the public administration are so diverse that the public 
servants are skeptic to give comments on other fields of activity within the same institution. But 
the main limitation of the interviews is that in general the informants were ‘careful’ when talking 
about BPA, given that it is still a controversial topic. Many informants asked if they could take 
the interviews together with a colleague, and many others were interested in the final usage 
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possible of literal citations. In order to make them feel more comfortable, I also offered them 
anonymity, and this is also a reason why they are not always referred to directly.
20
  
In order to more systematically evaluate the quality of the data in qualitative research, the 
concept of trustworthiness has been advanced (Bryman, 2008). It is composed of four criteria:  
a) Credibility, dealing with how credible your findings are: In this respect I would say that 
the fact that I tried to triangulate all my data ensures a certain credibility.  
b) Dependability, referring to the extent to which your findings can be relevant to another 
time period: Here I would say that my findings are specific to the time when I was 
studying them. Actually given the actuality of the topic and the many activities going on, 
many times I was confronted with changing information from one month to another. As 
scientific research was advancing (as well as EU-level policy processes), the perspectives 
of the different actors that I was studying were also being modified accordingly.  
c) Transferability, dealing with the question of whether your finding can be generalized: 
Here I would comment, as stated above, that BPA case cannot be really called a typical 
case and it cannot be assumed that the same policy-outcome would the same for a 
different endocrine disruptor. However, as I mentioned, I would expect that the policy 
processes themselves would be similar.   
d) Confirmability, dealing with how much the researcher’s analysis was influenced by 
theoretical inclinations or personal values: To this I must answer that it is very hard to 
study a controversy without taking a stand, in particular when using a theoretical 
approach. I would claim that already the selection of the theoretical lens that will be used 
has a normative dimension. I have used theories that are known to be critical to the 
current state of affairs when dealing with scientific uncertainty, and thereby, I am most 
likely influenced by those thoughts. However, I have tried as much as possible to remain 
objective and open in my approach to all arguments. I do believe that the current 
regulation on BPA is insufficient, but I have tried to account for the arguments and 
counterarguments for this as thoroughly as I can.  
                                                     
20
 Again, this is often the case with contributions to background knowledge. When specific ideas are formulated I 
refer to the interviews. 
31 
 
3.4 Data analysis  
Data analysis 
In order to analyze the data, I have used a so-called issue-centered analysis, so that I could 
compare the information about a particular ‘issue’ in all documents and interview transcripts.  In 
order to do that I selected an issue relevant to the research question that I was investigating (e.g. 
how to deal with uncertainty?) and compared the information given on that particular ‘issue’ in 
the documents. I used the same approach to compare the answers (on the same issue) given by 
the different informants during the interviews. The objective of such an approach is to gain an 
overview of the different perspectives on the issue and to find general tendencies (Thagaard, 
2009). To operationalize this approach, I used a color coding method. This involves establishing 
conceptual categories, assigning colors to them, and then going into the texts and transcripts to 
use those same colors to identify statements or ideas that are related to those concepts (Bryman, 
2008). In this way one can identify the specific data that is relevant for the research questions. 
However one has to be careful when removing the data from its context in order to analyze it.  
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4. Background 
The purpose of this background chapter is to set the stage for some of the major arguments that 
take places during the debate about the safety of BPA. As I will explain, the debate over the 
safety of BPA takes place in the context of a larger debate, namely that of the future regulation of 
endocrine disruptors  
4.1 Endocrine disruptors 
4.1.1 What are endocrine disruptors? 
Endocrine disruptors (EDs), also known as Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals (EDCs), refer to 
chemicals that are hormonally active. This means that they can interact with the endocrine 
(hormonal) system in one way or another (Beronius, 2013). 
The endocrine system consists of many interacting organs and tissues that talk to each other, and 
the rest of the body, using complex signaling pathways mediated by hormones.
21
 The body’s 
natural hormones can be seen as messengers that carry vital information across the body and 
between organs and tissues. There are over 50 different hormones in humans, among which 
estrogens (“female” hormones) and androgens (“male” hormones). The endocrine system is in 
charge of releasing and suppressing hormones, which serve as signals that control essential body 
functions, such as: cell differentiation and organ formation during fetal development, metabolic 
functions, brain and sexual development, reproduction, growth and many other.  These represent 
complex physiological processes that are not completely understood in all cases (Gore et al., 
2014; WHO/UNEP, 2013).  
EDs include a large variety of compounds. Some are naturally occurring (like phytoestrogens)
22
 
and a large majority is man-made (such as synthetic chemicals). They are present in many 
different chemical groups, such as persistent organic pollutants (POPs), metals, pesticides, food 
additives, cosmetics and personal care products, pharmaceuticals, chemicals in consumer 
products, building materials and by-products formed during industrial activities and combustion 
                                                     
21
 These are produced by: the pituitary gland, the pineal gland, the hypothalamus, the thyroid, the thymus, the adrenal 
cortex, the adrenal medulla, the gastrointestinal tract, the testes, the ovaries, the adipose tissue, the pancreas, the 
kidney, the heart and the skin.  
22
 Phytoestrogens are a naturally occurring group of chemicals found in plants that can act like the hormone estrogen, 
for example soy and alfalfa.  
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of waste. Exposures are widespread. Humans and wildlife are daily exposed to complex mixtures 
of EDs through food consumption, breathing in air, and through skin absorption.
23
 Developing 
organisms are additionally exposed to their mother’s chemical load via the placenta and when 
breastfeeding (WHO/UNEP, 2013).  
Among the different groups of EDs, persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have received particular 
regulatory attention. These chemicals are very persistent and can be transported by air and water 
currents to distant locations. Consequently, they can be broadly dispersed in the environment and 
many can also build up in the food chain to high levels in top predators, including humans.  
During the last decade, it has been increasingly recognized that exposures to less persistent and 
less bioaccumulative, but equally ubiquitous, EDs – such as phthalates and bisphenol A – are also 
a matter of concern. In particular when exposures take place during sensitive periods 
(WHO/UNEP, 2013).
24
 
A 2013 study by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) estimated that there are about 800 known or suspected EDs in the consumer 
market. Yet, it was concluded that this number was likely to represent only “the tip of the 
iceberg”, given that most chemicals in current commercial use have never been tested for 
hormonal activity. Neither is there a commonly agreed upon definition nor scientific criteria to 
systematically identify them (WHO/UNEP, 2013). 
4.1.2 Why are EDs a human health concern? 
Several recent reports and scientific statements have summarized the growing evidence 
suggesting that exposure to EDs plays – and has played – a significant role in the increase of 
many hormone-related diseases and disorders in humans over the last few decades. The 
converging lines of evidence collectively indicate that many of the hormonally-active chemicals 
that humans are continuously exposed to, contribute in disease causation, progression and 
susceptibility.
25
 For example, studies conducted in laboratory animals show that low-level 
                                                     
23
 Just in food, for example, EDs can be found as natural constituents, pesticides and pharmaceutical residues, 
environmental pollutants, food additives and chemicals migrating from food packaging. In the air, they can be 
present as dust, particles and gases. 
24
 Phthalates are plasticizers that are added to plastics to make them more flexible and durable. Bisphenol A is a 
monomer used in the manufacture of polycarbonate plastic and epoxy resins. 
25
 It is important to note that the strength of evidence between ED-exposure and the different health effects is not 
equally strong in all cases. Even if there is strong evidence for causation for some conditions and exposures, it is a 
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exposures to certain EDs during development can lead to permanent changes in the endocrine 
system. This toxicological data is supplemented by varying levels of epidemiological evidence 
that show similar associations between ED-exposures and a variety of endocrine-related diseases 
in humans. At the same time, the rapid and significant increase in those diseases in human 
populations, further supports that environmental factors are contributing in disease etiology – 
since such changes cannot be solely explained by genetic factors (Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., 
2009; Gore et al., 2015; WHO/UNEP, 2013). 
Among the endocrine-related diseases, it has been reported an increased incidence of hormone-
sensitive cancers (e.g. breast, testicular, prostate, thyroid), neurobehavioral disorders associated 
with thyroid disruption in children, alarming trends in metabolic disorders like obesity and type 2 
diabetes, suppression of the immune system, genital malformations in baby boys, earlier onset of 
puberty in young girls, fertility problems linked to low semen quality and many more 
(WHO/UNEP, 2013).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
challenge to prove causality. On the one hand there is the complexity of the disease etiology across the lifespan – the 
fact that diseases are multifactorial with several intervening genetic and environmental factors. On the other hand, 
there is the complexity of the exposures: low-dose, chronic, in mixtures and the fact that exposures usually take place 
many years before the development of the disease (WHO/UNEP, 2013). For these reasons, it is important to use 
different lines of evidence simultaneously, such as: biological plausibility, observations in wildlife, effects observed 
in cell cultures and laboratory animals, human epidemiological studies and information coming from occupational 
exposures or chemical accidents (Olsson, 2014). For a detailed discussion on the strength of the evidence, see the 
State of the science of endocrine disrupting chemicals (WHO/UNEP, 2013), State of the art assessment of endocrine 
disruptors ((Kortenkamp et al., 2012), Endocrine society two position statements (Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., 2009; 
Gore et al., 2014). 
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Figure 1: Incidence of testicular cancer in the Nordic Countries26. A rise in the incidence of testicular cancer is the most evident 
of the male reproductive disorders. The incidence of testicular cancer has increased twofold to fourfold over the past 50 years in 
Denmark. 
 
Moreover, there is a growing concern that exposure to EDs during sensitive periods, such as early 
childhood, plays a bigger role in the development of endocrine disease than previously 
anticipated. At the same time, it is commonly young children that have the highest levels of 
exposure to these chemicals due to their hand-to-mouth activity and higher metabolic rate (Gore 
et al., 2014). 
4.1.3 Call for regulatory action 
The mounting concern about the negative effects of EDs on human health and the environment, 
have motivated diverse calls for regulatory action. On the scientific side, different professional 
groups – including the Endocrine Society (references), pediatric organizations (Skakkebaek et al., 
2011) and the influential update of the WHO/ UNEP (2013) report on Eds – conclude that EDs 
are a “threat that needs to be solved”. On the political side, several NGOs, civil society 
organizations, governments and even the EU Parliament, are calling to reduce exposures to EDs.   
Recent publications have also stressed the opportunity to improve public health and obtain 
economic benefits by adopting preventive measures. A study released by the Endocrine Society 
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 The graph was made using the software of the Nordic Cancer Registries: Engholm G, Ferlay J, Christensen N, 
Kejs AMT, Johannesen TB, Khan S, Leinonen M, Milter MC, Ólafsdóttir E, Petersen T, Stenz F, Storm HH. 
NORDCAN: Cancer Incidence, Mortality, Prevalence and Survival in the Nordic Countries, Version 7.1 
(09.07.2015). Association of the Nordic Cancer Registries. Danish Cancer Society. Available from 
http://www.ancr.nu, accessed on 14/07/2015 
36 
 
in 2015, predicted that exposure to EDs was costing the EU €157 billion per year in health care 
expenses and lost earning potential (Trasande et al., 2015). While estimations from the Nordic 
Council of Ministers concluded that the socio-economic costs related only to male reproductive 
problems linked to ED-exposures could range between €59 million to €1,184 million per year 
(Olsson, 2014).
27
  In both cases the estimations represented only a fraction of the potentially ED-
related diseases, which suggests that the real costs might indeed be much higher. 
4.2 Legislation of endocrine disruptors in Europe 
The European Union has been engaged in policy-related work on EDs since the late 1990s.
28
 
During the last decade, new chemical regulations have been proposed in Europe, where EDs are 
specifically identified as problematic compounds that should be subjected to strict authorization 
processes, or phased out (Stolzenberg et al., 2013). These new pieces of legislation, their 
economic consequences, together with a growing public concern and the rapidly advancing 
scientific understanding on endocrine disruption, are at the heart of the ongoing debate 
concerning the regulation of EDs in Europe.  
4.2.1 REACH chemical regulation 
In 2007, after intense negotiations and compromises between health and environmental concerns 
and business interests, the new European chemical legislation REACH (Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals) entered into force (Fisher, 2008). The intention 
behind this piece of legislation was to address the general dissatisfaction with the severe lack of 
safety information of the vast majority of chemicals in the European market,
29
 and also to reverse 
the historical burden of proof in the regulation of chemicals. Namely, that chemical 
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 The costs included: cost of treatment, absence to work, loss of life years and life quality. They were estimated on 
the assumption that ED-exposures constituted either 2%, 20% or 40% of the total cost, corresponding to €59 million, 
€592 million and €1,184 million per year respectively (Olsson, 2014) 
28
 The EU strategy on EDs dates back to 1999. It focuses on research, international cooperation, public information 
and political action. The strategy started with the establishment of a list of EDs (documented and suspected), 
development of test methods and criteria for the identification of substances as EDs, with the objective to – in the 
long run – cover EDs in the different pieces of chemical legislation in the EU, such as the plant protection products 
regulation, the biocidal products regulation and REACH (EC, 2015a). 
29
 Before REACH, all so-called “existing” chemicals (those which had been introduced into the market before 1981) 
could be used freely unless an authority had shown a risk and proposed specific regulations. While “new” chemicals 
(those introduced in the market after 1981) required safety testing. The “existing”/”new” chemical distinction was 
problematic because it worked as an incentive to keep using old unregulated chemicals and at the same time, 
maintained the problem concerning the lack of information – with regard to health and the environment – for almost 
all “existing” chemicals (which represented more than 90% by volume of all chemicals in the market) (Massey, 2005)  
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manufacturers and importers were made responsible, for the first time, to prove that chemicals 
were safe before placing them in the market (Massey, 2005).
30
 
In REACH, endocrine disruptors are considered of similar regulatory concern as substances of 
very high concern (SVHC) according to REACH article 57(f).
31
 This implies that EDs might 
need to require a special authorization to be used in consumer products in Europe. However, at 
present, the standard information requirements of REACH are not sufficient to detect substances 
with ED-properties, meaning that the information required for applying article 57(f) is usually not 
available. And, for those substances where ED-properties are documented, no specific regulatory 
criteria are provided for the legal regulation of EDs, according to article 57(f) (as opposed to the 
other SVHC for which there are detailed criteria) (Stolzenberg et al., 2013). 
In order to systematically cover EDs through REACH, it would be necessary to 1) have 
regulatory criteria for the identification of EDs as substances of very high concern, 2) improve 
the standard information requirements (in particular covering sensitive ED-effects), 3) clarify 
whether or not safe regulatory thresholds can be determined for EDs (Olsson, 2014; Stolzenberg 
et al., 2013) .
32
  
4.2.2 Plant Protection Products Regulation (PPPR) and Biocidal Products Regulation 
(BPR) 
The new pesticide regulation from 2009 and the new biocide regulation from 2012, introduced 
ED-properties as a hazard-based “cut-off criterion” for the approval of active substances as 
pesticides and biocides In practice this means that pesticides and biocides with ED-properties 
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 Before REACH, the authorities had the responsibility to prove that chemicals were dangerous before proposing 
regulation.  
31
 REACH is composed of three stages. In the registration phase, producers and importers of chemicals must provide 
safety information on chemicals produced at or above one tonne per year. During the evaluation phase, member 
states assess the information provided in the registration phase and can request additional information if needed. 
Substances of very high concern (SVHC substances) can be included in the so-called candidate list according to 
article 57 (a-e). This includes substances that are classified as CMR (carcinogenic (a), mutagenic (b) and toxic to 
reproduction(c)), PBT (persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (d)), vPvB (very persistent and very bioaccumulative 
(e)) and substances which give rise to an equivalent level of concern such as those having endocrine disrupting 
properties (f). SVHC substances included in the candidate list can then be recommended to be subject to the 
authorization process, meaning that they will need to be granted special permission to be used. Alternatively, SVHC 
substances and other problematic chemicals can also be regulated via restrictions if an unacceptable risk is 
documented (Stolzenberg et al., 2013).  
32
 The issue of whether it is possible to determine a safe level of exposure to EDs or not (commonly referred to as a 
threshold) is very relevant for the authorization procedure. For substances without a threshold, authorization will be 
granted only when the socioeconomic benefits outweigh the risks (or if there are no suitable alternatives). For 
substances with a threshold, authorization will be granted if exposures are below regulatory toxic thresholds. 
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would no longer be authorized in the EU market unless it is proven that exposure is negligible. 
This hazard-based approach represents a big change from the traditional risk-based regulation of 
EDs. Yet, the final implementation of these two pieces of legislation also requires the 
establishment of regulatory criteria for the identification of EDs (Stolzenberg et al., 2013).   
4.2.3 Scientific criteria for the identification of endocrine disruptors 
From 2009 to 2013, there was an intense scientific and regulatory activity at EU level, to develop 
an approach and establish scientific criteria – based on the most recent scientific knowledge – for 
the regulation of EDs, as demanded by the PPPR, BPR and REACH. With a deadline set by the 
end of 2013, the EU Commission put that responsibility on the Directorate-General for the 
Environment (DG Environment). Several scientific reports were commanded to this end, among 
which the state-of-the-art assessment by Kortenkamp et al. (2012), EFSA’s opinion on ED (2013) 
and the EC’s Joint Research Centre report (2013).  At the same time, EDs were also high on the 
political agenda. In 2013, the EU Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of public 
health from EDs, and the same year, the 7th Environmental Action Programme also called for 
minimizing exposures to EDs (Horel, 2015).
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Yet the development of the scientific criteria turned out to be more complicated than previously 
anticipated. For example, different definitions of what an ED is, rely on whether or not there is a 
clear causal link between a chemical’s endocrine activity and the onset of an adverse health effect.   
In their 2013 opinion, EFSA adopted the WHO/IPCS definition from 2002, namely that an ED is 
“an exogenous substance or mixture that alters function(s) of the endocrine system and 
consequently causes adverse health effects in an intact organism, or its progeny, or (sub) 
populations” (WHO/IPCS, 2002, p. 1). Adhering to this definition implies two things: First, that 
it is possible to make a clear distinction between adverse effects of endocrine disruption and 
normal physiological modulations of the endocrine system.  Second, that adverse health effects 
are caused by a chemical’s endocrinal activity. However, it can be said that for the time being 
there is no enough knowledge to universally define what constitutes an adverse endocrine effect. 
Nor there are adequate standardized test methods to identify such possible effects. Meaning that 
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 The environmental action programs represent a general policy framework for the EU’s environment policy. 
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adversity, and thus the identification of EDs, would have to rely on weight-of-evidence 
approaches, relying on expert judgment and done on a case-by-case basis (Beronius, 2013). 
Other definitions, in particular the one proposed by the Endocrine Society in 2012, state that an 
EDC is “an exogenous (non-natural) chemical, or mixture of chemicals, that interferes with any 
aspect of hormone action” (Zoeller et al., 2012, p. 2) – implying that a chemical’s capacity to 
interact with the endocrine system in itself can be considered as endocrine disruption.  In this 
definition, a causal link is not required, implying that a significant amount of chemicals would 
potentially be identified as EDs. This would lead to a situation where risk managers would 
require additional guidelines to prioritize regulatory decisions (Beronius, 2013). Today 
WHO/IPCS definition is the most agreed upon, however there are still discrepancies on how to 
operationalize it for regulatory purposes. 
Despite these and other complexities, in the summer of 2013, DG Environment had a proposal 
ready for the definition, identification and categorization of EDs, based on the Kortenkamp’s 
report (2012) and EFSA’s opinion (2013).34 However, before its official release, DG 
environment’s draft proposal was leaked. This led to its ultimately rejection by the EU 
Commission - who under the pressure of the “informed” chemical industry, put in place less 
stringent options along with a plan to conduct an impact assessment with regard to the pesticide 
and biocide legislation.
35
 The 2013 deadline was not met, and the Commission embarked on the 
preparation of an impact assessment to evaluate a range of options for the regulation of EDs 
which in practice has meant a delay in the implementation of the regulations for at least four 
additional years (Horel, 2015).   
4.2.4 The impact assessment on endocrine disruptors 
Even if the delay was initially attributed to scientific disagreements and differences of opinion 
inside the Commission’s Directorate Generals, it was later acknowledged that industry lobbying 
                                                     
34
 Although DG Environment’s proposal was intended to be applied first to the PPP regulation, if implemented, it 
would have later also applied to the BPR and REACH. 
35
 Broadly speaking, an impact assessment refers to the evaluation of the potential economic, social and 
environmental consequences of a policy initiative. Among the critiques of such cost-benefit exercises is that they are 
biased in favor of economic aspects rather than on public health and environmental aspects. In the sense that it is 
easier to put numbers on the costs of immediate regulations than on the diverse range of benefits to society that 
extends much farther into the future than the costs. Furthermore, such lengthy assessments often delay regulation 
(Ackerman, 2008).  
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and an open letter written to Anne Glover (the Chief Scientific Adviser to the President of the 
European Commission) were decisive factors in the Commission’s final decision (EU-Monitoring, 
2014).  
The industry lobbying refers to a coordinated effort of major chemical, plastic and pesticides 
companies to express their worries among top EU officials. These companies insisted on the need 
to conduct an impact assessment, and highlighted that the proposed criteria would have 
significant impacts in economic and agricultural terms, and in relation to trade. A recent article 
by "The Guardian" has revealed that DG Environment’s criteria would have led to the banning of 
31 pesticides worth billions of euros (Neslen, 2015). At the same time, the negotiation of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US has also been 
a target for lobbying against ED regulation. The main goal of the TTIP is to promote free trade by 
removing barriers to commerce, including regulatory barriers. In this respect, a stringent 
European ED-regulation – based on hazard criteria – would represent a major technical barrier to 
trade between the European and the American block. Industry and trade lobby groups on both 
sides of the Atlantic, together with their political allies, have been aiming at achieving some sort 
of regulatory harmonization where ED regulation is solely risk-based and dependent on 
thresholds (Horel, 2015; Nielsen, 2015).
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The letter directed to Anne Glover also echoed and reinforced the need for an impact assessment. 
This letter, signed by 71 toxicologists, urged the Commission to reconsider its regulatory 
approach to EDs. According to the authors there were neither scientific grounds nor broad 
support in the field to assume that there were no safe thresholds for EDs, as suggested by the 
hazard-based cut-off criteria for the regulation of pesticides and biocides. This was followed by 
the publication of an editorial in 14 different toxicology journals under the title: ‘Scientifically 
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 Yet the public concerns related to the TTIP cut deeper. Besides the generalized critique that the negotiations have 
suffered from a lack of transparency and democratic accountability, where only a very few members of the EU 
Parliament and EU Member States had access to the documents being negotiated by the EU and US trade officials 
and their industry advisors. Several politicians, scholars and civil organizations are also concerned about the so-
called investor-state dispute resolution (ISDR), which would allow any US-based company to sue governments for 
compensation over rules that affect their expected profits. ISDR would threaten both EU-wide regulatory measures 
and any more protective measures approved by member states – such as the Danish national ban on bisphenol A. At 
the same time, it is also feared that in order to minimize the regulatory differences between the two blocks, the EU 
chemical regulatory framework would have to be downgraded towards regulations and standards that are less 
protective for health and the environment (as the ones prescribed by the weak American Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA) from 1976). Consequently, several NGOs have been campaigning at EU level to demand the exclusion 
of the chemical sector from the TTIP negotiations (CHEMTrust, 2015; Hansen-Kuhn & Suppan, 2013; Horel, 2015).  
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Unfounded Precaution Drives European Commission’s Recommendations on EDC Regulation, 
While Defying Common Sense, Well-Established Science and Risk Assessment Principles’ (the 
editorial was written by 18 of the undersigned toxicologists)(Dietrich et al., 2013). Yet these 
claims did not go unanswered. Shortly after, several rebuttals were published, where over 100 
endocrine scientists aimed to pick apart the statements put forward by the editorial, and 
concluded that such publications “does the European Commission, science, including the field of 
toxicology, and most importantly, public health, a profound disservice”(Gore et al., 2013, p. 
3959). In order to address the ongoing discrepancies, Anne Glover convened a meeting with 
representatives from both sides – toxicologists and endocrine scientists. 
The outcome was a surprising consensus on issues that the editorial had originally critiqued; in 
particular the point that thresholds might not always exist (EC, 2013).
37
   
Even when the main doubts concerning the scientific work performed by DG Environment were 
brought to an end, the Commission supported the continuation of the impact assessment, based 
on: the complexity of the issue, the diverging views among scientists and stakeholders and the 
significant potential economic impacts for the chemical industry and international trade.  
As of today, the Commission has proposed four options to define possible criteria and three 
approaches to regulatory decision making.
38
 These have been subjected to a public consultation 
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 In the time that followed, an investigation conducted by Environmental Health News (which was awarded a laurel 
from Columbia Journalism Review) revealed that at least 40 of the 71 signees (including 17 of the 18 authors of the 
editorial) had failed to disclose ties to the regulated industries including funding, patenting, consultancy and advisory 
services. Among them, there were three tobacco industry veterans and three members of EFSA’s working group on 
EDs (Horel & Bienkowski, 2013) – a group which had also been heavily criticized due to conflict of interests 
(Benkimoun & Foucart, 2012).  It has been suggested that the actions of this group of toxicologists has many 
similarities with the tactics used by the tobacco industry in the 1950s, in their fight against the science linking 
cigarettes to cancer. This strategy – consisting of discrediting scientific consensus, spreading confusion and 
ultimately promoting doubts – has been well documented in the book of historians Oreskes and Conway, Merchants 
of Doubt (2010). Over the last years, additional journalistic pieces have reported that such a tactic is gaining 
popularity in the field of chemical regulation (Brown & Grossman, 2015). Given that science is at the heart of many 
political decisions, sowing scientific doubt can be seen as an effective way of delaying or diluting regulation, by 
making it harder for policy makers to make decisions.   
38
 Four different options to define possible criteria to identify EDs: Option 1 (baseline): keep using the interim 
criteria in the PPPR and BPR (no policy change). Option 2: use the WHO/IPCS definition to identify ED (proving 
adversity and endocrine disrupting mode of action and causality). This is similar to EFSA’s proposal (2013). Option 
3: use the WHO/IPCS definition to identify ED and establish additional categories based on the different strength of 
evidence (three categories: ED, suspected ED and endocrine active substance). This is similar to Denmark’s proposal 
(ref) and supported by endocrine scientists. Option 4: use the WHO/IPCS definition to identify ED and include 
potency (the amount of substance necessary to produce a certain effect). Similar to the joint German/British proposal 
(ref) and supported by the industry.  
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that confirmed the wide variety of stakeholders and the very diverging views on the topic. At 
present, two studies are being conducted where 700 potential EDs are being assessed using the 
four different options for criteria and their corresponding socio-economic impact are being 
calculated(EC, 2015b) .  
Yet, not all actors are equally patient with such delays and stagnation in the regulation. In 2014 
Sweden (followed by Denmark, France and the Netherlands) decided to sue the European 
Commission for delaying the establishment of criteria to identify EDs, and thus hampering the 
implementation of several pieces of legislation in the EU. By January 2015, both the EU Council 
of Ministers and the European Parliament, in an unprecedented move, decided to back up Sweden 
in taking the Commission to the European Court of Justice for failure to act, and fulfil its legal 
obligations regarding EDs (HEAL, 2015; NexReg, 2015).  
What was originally meant to be exclusively science-based criteria for EDs, has become a mix of 
scientific and socio-economic considerations – where science, values and politics are in tension. 
This is particularly accentuated by the high stakes of the debate, in terms of public health 
consequences, economic implications, far-reaching ramifications for trade and not least, given 
that the EU will be the first authority in the world to regulate EDs, setting a precedent for what is 
seen as appropriate scientific evidence and regulatory practice. Yet, as of today, it is still not clear 
how evidence, values and political judgments will be combined to produce the awaited final 
regulatory decision.     
4.3 The scientific debate on endocrine disruptors 
Over the last decade, many publications reflect an intense scientific debate concerning the issue 
of ED. The debate has mainly taken the form of two very distinct perspectives, namely that of 
toxicologists and endocrine scientists.
39
 In what follows the most relevant points of each 
perspective will be presented.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
Three approaches to regulatory decision making: Option A (baseline): no policy change (meaning hazard-based 
decision making). Mainly supported by NGOs, civil society organizations and citizens. Option B: introduce risk 
assessment considerations. Mainly supported by the industry. Option C: introduce socio-economic (risk benefit) 
considerations (EC, 2015b). 
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 Endocrine scientists belong to several disciplines, first and foremost (experimental) endocrinology, but also 
reproductive and developmental toxicology, biology, epidemiology, environmental epigenetics and many more. I 
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4.3.1 Toxicology 
According to environmental historian Linda Nash, the consolidation of modern toxicology as a 
scientific discipline took place in the late 1950s when toxicologists became responsible for 
assessing the risk posed by synthetic chemicals present in consumer products, food chains and the 
environment (Nash, 2008).
40
  
However, the central tenet in toxicology dates back to the sixteenth century scientist Paracelsus’ 
statement “All things are poison and nothing is without poison, only the dose permits something 
not to be poisonous”(Paracelsus, 1539). This is known as toxicology’s "founding sentence" and 
implies two main assumptions concerning the relationship between the dose and the exposure. 
First, it is expected that the response (the physiological effect) of an organism to a chemical 
increases proportionally with the level of exposure (the dose) until a maximum response is 
reached (beyond which increasing chemical dose will not increase the effect), generating an S-
shaped monotonic dose-response (Lagarde et al., 2015). Second, it is assumed that there is a 
threshold dose for effect. This means that one can always identify a level of exposure (or 
threshold) below which a chemical is not expected to induce adverse effects (Myers, Zoeller, & 
vom Saal, 2009).
41
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
will refer to all of them as endocrine scientists given that they share the same understandings concerning how EDs 
act and their effects, and because they have expertise in hormone research.   
40
 According to Nash, toxicology has its roots in the set of techniques developed by industrial hygienists in the early 
20
th
 century addressing the problem of chemical exposures in the workplace. Industrial hygienists believed that 
bodies had the ability to self-regulate and achieve equilibrium again after exposure to low levels of pollutants. 
Drawing on this idea, they developed the concept of threshold limit values – referring to the explicit level of 
chemical exposure below which the organism (man or animal) had the ability to re-adjust without suffering any 
harmful biological effects. Such a concept was very welcomed in the industrial context since it offered a middle 
ground between the workers’ rising health concerns and the corporations’ interests (Nash, 2008).  When it became 
evident that synthetic chemicals could also migrate out of the occupational realm and into everyday life, toxicology 
became the applied science in charge of assessing chemical risk.  
41
 The exception to this is mutagenic (or genotoxic) carcinogens. For these chemicals it is assumed that there is no 
threshold for effect (represented by a linear dose-response curve at low doses). This is based on the theoretical 
understanding of their mode of action. That is, that exposure to one single molecule can induce genetic damage that 
can ultimately result in tumor formation and cancer (Beronius, 2013). 
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Figure 2: A monotonic dose-response curve with a sigmoidal shape (S-shape) indicating a threshold below which no adverse 
effects are expected and a health-based guidance value used for regulatory purposes. The dashed orange arrows represent the 
safety margin – that is, the uncertainty factors that are applied to the NOAEL/BMDL in order to calculate the TDI. Adapted from 
Beronius (2013) 
 
Determined by these particular assumptions, regulatory toxicology developed to become an 
experimental science where controlled animal-based experiments are used to predict the toxic 
effects of chemical exposure. Typically in a toxicological study, adult animals are exposed to 
high doses of a chemical to determine the no observed adverse effect level (NOAEL) - which is 
the concentration of a chemical at which no toxic effect is seen. A health-based guidance value 
(or safety reference dose) for a chemical is then established by adding a generous safety margin 
to the NOAEL (Vogel, 2008). The safety margin can account for variability of effects among 
individuals, vulnerable populations, extrapolation of animal-based results to humans, and many 
more (Vandenberg et al., 2009). The toxicology model then suggests that chemical exposures 
below the safety reference dose are, in general, safe for humans. However, toxicologists do not 
engage in the empirical study of physiological effects below the NOAEL. Instead, the assessment 
of harm below the safety threshold (or NOAEL) exclusively relies on the assumptions made 
concerning the dose-response relationship (Vogel, 2008). 
Yet, it is important to highlight that the presence or absence of a threshold can never be 
experimentally proven. The reason is that all methods for measuring effects have a limit of 
detection below which effects cannot be observed (Hass, Christiansen, Axelstad, Dreisig 
Sørensen, & Boberg, 2013; Kortenkamp et al., 2012) – and no conclusion regarding the shape of 
the dose-response curve can be made below this detection limit. In order to produce dose-
response curves as accurate as possible, one would require an infinite number of doses and 
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infinitely precise measures (Hass et al., 2013). However, common toxicity studies often include 
only three dose groups or less (and a unexposed control group)(Beronius, 2013). This implies two 
things: First, that the NOAEL does not really represent the dose where there is an absence of 
effect, but rather, the dose at which it was not possible to observe a an adverse effect (when 
compared to the control group), which in turn relies on the statistical power of the study 
(Beronius, 2013).  Second, that the conclusions regarding the shape of the dose-response curve 
cannot be made only by experimental observations but heavily depend on the theoretical 
assumptions made and their biological plausibility (Hass et al., 2013) .  
Typically, toxicology studies examine specific adverse events such as changes in body weight, 
development of cancer and mortality. Consequently, the methods employed are mainly based on 
the detection of gross changes in morphology and development. Other more sensitive endpoints 
and subtle effects are usually not addressed – such as perturbations that change the predisposition 
to develop a disease, which require more sophisticated analytical tools (Myers, vom Saal, et al., 
2009; Vandenberg et al., 2009). 
The institutionalization of the regulatory risk assessment paradigm in the 1950s was both based 
on, and served to sustain, the scientific discipline of toxicology. Environmental historians (such 
as Nash (2008) and Vogel (2008, 2009) have claimed that this was the result of the simultaneous 
attempts of policymakers and industry representatives to legitimize chemical exposure – and the 
corresponding chemical risk – as the necessary trade-off for economic progress. As well as a 
reaction to the growing evidence that chemical pollution was indeed inevitable (Nash, 2008; 
Vogel, 2008, 2009).
42
 The introduction and acceptance of the toxicology principles and the 
institutionalization of risk assessment approaches normalized the problem of chemical safety – 
where the focus did not lie on questioning the hazard per se but in controlling the exposure. 
Assuming that one can always determine a safe level of exposure, the most relevant question 
becomes what that level is. This narrative of chemical safety is still very tangible, in particular in 
the field of food safety where the prevailing assumption is that safety can be achieved by meeting 
health-based guidance values – that is, by controlling the amount of exposure (Vogel, 2008, 
2009). 
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 DDT was the typical example of how chemicals were at the same time “necessary” and impossible to keep out of 
the food chain. 
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4.3.2 Risk assessment approach 
A risk assessment is a conceptual framework that deals with the structured review and evaluation 
of toxicological data in order to estimate possible health or environmental outcomes in relation to 
exposure to chemicals (Molander, 2015).
43
 Health risk assessments are commonly based on 
animal toxicity studies which provide the basis to identify potential adverse effects and dose-
response relationships. It usually consists of three main steps: a hazard assessment, an exposure 
assessment and the risk characterization (Beronius, 2013). 
The hazard assessment consists of two parts: 1) the hazard identification, where any potential 
adverse health effects caused by exposure to the substances in question are identified, and 2) the 
hazard characterization, where the chemical’s toxicity is evaluated. 44 The outcome of the hazard 
assessment is: 1) the identification of the critical effect (i.e. the most sensitive adverse effect 
relevant to human health), and 2) the characterization of its dose-response relationship with the 
aim of determining the no observed adverse effect level (NOAEL) (i.e. the highest 
experimentally determined dose considered not to have resulted in statistically or biological 
significant adverse effect in laboratory animals) (Beronius, 2013).
45
  
The NOAEL for the most sensitive adverse effect is then used to establish an acceptable health-
base guidance value which is considered safe for humans – such as the tolerable daily intake 
(TDI). The TDI represents the estimated quantity of a chemical that can be ingested over a 
lifetime without posing a significant risk to health (it is usually expressed in milligrams (mg) or 
micrograms (µg) of the chemical in question per kilogram (kg) of body weight, and per day in the 
case of repeated exposure) (Beronius, 2013).
46
 
To extrapolate the results coming from animal experiments to human conditions, uncertainty 
factors are applied to account for e.g. possible differences between and within animals and 
humans, uncertainties due to lack of data, conflicting results, differences between acute and 
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 Both health and environmental risk assessment follow the same steps, although with some differences in the 
practice of each step. However, the major difference regards their objectives - while human health risk assessment 
aims at protecting the most sensitive individual, environmental risk assessment aims at preventing harm at the 
population-level (in order to ensure the proper functioning of the ecosystem).  
44
 Including the possible effects on the body, the mechanisms by which it leads to those effects, how the chemical is 
absorbed, distributed, metabolized and finally eliminated from the body. 
45
 Or alternatively, the benchmark dose lower-confidence limit (BMDL) (i.e. the minimum dose of a substance that 
produces a clear, low level health risk). 
46
 Where 1 mg corresponds to 1 000 µg. For the TDI, it is usually assumed standard body mass of 60 kg.  
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chronic exposure, and many more. The traditional default uncertainty factor for health risk 
assessment has been 100, consisting of a factor of 10 for extrapolating from test animals to 
humans and a factor of 10 for differences between individuals (Beronius et al., 2010).
47
  
The second step in the risk assessment process is the exposure assessment, which, broadly 
speaking, deals with estimating the likelihood and quantifying the magnitude, frequency and 
duration of human exposure to the chemical in question. Finally, the last step is known as risk 
characterization, which is an estimation of the potential health impact posed by the current 
exposure to the chemical in question. In practice, the outcome of the hazard assessment – often 
the established TDI – is compared to the outcome of the exposure assessment. If the levels of 
exposure are below the TDI, it is generally considered that there is no health risk (Beronius, 
2013).  
 
Figure 3: Health risk assessment’s main steps: hazard assessment, exposure assessment and risk characterization. 
 Adapted from Molander (2015) 
 
 
Evaluation of the scientific evidence for risk assessment 
In order to conduct a risk assessment, it is necessary to evaluate the reliability and relevance of 
the available scientific evidence. The reliability of a study relates to “the study’s inherent 
scientific quality, including, for example, the robustness of the methods used and reproducibility 
of the results.” While its relevance relates to “the appropriateness of the experimental model for 
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 The TDI is derived by dividing the NOAEL (or the BMDL) by the chosen uncertainty factors. 
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investigating the chosen endpoints as well as for evaluating the human health or environmental 
risk of interest” (Molander, Agerstrand, Beronius, Hanberg, & Ruden, 2015, p. 754) . Risk 
assessment guidance documents in Europe often recommend that all relevant toxicity data is 
taken into consideration in the risk assessment process. However, in practice, regulatory risk 
assessments are predominantly based on so-called standard studies (Molander, 2015). 
These are studies that are conducted and reported according to internationally standardized test 
guidelines, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tests 
guidelines and following the principles of Good Laboratory Practice (GLP). The standardized 
OECD test guidelines provide uniform requirements as well as recommendations for 
experimental design, execution and reporting of toxicity studies (Beronius, Molander, Rudén, & 
Hanberg, 2014). GLP is a separate set of requirements that promotes the quality of the laboratory 
practices by specifying operational laboratory procedures and requirements for data reporting – 
such as: calibration and maintenance of the equipment, protocols for laboratory animal care and 
procedures to keep records of raw-data (Tweedale, 2011).
48
 Standard studies have traditionally 
been considered to provide the most adequate data for regulatory purposes given that they 
promote the reliability of results – that is, they facilitate the replication of experiments if 
necessary . The major advantages of conducting standard studies are that their results are 
accepted across jurisdictions and are comparable across substances (Molander, 2015). These type 
of studies are usually required to authorize the introduction of new chemicals into the market and 
are thus mainly funded by the industry and performed by commercial laboratories (Beronius, 
2013). 
However, a frequent critique of standard studies is that their methods do not always represent the 
most relevant testing approach, neither can they cover all relevant adverse endpoints for a given 
substance (Beronius, 2013; Myers, Saal, et al., 2009). This has led some critics to claim that 
“Their objective is not to reflect the best scientific knowledge, but to offer a science-based 
political compromise among OECD member states. For this reason, there is significant potential 
for a gap between some OECD guidelines and rapidly advancing scientific knowledge” (Maxim 
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 It has been reported that GLP were originally mandated by the American Environmental Protection Agency in the 
70s after the discovery of gross laboratory frauds (intentional manipulation of data) by private research companies. 
GLPs were established to ensure that basic guidelines were followed when conducting scientific research for 
regulatory purposes (Tweedale, 2011). 
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& van der Sluijs, 2014, p. 14). This applies particularly to the case of EDs, given that current 
standardized test guidelines do not cover: sensitive “windows” (short periods at specific stages of 
development of the body) of exposure, the most sensitive endpoints and all possible endocrine 
pathways (Hass et al., 2013). 
Weight of evidence (WOE) 
Risk assessors often use a so called weight of evidence (WOE) approach to evaluate the available 
evidence and give an overall conclusion of the hazard of the chemical in question.
49
 WOE refers 
to the way in which a body of scientific evidence is summarized, interpreted and concluded upon. 
However, most of the times it is not clearly defined which methods and criteria are specifically 
used, and often, the conclusions are based on the results of one or a few key standard toxicity 
studies (Beronius, 2013).  
Adversity 
Adversity relates to what exactly is considered to constitute an adverse health effect during the 
risk assessment.  At present, the most used definition for adversity is that of the WHO/IPCS 
(2002).
50
 Yet, identifying harmful effects also implies that it is possible to differentiate adverse 
effects from so-called modulatory not-adverse effects. This is based on the idea that organisms 
may physiologically respond to chemical exposures in ways that do not necessarily impair their 
functions.  Modulatory effects are regarded as adaptive or compensatory effects not leading to 
harmful effects (EFSA, 2015b). Currently there are no generally accepted criteria, nor 
transparency in the ways, to determine when an adaptive or compensatory effect becomes 
adverse, and the distinction between adverse and not-adverse (adaptive) effects heavily depends 
on expert judgment (Beronius, 2013).  
Expert judgment 
As mentioned before, there are several aspects in a risk assessment process that are inevitably 
reliant on expert judgment. These include among other things the evaluation of the reliability and 
relevance of the available studies, the identification of adverse effects, the assessment of 
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 In the context of the risk assessment, a hazard relates to the possible adverse health effects caused by the intrinsic 
properties of a chemical, for example, its capacity to damage the kidney. This is different from a risk in that, the risk 
that that chemical could cause kidney damage must take into consideration: how much of the chemical humans are 
exposed to, the length of the exposure and when the exposure takes place (fetal life, childhood, adulthood). 
50
 “Change in the morphology, physiology, growth, development, reproduction, or, life span of an organism, system, 
or (sub)population that results in an impairment of functional capacity, an impairment of the capacity to compensate 
for additional stress, or an increase in susceptibility to other influences.” (EFSA, 2015b). 
50 
 
remaining scientific uncertainties and the determination of uncertainty factors. Expert judgment 
has been shown to be partly dependent on the knowledge, views and experiences of the risk 
assessors (Beronius et al., 2010), their disciplinary backgrounds and their institutional affiliations 
(Maxim & van der Sluijs, 2014).
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The flexibility introduced by expert judgment is particularly desirable in face of the complexity 
and the different levels of uncertainty that typically characterize the assessment of chemical risk.  
Yet, it can also introduce value-based assumptions to the process, that need to be described and 
justified (Beronius, 2013; Maxim & van der Sluijs, 2014). 
4.3.3 Endocrine science 
The origin of the endocrine disrupting hypothesis dates back to a meeting in the early 1990s, 
when an interdisciplinary group of researchers – including wildlife biologists, experimental 
endocrinologists and molecular biologists – got together to discuss the emerging body of 
scientific evidence on the developmental and reproductive effects of chemicals capable of 
interacting with the endocrine system. The outcome of the meeting was the so-called Wingspread 
consensus statement declaring that: “Many compounds introduced into the environment by 
human activity are capable of disrupting the endocrine system of animals, including fish, wildlife, 
and humans. Endocrine disruption can be profound because of the crucial role hormones play in 
controlling development” (Hotchkiss et al., 2008, p. 235). 
During the last 20 years, the scientific knowledge about EDs has been rapidly increasing– leading 
to new areas of interest and new concerns. For example, the initial focus on environmental 
estrogens has been broadened to include several other mechanisms of endocrine toxicity.
52
 It is 
also acknowledged that EDs can affect all hormonal systems and that a single ED can interact 
with multiple hormonal pathways, leading to several different effects (Gore et al., 2015). At the 
same time, the field is so complex that even the continuous accumulation of information about 
effects and mechanisms cannot cover all remaining knowledge gaps. However, there is a broad 
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 This includes whether the expert has prior experience with the chemical to be assessed, by means of own research 
and publications, what the nature of her/his knowledge is (e.g. experimental or theoretical), her/his institutional 
affiliation (e.g. regulatory agency, university) and links with industry (affiliation bias, or conflict of interest, can also 
influence expert judgment, highlighting the importance of establishing appropriate disclosure mechanisms when 
conducting risk assessments). 
52
 Such as androgen, thyroid, corticosteroids, growth hormones, vitamin a and vitamin d hormones pathways – some 
of which are today considered to be of equal or greater concern than environmental estrogens (Hotchkiss et al., 2008). 
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consensus among endocrine scientists concerning the main characteristics of endocrine disruptors 
– such as the fact that EDs exhibit the same characteristics as endogenous hormones (that is, the 
hormones produced by the body) (Gore et al., 2015). These ED-hallmarks will be summarized in 
what follows.  
Low-dose effects and thresholds  
Endocrinological research has shown that natural hormones act at extremely low concentrations, 
typically in the part-per-trillion to part-per-billion range.
53
 EDs, like endogenous hormones, can 
also induce effects at extremely low concentrations, in the range of typical human exposures (that 
is, at doses below the NOAEL and the TDI, and also below the doses typically used in standard 
testing protocols). At the same time, EDs act by the same mechanisms and against a background 
of natural hormones which means that their activity can add to and increase the response of 
already ongoing biological processes. Based on these arguments and on experimental 
observations, many experts claim that it cannot be assumed that there is a threshold for effects 
induced by EDs. Especially during sensitive and critical periods of development (Gore et al., 
2014).  
Timing of exposure  
The concept of sensitive windows of exposure comes from the realization that developmental 
processes dependent on precise hormonal signals. During early development, for example, 
endogenous hormones guide and control the development of tissues and organs from the 
fertilized egg to the fully developed fetus. During this sensitive period, exposures to EDs can 
affect this delicate programming, which can lead to irreversible effects.
54
 These include physical 
malformations and functional defects, but also permanent changes that influence the propensity 
of the exposed organism to develop a disease later in life or the manifestation of a dysfunction in 
a subsequent generation. Depending on when, how and to which ED(s) the fetus was exposed, the 
effects can be evident relatively fast, but in general there is a long lag phase between the time of 
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 Respectively, one part in one trillion (1 in 1,000,000,000,000) and one part in one billion (1 in 1,000,000,000).  
54
 As an example, the “male” fetus has to be exposed during the precise developmental window to fetal androgens (or 
male hormones) to trigger the masculinization of the external genitalia. If this does not happen, different signs of de-
masculinization can be observed at birth such as a misplaced opening of the urethra, known as a hypospadias. 
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exposure and the actual manifestation of the effect (Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., 2009; Gore et al., 
2014).
 55
  
Given that some tissues continue to develop after birth (e.g. in the brain and the reproductive 
system), these sensitive periods can cover many years. Fetal development, infancy, childhood and 
puberty are periods when developing tissues are sensitive to the action of hormones and thus 
particularly vulnerable for ED-exposures. Timing of exposure is thus fundamental in order to 
understand which tissues and organs might be affected. However, exposures to EDs during adult 
life may have very different consequences, since, in general, the effects are often temporary and 
usually disappear when the exposure has ceased  (Diamanti-Kandarakis et al., 2009; WHO/UNEP, 
2013). 
Non-monotonicity 
Research in the field of endocrinology and clinical medicine has shown that endogenous 
hormones display non-monotonicity dose-response (NMDR) relationships.
56
 Non-monotonicity 
refers to dose-response curves where the slope of the curve changes sign somewhere within the 
range of the doses examined (Figure 4).
57
 This type of dose-response relationships have also been 
reported for several EDs (N et al., 2012). Non-monotonicity implies that adverse effects can 
occur at low dose levels irrespective of effects seen at high doses – and consequently, that the 
extrapolation from high-dose effects to low-dose effects (as suggested by the toxicology model) 
is not always possible  (Vandenberg et al., 2009).  
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 Based on this understanding, a concept named the developmental origins of health and disease (DOHaD) has been 
advanced with the aim of investigating developmental exposures to EDs and disease outcomes later in life. 
56
 For example, non-monotonicity has been used in human endocrinology as a basic principle behind the 
pharmaceutical treatment of severe diseases (Hass et al., 2013).  
57
 NMDR curves are often U-shaped with maximal responses of the measured effect observed at low and high doses 
(Figure 4, b), or inverted U-shaped with maximal responses observed at intermediate doses  
53 
 
 
Figure 4: Examples of monotonic (a) and non-monotonic (b,c) dose-response curves. Non-monotonic curves are characterized 
by a change in the sign of their slope, whereas monotonic curves do not change sign. They may be U-shaped (b) (or inverted U-
shaped) when there is one inflection point, or bi-phasic (c) when there are two inflection points . Adapted from Review of the 
environmental protection agency’s state-of-the-science evaluation of non-monotonic dose-response relationships as they apply to 
endocrine disruptors (2014)  
 
Transgenerational effects 
In addition to the well-known transfer of persistent ED from mother to child, it is also recognized 
today that some EDs can also induce so-called transgenerational effects in subsequent 
generations. These effects are transmitted through epigenetic changes that modify the way the 
DNA is expressed and can affect several organ systems. The implication of transgenerational 
effects is that even when there is no further exposure, the epigenetic changes (imprinted on the 
organism’s DNA) may persist for several generations (Gore et al., 2015).58 
Combination effects 
Endocrine science also recognizes that organisms are exposed to complex mixtures of EDs. In 
particular, it is highlighted that the simultaneous exposure to a combination of EDs can produce 
additive effects – even when each chemical is present at low doses and do not cause adverse 
effects when given alone.
59
 Endocrine scientists have stressed that ignoring the effects of 
simultaneous exposures can lead to wrong risk estimations (Gore et al., 2014).  
Academic research on endocrine disruptors  
As mentioned, through the last decades, research on EDs has advanced rapidly. The field has 
grown to include many different scientific specialties that have addressed a large and diverse 
range of dysfunctions and diseases – reproductive, neurological, behavioral, metabolic, 
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 These effects do not involve DNA mutations but rather changes in DNA methylation and histone acetylation, 
which are molecular mechanisms that regulate gene expression. When these epigenetic changes take place during 
development – affecting for example the germ cells of the developing fetus (the egg or the sperm cells) – the effects 
will not only affect the particular individual, but also subsequent generations (Gore et al., 2014) 
59
 Besides dose additivity, mixtures of EDs can also interact multiplicatively (or synergistically) or antagonistically  
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immunological and several other. Academic research on endocrine disruption often enters new 
areas of research, and make use of the latest developments in methods. Experimental studies 
habitually include novel endpoints that are particularly sensitive and relevant to the investigation 
of endocrine-related effects (Gore et al., 2015).
60
  However, this type of academic studies is 
seldom conducted according to any internationally standardized test guidelines. This has 
hampered the use of such academic research studies in the regulatory setting, where it is usually 
concluded that non-standard studies suffer from methodological limitations and have low 
reliability. Risk assessors point to the fact that many non-standard academic studies only 
investigate a single dose, are not statistically robust (some failing to control for litter effects and 
using inappropriate statistical methods), are poorly reported, and often contradict the results 
reported in standard studies (Molander, 2015).
61
  
Yet, several recent investigations have emphasized the need to enhance the use of non-standard 
studies for regulatory purposes. Today, it is acknowledged that academic research studies can 
contribute with critical data to fill information gaps in the risk assessment of EDs – and 
complement the information provided by standard studies (Beronius et al., 2014; Maxim & van 
der Sluijs, 2014; Molander, 2015; Myers, vom Saal, et al., 2009). In connection to this, several 
initiatives have been proposed to “bridge the gap” between academic research and regulatory risk 
assessment, including guidance on how to report research to meet regulatory requirements 
(Beronius et al., 2014), and to develop a common framework to assess the quality of non-
standard studies in a transparent way (Maxim & van der Sluijs, 2014).  
4.3.4 Call for a change in risk assessment practices 
As summarized in the previous section, the specific characteristics of EDs challenge many of the 
traditional toxicological assumptions concerning chemical risk and the conventional risk 
assessment approach. Endocrine scientists have been arguing that the accumulated evidence and 
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 Academic research on endocrine disruption is often conducted at universities and research institutions. They are 
usually sponsored by public funds and are subjected to publication-related peer-review processes  
61
 Independent scientists have, however, highlighted that underreporting is linked to the publishing demands from 
scientific journals, namely the need to write concise papers and limit the amount of information reported. Similarly, 
concerning the statistical robustness, it has been explained that most academic studies use only small amounts of 
animals, to comply with research guidelines in public institutions (Beronius et al., 2014). Finally, concerning the lack 
of replication of the results, it has been noted that it is impossible to identically reproduce the particular conditions of 
a specific experiment, and that in academia there is no incentive to repeat previous results given that funding and 
publications depend on originality (Maxim & van der Sluijs, 2014). 
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the rising number of many endocrine-related disorders in humans (which are also observed in 
laboratory animals) warrant a paradigm shift in how risk assessment is conducted and EDs are 
regulated (Gore et al., 2014; Myers, vom Saal, et al., 2009; Myers, Zoeller, et al., 2009; Zoeller et 
al., 2012).  
An improved risk assessment method would fully incorporate the basic principles of endocrine 
science, such as: taking into consideration exposures during sensitive windows of development – 
including the manifestation of delayed and transgenerational effects; considering that effects may 
occur at very low doses – similar to current levels of human exposure, and below the doses 
traditionally used in toxicity testing; recognizing that the potential occurrence of non-monotonic 
dose-response relationships, implying that one cannot always extrapolate the effects observed at 
high doses to the low doses – and that effects in the low range can take place independently of 
what is observed at high doses;
62
 to not systematically assume the existence of a safety threshold 
– in particular for exposures during sensitive periods; and lastly, to move beyond the customary 
chemical-by-chemical approach to incorporate cumulative and mixture effects. At the same time, 
non-standard academic studies should be included in regulatory assessments to complement the 
information coming from standard studies – since current standard test guidelines do not 
represent the most sensitive or relevant endpoints to test, nor do they cover all the specter of 
possible ED-effects. And finally, endocrine scientists ought to be included in panels that review 
EDs, given their expertise in hormonal action and effects (Gore et al., 2014; Myers, vom Saal, et 
al., 2009; Myers, Zoeller, et al., 2009; Zoeller et al., 2012). 
Many of these recommendations have been elaborated and published in connection to the 
controversial risk assessment of one particular endocrine disruptor: bisphenol A. 
4.4 The case of bisphenol A 
4.4.1 What is bisphenol A? 
The invention and synthesis of bisphenol A (BPA) dates back to 1891, but it was not until forty 
years later that this chemical attracted commercial interest. In the 1930s, medical researcher 
Edward Charles Dodds, was searching for synthetic chemicals that could be used as estrogen in 
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 This means that effects seen at low doses, but not at higher, should be carefully interpreted, since non-
monotonicity challenges the classical assumption, that a chemical must show evidence of an adverse effect that 
increases proportionally with the dose, in order to be considered dangerous.  
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pharmaceutical applications. Although BPA’s estrogenic activity was confirmed at that time, it 
was never used as a drug because a more potent and promising estrogen –diethylstilbestrol (DES) 
became available (Dodds & Lawson, 1936).
63
  
        
  
 
Figure 5: The chemical structures of BPA, DES and Estradiol.  Where BPA is a synthetic chemical used in the production of 
plastic, DES is a pharmaceutical agent and Estradiol is one of the three most important forms of the endogenous female sex 
hormone – estrogen. Structurally, BPA and DES are more similar to each other than they are to estradiol but all chemicals can 
bind to estrogen receptors in human cells. Exposure to synthetic estrogen-like substances during critical stages of development 
has been reported to interfere with normal hormonal signaling, leading to irreversible adverse effects (Vandenberg et al., 2009). 
 
4.4.2 A growing problem  
By the 1950s, BPA found new commercial opportunities in the expanding plastic industry. Today, 
BPA is mostly used in the production of polycarbonate plastic, which is a transparent plastic used 
in CDs, DVDs, computers, spectacles, but also in food and drink plastic containers, tableware and 
water pipes. BPA is also widely used in the manufacture of epoxy resins which make the inner 
coating of metallic cans in order to prevent rusting and corrosion. In the last decades, BPA 
applications have expanded dramatically and today it is also commonly found in thermal paper 
(receipts)
64
, children toys, medical and laboratory equipment, dental sealants
65
, printing inks, 
flame retardants (tetrabromobisphenol A) and several other products (EU-RAR, 2008b).
66
 It has 
been shown that BPA is released from many consumer products under regular conditions of use 
and also when these products are disposed. Consequently, BPA is also regularly found in the 
indoor and outdoor environment – in water bodies, air and dust. Ingestion is considered to be the 
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 DES became a commonly used pharmaceutical drug given to pregnant women in the 50s with the intention of 
preventing miscarriage and premature births. However, prenatal exposure to this potent estrogen proved to induce 
different types of reproductive cancers in the daughters and sons of the women who took it during pregnancy  
(whereas the mother did not suffer any effect). It was finally removed from the market in the 70s (Rubin, 2007). 
Studies on people exposed to DES during fetal development, together with the study of mouse models of early DES 
exposure, have provided essential evidence for the development of the developmental origins of health and disease 
(DOHaD) concept (Rubin, 2007). 
64
 Paper used in receipts and tickets where BPA is used as a developing agent. 
65
 These are type of dental treatment where BPA is applied to the tooth in order to prevent dental caries. 
66
 For a complete review, consult the website of the European Information Centre on Bisphenol A 
http://www.bisphenol-a-europe.org/uploads/EN_BPA%20applications.pdf 
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main route of exposure, but over the years, additional sources of exposure have been identified. 
Today, exposure to skin (from thermal paper and cosmetics) and inhalation are known 
contributors to total exposures, but precise estimations are uncertain (EFSA, 2015d) 
BPA is currently one of the highest production volume chemicals in the world, with a steadily 
increasing demand. European estimations revealed that the EU consumed about 1.15 million tons 
of BPA in 2005 and 2006, and that there was an increase in consumption of 69% over a seven 
year period (late lessons). Even though BPA is not a persistent chemical, it is produced in such 
large quantities and used in so many products that this chemical is widespread in the environment, 
and exposure to humans is prevalent (EEA, 2013). Biomonitoring studies reveal that BPA is 
repeatedly found in human tissues and body fluids of over 90% of all people tested in developed 
countries. This chemical has also been continually measured in pregnancy associated fluids at 
concentrations that have been reported to induce harmful effects in laboratory animals 
(Vandenberg et al., 2009)
67
 The highest exposed groups in the population include infants, 
children and adolescents (EFSA, 2015d).  
BPA is believed to have a rapid metabolic clearance, which means that it finds its way out of the 
system relatively fast. This means that reducing exposure can rapidly reduce body burden. 
Studies have shown that reducing the consumption of canned foods and usage of plastic 
containers can rapidly reduce BPA levels in body fluids (Gore et al., 2014).  
4.4.3 BPA’s estrogenic activity 
The origin of the massive scientific interest in the possible risks related to BPA’s estrogenic 
activity was not related to any particular regulatory processes, but to an accident, so to say. In 
1993, a team of endocrinologists at Stanford University discovered that BPA leaching from the 
plastic equipment used in their laboratory was responsible for altering the results of their 
hormone-sensitive experiments. This incident and its subsequent publication revealed that tiny 
amounts of BPA leaching from polycarbonate plastic could mimic important functions of the 
natural female hormone estrogen (Krishnan et al., 1993). Promptly after that, BPA became a 
study candidate in the emerging field of endocrine disruption and by 1995, BPA became the most 
prominent example of an ED in the scientific and the public debate.  
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 Such as amniotic fluid, umbilical cord blood and fetal blood and breast milk. 
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Today, BPA is one of the most extensively studied and well-known EDs. Yet, scientists and 
regulators still disagree about the nature and extent of the health risks posed by this chemical. 
The list of adverse health effects associated with BPA exposure has grown to include: adverse 
impacts on neurological and behavioral development, mammary gland changes related to the 
development of breast cancer, immune system dysfunctions, cardiovascular disease, perturbation 
of fertility, modification of insulin regulation and obesity (EEA, 2013).
68
  
At present, there are several hundreds of papers on the low-dose effects of BPA. Many of these 
show significant effects on laboratory animals that are exposed during development, to doses 
similar to the doses of current human intake. At the same time, these studies show that both the 
selection of sensitive endpoints, and following up the exposed individuals later in life (when 
effects usually take place), is crucial. Some of these results also support the observation of non-
monotonic dose-response curves for BPA (EEA, 2013; Vandenberg et al., 2009). Within the field 
of endocrine science there is broad agreement on these concepts and findings. Yet, the BPA-
related industry claim that the evidence is questionable, since no study that reports low-dose 
effects, has been replicated by a second lab. 
4.4.4 Industrial sphere of influence on the BPA controversy  
In 2005, a literature review on BPA revealed that the source that funded each study was highly 
correlated with either positive or negative health effect findings. This publication pointed out that 
from 115 available animal studies published on BPA (looking into low-dose effects),  90% of 
those that were government-funded (94 out of 104) reported significant effects, while none of the 
industry-funded studies found an effect (11 studies) at the same exposure doses (F. S. vom Saal 
& Hughes, 2005). It has also been reported that some years later, the well-known consulting 
company Weinberg group (known for their renowned work for the tobacco industry) was hired 
by actors within the BPA industry to “soften” European classification proposals for the regulation 
of this chemical.
69
 Other than this, there have also been references to conflict of interests among 
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 The latest assessment by EFSA (2015) provides a comprehensive account of the possible risks associated to BPA 
exposure. 
69
 For a full account, consult Chapter 10 of the 2013 edition of Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, 
innovation (European Environment Agency Report No 1/2013). Some years later, the same consultancy group was 
subjected to a congressional investigation in the US in connection to their work for the chemical giant DuPont on 
PFOA (a chemical used in Teflon). The investigation was broadened to also include the consultancy’s work on BPA. 
According to members of the The House Energy and Commerce Committee at the US House of Representatives, 
Weinberg’s work raised the question about whether science was for sale at these consulting firms (Layton, 2008).  
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the members of the EFSA’s panel, who worked on the assessment of BPA (Horel, 2013; Horel & 
Bienkowski, 2013) 
At the same time, in response to the growing public concerns over the safety of BPA, the 
chemical and plastic industries have also actively tried to get their side of the story out. To this 
end, they have launched both international and European websites with the intent to educate the 
public on BPA matters. The European Information Centre on Bisphenol-A and the BPA 
Coalition’s website “let’s talk about bpa” have, through specialists in communication and public 
affairs, been providing “informed industry views on Bisphenol-A (BPA) and its uses” which 
“validate what international regulatory bodies and scientific research continues to clearly state – 
that the safe use of BPA poses no known health risk to people”.70 This coalition represents 
European manufacturers and users of BPA and big industries and corporations like 
PlasticsEurope, Bayer, Dow Chemical and Momentive (BPA-Coalition, 2015). 
4.4.5 BPA regulation in Europe 
At the EU level, BPA has been regulated in connection to food safety since 2002, when it was 
authorized to be used in plastic materials that are in contact with foodstuff (with a specific 
migration limit of 0.6 mg per kilogram food) (SCF, 2002). In 2011, an amendment prohibited the 
use of BPA in baby bottles in the EU, based on the precautionary principle. In the environmental 
sector there are ongoing efforts to restrict the use of BPA in cash register receipts (thermal paper) 
and tighten the regulation of BPA in toys (Miljødirektoratet, 2015a). 
At the member state level, Denmark and Belgium have national bans on BPA in food contact 
materials for infants and young children, Sweden has a ban in coatings and varnishes for food 
contact materials for infants and young children, Austria has a ban on pacifiers and teats and 
France has banned BPA in all food packaging (which recently has been modified to exclude 
packaging of export products) (BPA-Coalition, 2015). 
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 Through a careful selection of scientific articles and pieces of the controversy, the industry has used videos, graphs, 
twitter messages and fact sheets in several languages to support their claims. In February 2015, the American 
Chemistry Council (ACC) launched its latest communication and advertising campaign “Listen to the Science: 
Experts Say BPA is Safe”, to amplify EFSA’s latest conclusions on the safety of BPA. The ads were placed in major 
newspapers and consumer and health websites. For further information on the European websites, consult: 
http://www.bisphenol-a-europe.org/ and http://www.bpa-coalition.org/ and for the International ones: 
http://www.bisphenol-a.org/index.html and http://www.factsaboutbpa.org/about-us  
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4.4.6 The risk assessment of BPA in Europe 
Since 2002, BPA has been subject to several panel evaluations in the EU. Some have been in 
connection to food safety, others in connection to environmental regulations; some have been 
conducted at EU level and many others at the member state level. These assessments have been 
based on different assumptions, key studies, weigh-of-evidence approaches, ways of evaluating 
the quality of the studies and different ways of interpreting the remaining uncertainties. 
Consequently, different panels have reached different conclusions on the safety of BPA. Even 
though BPA research has expanded dramatically, and improved methods have improved the risk 
assessment, the uncertainties have not decreased. Actually the opposite seems to have happened. 
In 2015, EFSA reiterated that current exposures to BPA were safe, while regulatory agencies at 
the member state level have reached different conclusions.  
Historically, the safety of BPA at the EU level has been assessed according to classical 
toxicology principles (section 4.3.1.) and using standard studies. In the past thirteen years, the 
safety of BPA had been based on two key standard studies, investigating reproductive and 
developmental toxicity. Based on either one of those studies, a NOAEL for BPA of 5 mg/kg body 
weight (bw) per day has been identified. In 2002, this NOAEL was used to establish a tolerable 
daily intake (TDI) of 10 μg BPA/kg bw/day, using an uncertainty factor of 500, to cover low-
dose uncertainties with respect to reproductive and developmental effects. Four years later, the 
uncertainty factor was reduced to 100, giving a new TDI of 50 μg BPA/kg bw/day, which was 
valid until January 2015. During those years, a large number of non-standard research studies 
reporting developmental effects at very low doses (below the NOAEL of 5 mg/kg bw/day and 
down to just a few µg/kg bw/day) had continuously been disregarded, since they did not comply 
with the quality criteria used by the regulatory agencies. The elimination of hundreds of low-dose 
studies from policy considerations has been one of the main drivers of the BPA controversy in 
Europe – where regulators have been confronted with the critical question of defining which 
scientific evidence should be used to assess BPA’s safety, and how. 
In the meantime, at the member state level, different regulatory agencies have reached different 
conclusions concerning the safety of BPA. In 2008, the environmental agencies of the Nordic 
countries wanted to include several non-standard studies (reporting low-dose neurodevelopmental 
effects) in the ongoing assessment of BPA, conducted by the European Chemical Bureau (EU-
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RAR, 2008b). That same year, the Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety (VKM) also 
expressed some concern about potential neurotoxic effects at low-doses (VKM, 2008), which 
were expanded by the Danish National Food Institute in 2010 (DTU-Food, 2010), to include 
possible effects on learning ability. In 2013, the French Agency ANSES went one step further to 
declare that exposures to BPA during pregnancy posed a risk for the developing fetus (ANSES, 
2013).   
In an effort to terminate this lengthy debate, EFSA decided to conduct a full re-evaluation of 
BPA in 2012. This assessment, published in 2015, can be seen as a milestone in EFSA’s work 
with BPA. Besides improving the methodology, it also tried to address common critiques, such as 
to include both standard and non-standard studies, to take into account several routes of exposure, 
more transparency in the assumptions made during the assessment, and better treatment of the 
remaining uncertainties. In this assessment, EFSA established a new temporary TDI of 4 µg/kg 
bw/day (twelve and a half times lower than the previous one). Yet, dietary exposures were also 
much lower than previously estimated, which led the agency to conclude that there was no risk 
for any segment of the population (EFSA, 2015d). However, only weeks after EFSA’s release, 
the Danish National Food Institute released a scientific opinion related to EFSA’s latest 
assessment, that starkly contradicted the agency’s conclusions. Danish experts proposed a TDI of 
0.7 µg/kg bw/day or lower, in order to protect highly exposed groups against the endocrine 
disrupting effects of BPA (DTU-Food, 2015b). A more detailed account of the different 
assessments will be given in the next section.  
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Figure 6: Health based guidance values for BPA in Europe (logarithm scale). The blue and grey arrows represent the 
regulatory thresholds identified from standard studies in 2015. The continuous blue arrow represents the Danish DTU-Food’s 
NOAEL, and the dashed arrows represent EFSA’s BMDL (where the BMDL is an alternative to the NOAEL, and the HED 
represents the BMDL corrected for differences in kinetics between mice and humans). The grey arrows represent the “historic” 
threshold values for BPA in Europe in the food sector (EFSA) and in environmental regulation (ECB). Finally, the continuous 
green arrow represents DTU-Food’s TDI calculation and the dashed green arrow corresponds to EFSA’s calculation – where the 
TDI is the estimated amount of BPA that can be ingested daily over a lifetime without posing a significant health risk. Adapted 
from Beronius (2014) . 
 
4.4.7 The different risk assessments of BPA in Europe and North America 
The European Scientific Committee on Food (SCF, 2002) 
In 2002, the SCF evaluated the possible risk of BPA migration from in food contact materials  
(SCF, 2002). The Committee used the standard study by Tyl (2002) to derive a NOAEL
 
 for BPA 
of 5 mg/kg bw/day for effects on reproduction.  Based on that NOAEL, the SCF derived a 
temporary TDI of 10 μg BPA/kg bw/day by applying an uncertainty factor of 500, comprising of: 
the default factor of 100, plus an uncertainty factor of 5 to account for uncertainties related to 
possible effects on reproduction and development (SCF, 2002).  
The European Union Risk Assessment Report of BPA 2003 (EU RAR, 2003) 
The former European Chemicals Bureau (ECB) conducted, in 2003, a broader risk assessment for 
the purpose of chemical legislation. This covered all sources of exposure and assessed effects on 
human health and on the environment. The health risk assessment was also based on Tyl et al. 
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(2002). ECB identified a NOAEL of 50 mg/kg bw/day for effects on reproduction, which was 
used for the risk characterization of BPA (EU-RAR, 2003).  
According to the assessors, there was no solid evidence of BPA’s effects on developmental 
toxicity at low levels of exposure – as it was noted that the majority of the low-dose studies 
reporting such effects used experimental protocols that were not internationally validated. Yet, it 
was recognized that the conflicting results warranted further attention
71
:   
“Overall, in standard developmental studies in rodents, there is no convincing evidence that 
bisphenol-A is a developmental toxicant. However, the available and apparently conflicting data 
from studies conducted using low doses (in the μg/kg range) do raise uncertainties. Overall, the 
majority of EU member states felt that the studies reporting effects at low doses could not be 
dismissed. However, the member states disagreed on how these studies should be used, if at all, 
in the risk characterization for this endpoint. The disagreements were based on differing views 
about the uncertainties surrounding the reproducibility of the findings and their biological 
significance, if any, to human health.” (EU-RAR, 2003, p. 233).  
ECB concluded that further testing was required to resolve the remaining uncertainties on 
developmental toxicity, in particular a new standard reproductive study following test guidelines 
OECD 416 (EU-RAR, 2003).  
The European Food Safety Authority 2006 (EFSA, 2006) 
In 2006, EFSA conducted a full health risk assessment of BPA in connection to food safety.  The 
aim was to estimate the exposure of BPA through the diet, to establish a TDI, and to look into the 
controversial effects on reproduction. Only studies where animals were exposed to BPA through 
the diet were taken into consideration (EFSA, 2006) .   
The panel noted that several non-standard studies reported effects on behavior and reproduction 
at dose levels below the regulatory NOAEL of 5 mg/kg bw/day. However, the panel expressed 
“considerable reservations” (p.3) concerning the relevance of the reported adverse effects and the 
overall reliability of non-standard studies. This because many used a single dose, it was not 
possible to identify a clear dose-response relationship and most studies used a small number of 
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 The database refers to all the available studies concerning a specific effect at a specific time point. 
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laboratory animals  (EFSA, 2006).
72
 It was emphasized that the studies reporting low-dose effects 
and non-monotonic dose-response curves had not been taken into consideration in the risk 
assessment, because their results diverged from the results coming from standard studies: “The 
Panel considers that while low-dose effects and non-monotonic dose-response curves may be 
theoretically possible (Conolly and Lutz, 2004), low dose effects of BPA in rodents have not 
been demonstrated with the sufficient certainty to serve as pivotal studies for risk assessment.” 
(EFSA, 2006, p. 46).
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It was also concluded that humans could rapidly eliminate BPA from the body after dietary 
exposure while rodents’ elimination was much slower – something that raised further doubts 
about the relevance of reported low-dose effects of BPA in rodents, to assess human health 
(EFSA, 2006).  
In the panel’s view, the results from Tyl (2002) had been further sustained by a new standard 
study by Tyl (2006)(Tyl et al., 2008).
74
 Given that none of these two standard studies reported 
effects on reproduction or development at low doses, the panel concluded that the new Tyl et al. 
(2008) study resolved the uncertainties related to possible low-dose effect on reproduction and 
development. The panel thus decided to remove the extra uncertainty factor of 5 used by the SCF 
in 2002 to account for such uncertainties. Instead, a default uncertainty factor of 100 was used to 
derive a new TDI of 50 μg BPA/kg bw/day based on a NOAEL of 5 mg/kg bw/day this time for 
liver effects identified in Tyl et al. (2008).  Based on the new TDI, it was concluded that BPA 
dietary exposure was safe for all population groups considered (EFSA, 2006).
75
 
US Chapel hill assessment 2007 
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 The adverse effects referred to: behavioral effects, changes in tissue architecture, organ weight and time of puberty 
onset, among others. The panel also noted that some of the changes were present just at particular points of life, and 
not sustained through adulthood  
73
 The panel identified possible confounding factors that could partially explain some of the differences between 
standard and non-standard studies, such as: the influence of the diet of the animals, the route of BPA exposure during 
the experiment (leading to different clearing mechanisms in the body), the possible contamination of samples due to 
the ubiquity of BPA in the environment (such as in housing facilities) leading to increased exposures, and the 
selection of the animal strain (some animal strains being more sensitive to the effects of oestrogens than others).  
74
 The difference between Tyl (2006) and Tyl (2008) is merely that the 2006 version represents the unpublished 
version and the 2008 the official per reviewed publication of the results. This study is also referred to as Tyl (2007) 
75
 Yet, it is interesting to mention that had the additional uncertainty factor of 5 been kept to account for possible 
low-dose effects in development and reproduction (as in the previous SCF 2002 assessment), the new TDI would 
have remained at 10 μg BPA/kg bw per day (instead of being changed to 50 μg BPA/kg bw per day). In this case, the 
highest exposure scenario, estimated at 13 μg/kg bw/day for infants, would have exceeded the new European TDI 
and challenged the overall conclusion that current BPA exposure was safe for all population groups.  
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In 2007, the American National Institutes of Health sponsored a meeting in Chapel Hill where 38 
endocrine scientists and experts on BPA released a consensus statement that concluded with 
certainty that current levels of exposure to BPA in humans, have been shown to induce adverse 
health effects in laboratory animals, and BPA must thus be considered a potential risk to human 
health. This conclusion was based on a literature review of 700 non-standard studies on BPA up 
until the end of 2006, and focused on the exposure of the general population to BPA via food and 
the environment (Chapel Hill, 2007).
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The European Union Risk Assessment Report of BPA 2008 (EU RAR, 2008) 
In April 2008, the EU-RAR of BPA was updated after an evaluation of the awaited new standard 
study by Tyl (2008), along with new data on human exposure and newer studies that had become 
available since 2003.
77
 The environmental assessment concluded that there were still 
uncertainties related to the low-dose effects of BPA on snails (EU-RAR, 2008a) while the health 
risk assessment concluded that there were no risks for any segment of the population and that no 
further information or testing was needed(EU-RAR, 2008b).  
In the EU-RAR (2008) it is mentioned that a large number of non-standard studies had 
investigated, among other things, the same developmental and reproductive endpoints examined 
by Tyl et al. (2008). These non-standard studies had used different animal species and strains, 
covered a broad array of doses, a variety of exposure routes, different life stages, varying 
exposure durations, and included a wider selection of endpoints(EU-RAR, 2008b).  Yet they 
were not taken into consideration in the assessment, since the reviewers found that the results 
were not consistent: “[…] the results from these studies have been in contrast to the results of 
investigations conducted according to internationally recognized guidelines and in compliance 
with GLP, including the recent 2-generation study in the mouse by Tyl et al. (2007). As we 
consider this investigation by Tyl et al. (2007) as the gold-standard, definitive study of the 
reproductive toxicity of BPA (for the endpoints examined), all the other recent publications 
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 The results and conclusions from the meeting have been presented in a number of published articles Frederick S. 
vom Saal et al. (2007), Vandenberg et al. (2007), Richter et al. (2007),  Wetherill et al. (2007), Crain et al. (2007) 
and Keri et al. (2007). For sake of clarity, the collective results of these articles are referred to as (Chapel Hill, 2007). 
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 Tyl et al. (2008) is a standard two-generation reproductive study in mice conducted in accordance with test 
guideline OECD 416 and GLP compliance.  It uses many doses (from the low μg/kg bw/day range and the high 
mg/kg bw/day range), a large number of animals, and exposure takes place through the diet. The study investigates 
possible effects of BPA on reproduction, in particular the effects on the development of the male reproductive tract at 
low doses in mice (EU-RAR, 2008b).  
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investigating the same standard reproductive and developmental endpoints have not been 
evaluated in detail in this report.” (EU-RAR, 2008b, p. 87). 
The uncertainties related to possible BPA effects on development at low doses were put to rest, 
because Tyl’s new study gave no evidence of this type of effects. Based on this study, a NOAEL 
of 50 mg/kg/day was identified, grounded on effects on bodyweight, kidney and liver(EU-RAR, 
2008b).  
Moreover, there were also a large number of non-standard studies reporting developmental 
neurotoxicity effects at low-dose BPA exposures. Since these effects were not examined by  
Tyl et al. (2008), these studies were evaluated in detail using a weight of evidence approach that 
focused on the reliability and consistency of the evidence. The overall conclusion was that there 
was a low level of confidence in the reliability of the studies and a lack of consistency in the 
results, so that no firm conclusions about developmental neurotoxicity could be drawn. However 
the representatives of the environmental agencies in Denmark, Sweden and Norway did not agree 
with this conclusion. These countries considered that the results from four neurodevelopmental 
studies at low doses (Adriani et al., 2003; Carr et al., 2003; Negishi et al., 2004; Ryan and 
Vandenbergh, 2006) were sufficiently reliable for regulatory use, or at least warranted further 
investigation. Their comments were included as a minority opinion in the final report (EU-RAR, 
2008b). 
US National Toxicology Program (NTP-CERHR,  2008) 
This two-year-long literature review on BPA concluded that it could not be dismissed that current 
levels of BPA exposure could alter human development: “The NTP has some concern for effects 
on the brain, behavior, and prostate gland in fetuses, infants, and children […]” and “[…] 
minimal concern for effects on the mammary gland and an earlier age for puberty for females in 
fetuses, infants, and children […]” (Beronius et al., 2010, p. 135). 
Health Canada 2008 
The overall conclusion from the expert group of Health Canada was that BPA “[…] may be 
entering the environment in a quantity or concentration or under conditions that constitute or may 
constitute a danger in Canada to human life or health.”(Beronius et al., 2010, p. 135).  
Norwegian Scientific Committe for Food Safety 2008 (VKM, 2008) 
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In 2008, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA) requested the Norwegian Scientific 
Committee for Food Safety (VKM) to assess whether the four non-standard neurotoxicology 
studies (Adriani et al., 2003; Carr et al., 2003; Negishi et al., 2004; Ryan and Vandenbergh, 
2006), identified by the Norwegian Environmental Authorities during the EU-RAR (2008) 
assessment, provided sufficient evidence to set a lower NOAEL in the hazard characterization of 
BPA (VKM, 2008).  
The Committee concluded that the four studies had several deficiencies and did not support a 
change in the current NOAEL of 5 mg/kg bw/day established by EFSA in 2006.  Yet, the panel 
expressed some concern about the potential neurotoxic effects of BPA at low doses and 
recommended to conduct a standard study according to test guideline OECD 426 and GLP-
compliance to clarify remaining doubts on developmental neurotoxicity (VKM, 2008). 
European Food Safety Authority 2008 (EFSA, 2008) 
In July 2008, EFSA released an updated opinion concluding that after oral exposure, humans 
rapidly metabolized and eliminated BPA. The panel concluded that EFSA’s 2006 conclusion was 
still valid – exposure to BPA was well below the TDI of 50 µg/kg bw/d, and that was sufficient 
margin of safety for all segments of the population (EFSA, 2008). 
Danish National Food Institute evaluation 2010 (DTU-Food, 2010) 
In Mars 2010, the Danish minister of Food asked the Danish National Food Institute (DTU-Food) 
to evaluate the new developmental neurotoxicity standard study of Stump (2009), provided by the 
industry (performed according to test guideline OECD 426 and in compliance with GLP). This 
standard study was specifically conducted to resolve the ongoing uncertainties regarding 
developmental neurotoxicity effects of BPA at low doses (DTU-Food, 2010). 
DTU-Food concluded that even if the study did not provide clear evidence that BPA had harmful 
effects on the types of behavior that were examined, it gave rise to some uncertainty with respect 
to effects on learning ability. It was noted that the learning effect was observed at low-dose 
exposure to BPA, but was not seen at high dose exposures – which suggested a non-monotonic 
dose-response relationship. The Danish report noted that there was an ongoing discussion on 
whether BPA could exhibit different effects at low and at high doses. It was concluded that the 
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effect on impaired learning ability could be a sign of a low-dose effect of BPA, but it could also 
be an incidental finding (DTU-Food, 2010).  
DTU-Food found that the standard study by Stump (2009) was weak in that it had not been 
designed to address the previously reported adverse low-dose effects of BPA on the development 
of the nervous system and on behavior. The overall conclusion was thus that even if the Stump 
(2009) study did not justify a change in the current NOAEL for BPA, it could neither clarify nor 
change the ongoing uncertainties with respect to BPA’s effects on neurotoxicity (DTU-Food, 
2010). The conclusions of the DTU-Food’s evaluation were used by the Danish government to 
introduce a BPA ban on food-related products for children younger than three years of age.  
European Food Safety Authority 2010 (EFSA, 2010) 
In 2010, EFSA noted that recent low-dose studies on developing animals had reported effects on 
the immune system, biochemical changes in the brain and enhanced susceptibility to breast 
cancer. Yet, the panel highlighted that these studies had several shortcomings in their methods, 
experimental design and reporting; and as a result of this, it could not be used to derive a new 
TDI. It was also concluded that there was no convincing evidence of the possible neurobehavioral 
toxicity of BPA and no conclusions could be drawn from Stump (2009) with respect to low-dose 
effects on learning and memory (as suggested by DTU-Food 2009) due to large variability in the 
experimental data (EFSA, 2010b). A panel member expressed a minority opinion concerning the 
uncertainties raised by the recent low-dose studies, and recommended to see the TDI as 
temporary until further clarification (EFSA, 2010a). EFSA’s 2006 conclusion was reaffirmed. 
The French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety 2013 (ANSES, 
2013) 
In 2011, ANSES published a report on BPA where it was concluded that, based on the available 
scientific literature and all exposure routes, BPA indicated proven effects in animals (on 
reproduction, mammary gland, metabolism and brain) and suspected effects in humans (on 
reproduction, diabetes and cardiovascular diseases), at levels of exposure below the current 
regulatory thresholds (ANSES, 2011). As a result of this, a full risk assessment was conducted by 
the French Agency in 2013. In this later assessment, it was concluded that there were situations 
for the fetus, associated with maternal exposure to BPA during pregnancy, that lead to a moderate 
risk of enhanced susceptibility to tumor transformation in the mammary gland of the unborn baby. 
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It was also noted that pregnant women that handled thermal paper and consumed water from 
refillable polycarbonate containers represented a specific risk situation, where, in addition to the 
effect on the mammary gland, other health risks were also identified (ANSES, 2013).  
European Food Safety Authority 2015 (EFSA, 2015) 
In 2012, EFSA conducted a full re-evaluation of BPA, that covered, for the first time, exposures 
through dietary and non-dietary sources, and included standard and non-standard studies. The 
assessment lasted for almost three years and included two public consultations. The agency 
received 503 comments from national agencies, governmental bodies, industry and trade 
associations, NGOs and academia (EFSA, 2015c).   
The final assessment was released in January 2015,  and revealed that diet continues to be the 
main source of exposure to BPA, with canned food as one of largest contributors. Yet, the overall 
dietary exposure was found to be 4 to 15 times lower than previous EFSA estimations (EFSA, 
2015d). Thermal paper was identified as the second largest source of exposure, but there were 
uncertainties concerning levels of exposure through the skin and what happens to BPA inside the 
body when it has been dermally absorbed (EFSA, 2015d).  
For this re-evaluation, the panel developed a structured weight of evidence approach, based on 
expert judgment – where the strengths, weaknesses and reliability of each line of evidence, in 
each study, were evaluated. This approach was developed to treat the evidence more consistently, 
to make the weighing more transparent and to better describe the uncertainties – in order to 
determine the hazard that BPA might represent. (EFSA, 2015e).  The panel found that effects on 
the mammary gland (related to carcinogenicity), kidney and liver were “likely”, while 
reproductive, neurobehavioral, immune and metabolic system effects were “as likely as not”.78  
Only the effects that were “likely” were taken onward to the hazard characterization (EFSA, 
2015e).  
For the hazard characterization, EFSA used a new methodology to refine their estimations. The 
standard study by Tyl, et al. 2008 was used to establish a dose-response curve for effects on the 
kidney, which in turn was used to identify a Benchmark Dose Lower-confidence Limit (BMDL) 
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 The likelihood was expressed using a seven degree scale of verbal terms (very likely, likely, from as likely as not 
to likely, as likely as not, from unlikely to as likely as not, unlikely and very unlikely). Where “as likely as not” 
refers to a level of likelihood between “unlikely” and “likely”, which means that “it is equally likely that BPA causes, 
or does not cause, the effect” (EFSA, 2015e, p. 14). 
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(or threshold). This was in turn used to derive an oral human equivalent dose (HED) - which is a 
predictive threshold level where no harmful effects in humans are expected (EFSA, 2015e).
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With respect to the effects on the mammary gland, it was concluded that there was too big of a 
variation in the data and no BMDL could be established. Instead it was decided to account for 
this effect in the overall uncertainty analysis (EFSA, 2015e). 
A new TDI of 4 μg/kg bw/d was established based on the calculated HED for effects on the 
kidney and applying an uncertainty factor of 150. This was composed of a factor of 25 for 
remaining inter-species differences and inter-individual differences (instead of the default factor 
of 100) and an extra factor of 6 to account for the uncertainty in the database related to mammary 
gland, reproductive, neurobehavioral, immune and metabolic system effects (EFSA, 2015e).  The 
extra uncertainty factor came from an assessment of the overall evaluation of the uncertainty - a 
process dependent on probabilistic estimations and expert judgment, whose objective was the 
quantification of the remaining uncertainties in the assessment: “EFSA’s experts used new 
methodologies to take account of the uncertainties regarding potential health effects, exposure 
estimates and evaluation of risks for humans. By analyzing each uncertainty one by one and 
combining expert judgement, the experts were able to quantify these uncertainties and to factor 
them in to the risk assessment and derivation of the t-TDI” (EFSA, 2015a, p. 1).80 
By comparing the TDI with the exposure estimates, the Panel concluded that BPA’s exposure 
from the diet and from a combination of sources (dust, cosmetics and thermal paper) posed no 
health risk to consumers of any age group at current exposure levels (EFSA, 2015e). It was 
however noted that the TDI was temporary (t-TDI) pending on the outcome of on-going studies 
that were expected to reduce remaining uncertainties (EFSA, 2015e). 
Danish National Food Institute 2015 (DTU-Food, 2015) 
In February 2015, the Danish National Food Institute (DTU-Food) was asked to examine EFSA’s 
(2015) assessment of BPA and to determine whether the agency’s new TDI was sufficiently 
protective according to the Institute.  DTU-Food’s main conclusion was that “the safe level 
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 The HED was calculated by multiplying the identified BMDL by a calculated factor that takes into consideration 
the quantitative difference in toxicokinetics between the animals species used in the study and humans 
80
 For a detail description please refer to EFSA (2015) assessment, Appendix D - Uncertainty analysis. 
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recently recommended by EFSA does not adequately protect consumers against endocrine 
disrupting effects of bisphenol A” (DTU-Food, 2015c, p. 1). 
DTU-Food did not support the uncertainty assessment conducted by EFSA, and noted that the 
new temporary t-TDI of 4 μg/kg bw/day gave insufficient protection to consumers (DTU-Food, 
2015b).  DTU-Food welcomed the calculation of a BMDL for regulatory purposes, but was 
critical to the way the “likely” mammary gland effects were dealt with in EFSA’s assessment. 
The Danish Institute proposed instead to conduct a “classical” hazard characterization for this 
endpoint. DTU-Food looked into the same database as EFSA, and identified a NOAEL of 25 
μg/kg bw/day for effects on mammary gland. Using the same uncertainty factors, they established 
a TDI of 0.7 μg/kg bw/day. The Danish assessment also noted that highly exposed humans 
belonging to vulnerable groups, such as children and pregnant women (according to EFSA’s 
exposure estimates) were exposed to around 1.4-2 times more than 0.7 μg/kg bw/day BPA – 
which gave rise to concern. It was also noted that neither EFSA’s nor DTU’s assessment have 
taken into account potential mixture effects due to exposure to other chemicals with similar types 
of effects as BPA, meaning that the overall risk might have been underestimated (DTU-Food, 
2015b). 
The overall conclusion was that the TDI for BPA should be 0.7 μg/kg bw/day or lower to be 
sufficiently protective with regards to endocrine disrupting effects of BPA on mammary gland 
development and other endocrine disrupting effect (such as developmental neurotoxicity and 
male sexual development, which in the Institute’s opinion warranted further attention) (DTU-
Food, 2015b). 
 
Figure 7: Table summarizing the conclusions of the different risk assessments of BPA in Europe. The results are presented 
on a traffic light color code: where green is used for those assessments that concluded that there was no health risk and red to 
those that concluded the opposite, with several other results in between. Abbreviations: EFSA (European Food Safety Agency), 
ECB (European Chemicals Bureau), SCF (European Scientific Committee on Food, EFSA’s predecessor), VKM (Norwegian 
Scientific Committee for Food Safety), DTU-Food (Danish National Food Institute), ANSES (The French Agency for Food, 
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Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety). The results of three international assessments were also included since they 
are mentioned during the analysis chapter. These are: Health Canada, the US National Toxicology Program (NTP-CERHR) and 
an assessment by endocrine-scientists under the name Chapel Hill. Adapted from Beronius (2014). 
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5. Endocrine Disruptors in Denmark 
In this chapter I will present the main characteristics of how Denmark has defined and addressed 
the ED-issue, and I will point to examples of what has this meant for the regulation of BPA in 
this country. One could maybe use the expression “snow ball effect” to describe how the ED-
issue has developed in Denmark over the years – from its origin in the laboratories of 
Copenhagen’s University Hospital to its influential position at the European Commission in 
Brussels. I will argue that the national “framework on EDs” has had a crucial role in supporting 
common regulatory objectives with respect to EDs and also in coordinating the activities of a 
broad variety of actors and processes. I will claim that the resulting, predominant understanding 
of the ED-situation, can help to contextualize and explain how the BPA problem was perceived 
and dealt with in Denmark – which I will account for in the following chapter.  
5.1 Endocrine Disruption – a public health concern 
The interest in EDs in Denmark dates back to the beginning of the 1990s and has a medical origin. 
In particular, it refers to research on male reproductive problems conducted at the University 
Hospital in Copenhagen (Rigshospitalet). A group of researchers form the hospital, headed by 
pediatric endocrinologist Niels Skakkebæk, published in 1992 an article revealing that sperm 
quality in healthy men had been decreasing over the last 50 years, and that during the same 
period there was a rapid and significant increase in the incidence of testicular cancer (Carlsen, 
Giwercman, Keiding, & Skakkebaek, 1992) (See Figure 1). One year later, Professor Skakkebæk 
elaborated the so-called “Oestrogen hypothesis”, suggesting that increased exposure to estrogens 
during fetal life could contribute to the observed falling sperm counts and the rise of disorders in 
the male reproductive tract. Suspicion was mainly directed towards chemicals in the environment, 
which could either act as estrogen in the body (the female sex hormone) or affect the estrogen 
balance(Sharpe & Skakkebaek, 1993). At the same time, there was also increasing evidence that 
some of these reproductive effects in men were also observed in wildlife populations, and in 
laboratory animals exposed to potent synthetic estrogens during development (Miljøstyrelsen, 
1995).
81
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 Human reproductive effects refer to: rise in testicular cancer incidence, decreased fertility due to poor sperm 
quality, deformed genitals in men and undescended testicles in young boys. The observed effects in wildlife refer to: 
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These findings caught the attention of the Danish Environmental Protection Agency (Danish 
EPA), who in 1995 requested Professor Skakkebæk to prepare a report to summarize the 
evidence. The report concluded that there was insufficient data to either prove or disprove that 
the growing incidence of male reproductive disorders, partially or completely, were a 
consequence of the exposure to chemicals with estrogenic effects in the environment 
(Miljøstyrelsen, 1995).  In order to investigate this further, a four-year grant from the Danish 
EPA was used to establish the Research Centre for Oestrogenic Substances, with the objective to 
gather more knowledge on chemicals displaying hormonal activity, coordinate Danish research in 
the area, communicate scientific results and provide tools for regulation(FØS, 2000). The field of 
enquiry was particularly complex and multifactorial, and called for a multidisciplinary research 
strategy (Miljøstyrelsen, 1995). 
The activities of the center attracted a lot of interest from a broad circle of users, including: 
industry, NGOs, researchers, educational institutions, regulators, journalists and other individuals. 
Public interest was high and there was a periodical coverage of the center’s achievements in the 
media. And even if there were still many unanswered scientific questions, Danish research on 
EDs kept attracting public and political interest, which lead to further initiatives and more 
research (FØS, 2000). 
It can be said that ED-research in Denmark has had a particular focus on health implications, and 
in particular on male reproductive problems. This can be explained by the national expertise on 
the topic but it has also been motivated by worrisome trends that have been observed in male 
reproductive problems in the country. For example, the results from the long term monitoring of 
sperm quality among young Danish men, have for many years been a cause of concern.
82
 At the 
same time, Danish men have one of the highest incidences of testicular cancer in the world, and 
there seems to be more boys born with genital irregularities in Denmark than in other comparable 
countries, such as Finland (Miljøministeriet, 2003, 2004, 2007).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
reproductive defects in Florida panthers, alligators with changes in hormone balance and genital abnormalities (due 
to pollution in their habitats), feminization of male fish in Britain, and more (Miljøstyrelsen, 1995; Wright, 1996).  
82
 The monitoring of sperm quality in Denmark over the last years has revealed that: around 20% of the men tested 
had sperm concentrations below the World Health Organization reference level, and around 42% of them were at 
high risk of having fertility problems in the future. It was also calculated that only about 10% of Danish men had 
optimal sperm quality in terms of sperm count and sperm morphology (shape and appearance) and that semen’s 
quality did not seem to improve over time (Miljøministeriet, 2003, 2004, 2007). 
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In 2001, Danish researchers came out with yet a new hypothesis, suggesting that the observed 
male reproductive disorders might have a common cause, that was to be found in the disruption 
of embryonal programming and gonadal development during fetal life.
83
 This hypothesis, the 
Testicular Dysgenesis Syndrome (TDS), proposed that fetal disruption could be caused by a 
combination of environmental influences such as exposure to EDs, lifestyle factors and 
susceptible genetic backgrounds (Skakkebaek, Rajpert-De Meyts, & Main, 2001). This 
hypothesis has been investigated for many years and in some areas, the link between exposure to 
EDs and the development of adverse effects has become stronger - for example in animal studies 
reporting similar effects as those described by the TDS hypothesis. However, at present, 
conclusive evidence in humans remains elusive for most chemicals (Miljøministeriet, 2007) .  
Although the initial interest on male reproductive problems has been expanding over the years, to 
include many other areas of research and a to cover a wide variety of effects (Miljøministeriet, 
2007), male reproduction is still at the core of the Danish work on EDs. In 2014, a new center – 
the International Center for Research and Research Training in Endocrine Disrupting Effects on 
Male Reproduction and Child Health (EDMaRC) – was established, with the objective of 
becoming a world leading research center on male reproductive health and children’s health 
(Politiken, 2015; Rigshospitalet, 2014). Besides male reproduction, EDMaRC would also look 
into the causes of the observed national trends in premature puberty in girls, which in the last 
years have also become a cause of concern (EDMaRC, 2015) . 
It can be concluded that the origin and a significant part of Danish research in the field of EDs 
has been related to human health – many times conducted at hospitals by endocrinologist or 
researchers familiar with hormonal functioning. One can thus argue that the Danish framing of 
the ED problem is based on an “endocrine science” perspective (see background section 4.3.3), 
and has a strong public health component.  
5.2 Danish endocrine disruptor science 
All from the beginning in Denmark, it has been very important to keep developing the knowledge 
base on EDs (Planlægningsudvalget, 2002; Regeringen, 2005, 2010, 2013). Much of the research 
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 Where the male reproductive disorders refer to: poor semen quality, testicular cancer, undescended testis and 
hypospadias (an abnormally placed urinary hole). 
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has been coordinated or carried out by the different national research centers on EDs, and in close 
collaboration with the Danish EPA.
84
  
The constant development of the knowledge base has led Denmark to become an internationally 
recognized forerunner in ED research. Danish research teams have for example looked into the 
relation between exposure to EDs and hormone-related diseases, combination effects of EDs, ED 
effects in the aquatic environment, ED exposure during fetal life and possible effects later in life, 
research on specific EDs such as BPA, among other areas (Regeringen, 2010, 2013). At the same 
time, Danish ED research has also been sensitive to real regulatory needs.  
From basic research to evidence-based policy 
What started as the standard hypothesis-driven investigations in the laboratories of the University 
Hospital in Copenhagen, has today developed into research with a long-term view on regulation. 
This is particularly the case for the projects conducted at the Centre on Endocrine Disrupters, 
which was established in 2008 with the objective of researching on EDs and providing advice to 
the authorities (CeHoS, 2015). Ever since its foundation, the results of the Centre’s investigations 
have been actively used to update regulatory authorities on new knowledge, provide them with 
scientific counselling and also answering specific policy-related questions in relation to EDs 
(Miljøstyrelsen, 2015b).   
One example of this well-coordinated interplay between the latest science and regulation is 
evident in a Danish EPA project from 2009, dealing with combination effects. In this project, the 
typical daily ED-exposure of a two-year-old in Denmark was assessed, taking into consideration 
some of the possible combined effects resulting from the simultaneous exposure to several EDs. 
The results revealed that combined exposures to certain EDs needed to be reduced 
(Miljøstyrelsen, 2009b). This led to the set up an information campaign for parents to reduce 
children’s exposures (Miljøstyrelsen, 2009a) and to proposing regulation for the combination 
effects of these EDs in Denmark and at EU level (Miljøministeriet, 2011; Miljøstyrelsen, 
2015d).
85 
Based on the same evidence, Denmark raised the issue of combination effects at EU 
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 Most often at the Centre for Oestrogenic Substances and the Centre for Endocrine Disruptors. 
85
 The information campaign – “65,000 reasons for better chemistry” – was prepared with the intent to reduce 
toddlers’ exposure to EDs, in particular phthalates and parabens (Miljøstyrelsen, 2009a). It was advised, for example 
to avoid children’s cosmetics that contained propyl and butyl parabens (preservative agents used in cosmetics). At 
the same time, a national ban on these substances was implemented and an EU regulation proposal was initiated to 
lower the concentrations of these substances in children’s products. Concerning the phthalates, a regulation proposal 
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level, which led to the ongoing EU Commissions work on how to take combination effects into 
account in future legislation (Miljøstyrelsen, 2015c).  
At the same time, I would argue that the close relation between the Danish EPA and the Danish 
ED research environment has not only resulted in an active use of the latest research for 
regulatory purposes, but that it also has promoted a common understanding and a common frame 
for action between experts and regulators. On one hand Danish regulators have been exposed to 
an “endocrine scientific understanding” of the problem, while on the other hand, Danish 
researchers have been exposed to the particular needs and limitations of the present chemical 
regulatory system.
86
 Over the years, both Danish experts and regulators have been trying to 
improve regulation. This has particularly been the case for the environmental sector where the 
Danish EPA and the Danish ED researchers have been: developing and improving standardized 
test guidelines for the detection and future regulation of EDs (Miljøministeriet, 2003, 2004, 2007; 
Regeringen, 2010), preparing the Danish criteria proposal for the identification of EDs 
(Miljøstyrelsen, 2011)
87
 and more recently contributing to improve the regulation of EDs through 
REACH (Hass et al., 2013).  This has also been seen in the food sector. For example, in Spring 
2015, researchers at the Danish National Food Institute developed a toolbox to be used for the 
prediction of combination effects when conducting risk assessments in the food sector (to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
for the combination effects of four phthalates (DEHP, DBP, DIBP, BBP) was initiated nationally and at EU level 
(Miljøministeriet, 2011). Phthalates are a group of chemicals that are used to soften plastics. They can easily be 
released from the plastics they have been added to, since they are not chemically bound to them. 
86
 Examples of these limitations include: shortcomings of the commonly used toxicology model to assess the risk of 
EDs, limitations of the available standard test guidelines to cover EDs’ properties, the potential underestimation of 
real risk when not taking into consideration combination effects, and many other (see section 4.3). 
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 The Danish proposal has been a very important contribution to the ongoing EU work on the development of 
common scientific criteria for the regulation of EDs in Europe. Denmark’s proposal suggests three regulatory 
categories: 1) confirmed ED, 2) suspected ED and 3) indication of ED properties. EDs belonging to the “confirmed” 
category would not be authorized under the pesticide regulation, and would be treated as a substance of very high 
concern under REACH. The Danish proposal is very similar to the present EU Commission’s option 3, which is the 
option supported by endocrine scientists and NGOs. Denmark’s proposal is heavily contrasted by the joint 
German/UK proposal, which is based on the traditional risk assessment of chemicals and that proposes a potency-
based cut-off criteria – meaning that only the most “potent” ED will be subject to regulation. This proposal 
corresponds to EU Commission’s option 4, the one supported by the industry. Regulation based on potency has been 
heavily criticized as being largely arbitrary and not scientifically justifiable. It is also claimed that it will not offer 
much protection since it would lead to the regulation of just the few worst offenders (ChemicalWatch, 2012). 
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complement the conventional one-substance-at-the-time evaluation) (DTU-Food, 2015a, 
2015d).
88
   
5.3 The Danish framework for EDs 
As described in the previous section, the early research on EDs - in particular the work of 
professor Skakkebæk - and the early intervention of the Danish EPA directed focus and resources 
on the ED topic. This was followed by a broad interest from the media, the public and, in 
particular, from politicians.  
5.3.1 National Strategy on ED and the Chemical Action Plans 
In 2002, the Danish Board of Technology organized a hearing on EDs at the Environment and 
Regional Planning Committee of the Danish Parliament with the aim of gathering different 
perspectives on the ED topic (Teknologirådet, 2002b).
 89
  The concluding advice was, among 
other things, to establish a multidisciplinary research center for EDs, to regulate based on a 
precautionary thinking without waiting for full scientific evidence and to strengthen information 
to the public (Teknologirådet, 2002a). 
That same year, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of the Interior and Health 
presented a report (beretning) on EDs to the Danish Parliament which led to the establishment of 
the national strategy on endocrine disruptors (Folketinget, 2002). After five years, this national 
strategy was replaced by a broader chemical framework namely, that of the chemical action plans 
which have been going on for the last ten years (Regeringen, 2005, 2010, 2013). In this respect, it 
can be said that Denmark has had a long tradition of a common political wish to address the 
problems related to EDs and to increase the level of protection of Danish citizens.
90
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 This team of researchers looked into the combination effects of chemicals in food – and concluded that the 
combined exposure to low-doses of chemicals (with similar effects) could add to significant adverse effects. This 
information was used to develop a toolbox to be used for the prediction of combination effects when conducting risk 
assessments in the food sector. Even though ED were not particularly assessed, it was mentioned that when assessed 
they also represented a problem (DTU-Food, 2015a, 2015d). 
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 In general, the role of the Danish Board of Technology has been giving advice to policy makers on techno-
scientific issues of public concern (such as cloning and genetically modified organism)(Teknologirådet, 2015). The 
advice on EDs was based on the input from a wide range of stakeholders, including: researchers from several 
disciplines, authorities from different governmental agencies, organizations (consumer organizations, environmental 
NGOs, industry and business representatives) and politicians (Teknologirådet, 2002b).  
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 Since 2006, all political parties in the Danish Parliament have agreed on three different four-year-term action plans 
(from 2006-2009, 2010-2013 and the last 2014-2017). 
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The national strategy and the action plans have in great measure outlined Denmark’s long-term 
work with respect to EDs. In practical terms these action frames have guided national efforts in 
the field such as: funding research in EDs, working towards tightening EU chemical legislation; 
raising awareness among the general public, companies and politicians, and working on 
initiatives for safer consumer products among others (Planlægningsudvalget, 2002; Regeringen, 
2005, 2010, 2013).  
I will argue that these action frames (namely the national strategy on EDs and the different 
chemical action plans) have led to the emergence of what I will call a “Danish framework on 
EDs”. This framework has in turned encouraged the establishment of networks of actors and 
processes that interact at different levels and in different ways towards the same goal – achieving 
a better regulation of EDs. In particular I will claim that the Danish framework on EDs and the 
resulting networks have contributed to the development of a common understanding of the 
problem at hand and to a better coordination of initiatives in Denmark and abroad. This will be 
the topic of the following section.  
5.3.2 A common scientific voice 
In the Danish framework on EDs, knowledge building has always been a priority. This interest 
has permitted a steady economic support for research in the field  and the establishment of 
several research centers on the topic (Regeringen, 2010, 2013). I will argue that these Centers 
have played a very important role in gathering resources in one same place, in terms of expertise, 
funding and regulatory and political attention.
91
 But most importantly, they have promoted the 
development of a common understanding of the ED issue in Denmark where they have 
functioned as brokers of this unified perspective and as a reference point for all stakeholders. A 
clear example of this unified understanding is that in Denmark, the scientific controversy around 
EDs is not nearly as polarized as it is in other places such as the EU and the US (personal 
communication with representative of the Centre on Endocrine Disrupters).  
Looking in particular at the Centre for Endocrine Disrupters, one can see that this center has 
played an important role not only in coordinating research on ED among different disciplines 
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 This is not to say that all ED-related research in Denmark takes place at those ED- research Centers, but rather that 
the latter function as national reference points. 
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(including basic science, human toxicology, ecotoxicology, epidemiology, human hormone 
related pathologies, and many more), but also among different institutions - referring to the 
Center’s three partner institutions: the Department of Growth and Reproduction at Copenhagen 
University Hospital, the Division of Toxicology and Risk Assessment at the National Food 
Institute (the Technical University of Denmark) and the Institute of Biology at the University of 
Southern Denmark (CeHoS, 2015). At the same time, the Center’s annual working program is 
established by a steering committee chaired by the Danish EPA and including representatives 
from the National Board of Health, the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration and the 
Danish Working Environment Authority (Miljøstyrelsen, 2015b). In this respect, one could claim 
that the work conducted at the center is a reference not only across academic disciplines but also 
across different sectors (e.g. the environmental sector, the food sector, the health sector and the 
occupational sector).   
Besides, given that the national expertise is gather in one place, it is not unusual that different 
regulatory agencies receive a common scientific advice on specific questions in relation to EDs. 
A clear example of this is the scientific opinion given on the toxicity of BPA (DTU-Food, 2010, 
2015b). In this case, the National Food Institute, division of Toxicology and Risk Assessment, 
has been in charge of giving advice to the food agency on scientific matters concerning EDs, and 
in particular concerning the toxicity of BPA. And, at the same time, this same group of 
researchers is part of the Centre for Endocrine Disruptors and hence also a main advisor for the 
environmental agency (CeHoS, 2015).  This means that both agencies have been receiving the 
same scientific input concerning the toxicity of BPA.  
Dissemination of information to the external world 
Besides its knowledge building and advisory activities, the Center on Endocrine Disrupters has 
also played an important communication role beyond the standard dialogue between scientists 
and regulators.  Over the years, the Center’s research and activities have attracted the interest of a 
broad spectrum of actors, including:  international researchers, the general public, the media, 
politicians and civil organizations.  
The Centre has for example contributed to the steady dissemination of knowledge by means of 
international scientific conferences and workshops (e.g. the International Copenhagen Workshops 
on Endocrine Disrupters) and through annual information days for the general public (CeHoS, 
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2015). Besides, its scientific achievements have continuous been covered by the media leading to 
a further dissemination of information.   
At the same time, it has also been the case that researchers belonging to the Center have been 
called to present the results of their research to politicians, in particular to members of the Danish 
Parliament. In November 2014 for example, the Danish Parliament Committees on Health and 
Prevention and on the Environment arranged a hearing to get an update on EDs research from the 
Centre. In this occasion, the group working on BPA a the National Food Institute (DTU-Food) 
had the opportunity of giving a direct and clear message to the politicians, namely this scientific 
team did not agree with the preliminary conclusions reached by EFSA in their latest risk 
assessment of BPA and that the recommended European safe level did not adequately protect 
consumers against the endocrine disrupting effect of BPA (Folketinget, 2014a). Concerning the 
particular case of BPA, other more informal forms of communication have been witnessed. In 
2009,  for example, Professor Skakkebæk himself sent a letter to the Danish Parliament 
concerning the debate on the regulation of BPA where he advise politicians  to use the 
precautionary principle when deciding on the regulation of this chemical.
92
 However, in general 
most politicians are updated on the latest EDs news by the media and the work of some NGOs 
(personal communication with representative of the Red-Green alliance political party). 
Last but not least, it can also be mentioned that researchers belonging to the Centre have also 
spread their knowledge through projects conducted in collaboration with NGOs. In Denmark 
there are two NGOs that are very active on the topic of EDs, these are The Danish Consumer 
Council (dealing mainly with consumer’s interests) and The Ecological Council (dealing mainly 
with broader environmental and health related questions) (personal communication with 
representatives of both NGOs). In the last years, The Ecological Council has been working with 
scientists on a project named “better regulation of chemicals” dealing with EDs and cocktail 
effects. The objective of the project is to prepare “call-for-action” documents to inform Danish 
and European politicians on the latest scientific advice, to prepare teaching material, to organize 
seminars and give to advice on substitution of harmful chemicals (Økologiske-råd, 2013) .  
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 The letter can be consulted in the website of the Danish Parliament at: 
http://www.ft.dk/samling/20091/almdel/flf/bilag/82/772546.pdf 
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5.3.2 Coordination at the administrative level  
During my interviews, it was brought to my attention that the Danish EPA has been the main actor 
when it comes to ED related work in Denmark (personal communication with representative of the 
DVFA). Yet, there is also a continuous effort to pull other agencies on board to promote collaboration 
across ministries and authorities on ED issues - with the ultimate intention of ensuring a better 
coordination throughout legislative areas.  In particular, I was informed that there are two cross-
ministerial meetings a year involving representatives from the Danish EPA, the Danish Veterinary 
and Food Administration (DVFA), the Danish Medicines Agency, the Danish Working Environment 
Authority, the National Board of Health and the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority 
(personal communication with representatives of the DVFA and Danish EPA). 93 Although it was out 
of the scope of my work to investigate into the precise content and outcome of such meetings, I will 
argue that an example of such administrative coordination is evident in some national risk reduction 
strategies, in particular the ones dealing with soft-policy measures.  
National risk reduction strategies for EDs. 
In Denmark, both hard regulatory measures and soft regulatory measures have been used for 
managing health and environmental risks posed by EDs. 
Hard regulatory measures refer to mandatory rules such as bans or restrictions on certain 
substances. These measures should preferably take place at EU level and should be mainly used 
when a potential risk has been identified (based on documented adverse effects and worrisome 
exposure levels). On important point here is that most regulations that concern EDs are 
harmonized within the EU (e.g. the legislation on chemicals (REACH), food contact materials, 
pesticides, toys, cosmetics, and many more). It is therefore difficult for member states to 
introduce national rules. However, in Denmark this has happened now and then, both in the 
environmental and the food sector, when the risks associated with certain EDs were assessed as 
unacceptable and not sufficiently managed by existing EU legislations (Dobel, 2011). 
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 Where the Danish EPA is in charge of industrial chemicals, consumer products, cosmetics, indoor climate, 
pesticides and biocides; the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration (DVFA)  is in charge of food contact 
materials, and pollutants and additives in food; the Danish Medicines Agency is in charge of medical equipment and 
pharmaceuticals; the Danish Working Environment Authority is in charge of the working environment; the National 
Board of Health is in charge of semen quality monitoring and the general health of the population and the Danish 
Enterprise and Construction Authority is in charge of construction materials (personal communication with 
representative of the DVFA and the Danish EPA). 
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Examples of national regulations include: a Danish ban in 2010 for the use of BPA in all food 
contact material for children aged 0-3; followed in 2011 by a national ban on parabens (propyl- 
and butylparaben) in cosmetic products intended for children under 3 years. More recently, in 
2012, Denmark decided to ban four phthalates (DEHP, DBP, DIBP and BBP) from consumer 
products. All of these regulations have been based on these chemicals’ ED-properties and, in the 
last two cases, also based on potential for combination effects (Dobel, 2011).   
Soft regulatory measures, on the other hand, refer to “alternative ways of protecting the consumer 
without resorting to regulation” (Sørensen, 2011, p. 7). This strategy is preferred when substances 
are suspected of having ED-effects or when the exposures are deemed unnecessary (Dobel, 
2011). Soft regulatory measures are particular relevant for the regulation of EDs, since it is often 
the case that available evidence is insufficient to draw firm conclusions that allow the 
implementation of hard regulatory measures.  Yet, it is also often the case that the evidence raises 
doubt and warrants caution. In cases of scientific uncertainty, contradictory evidence and 
inconclusiveness, Danish authorities have opted for the implementation of soft regulatory 
measures, while waiting for final answers. Targeted information campaigns, is a widely used soft 
regulatory measure in Denmark. The objective of these campaigns is to increase the chemical 
knowledge of selected consumer groups where it is particularly important to be careful. This is 
done by giving them advice on how to reduce exposures and on safer products.
94
 The campaigns 
are based on the assumption that informed consumers might modify their behavior and 
consumption patterns leading to a risk reduction while waiting for hard regulation (Sørensen, 
2011).  
Several information campaigns have been launched in the last decade based on: the latest 
scientific evidence, typical Danish exposure patterns for vulnerable groups and on information 
coming from inspection activities on consumer products.
95
  Even though most campaigns are 
prepared by the Danish EPA, other agencies have also been involved.
96
 At the same time, the 
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 Additionally, I will add that such campaigns can also contribute to a more sustainable production where producers 
and suppliers have an incentive to apply for environmentally friendly ecolabels, such as the Nordic ecolabel (which 
certifies that labelled products are among the safer alternatives in the market when it comes to chemical content).    
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 The later refers to the inspection of the content of chemicals in consumer products and the assessment of their 
related risk (Regeringen, 2005, 2010).   
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 Examples are the 2002 campaign on “Stof til eftertanke – fakta om hormonforstyrrende stoffer”. A booklet giving 
information to pregnant and parents of small children on what EDs are, which effects they have, and how to avoid 
them(Miljøministeriet, 2003). And the 2015 campaign “Gravid?, Kend kemien”, giving advice to pregnant women 
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food agency DVFA has also set up its own information website: “Food with less chemistry” to 
give advice to consumers on food safety issues and chemicals in food.
97
  
Since 2006, for example, the Danish EPA has been giving advice to soon-to-be-parents on how to 
minimize chemical exposure during pregnancy and infancy. In addition to the online information, 
some of the material has also been distributed through a network of midwives, general 
practitioners and maternity nurses – making Denmark one of the few countries (if not the only) 
where pregnant women are informed about the possible risk of EDs at the most crucial time. 
These campaigns have aroused much interest and have been repeated and expanded several times 
between 2005 and 2015 (Miljøstyrelsen, 2012).
98
  The most important though, is that a later 
evaluation of one of these campaigns revealed that a large majority of the target group had indeed 
modified their behavior according to the authority’s advice (Miljøministeriet, 2007; 
Miljøstyrelsen, 2015a). 
Even though these campaigns in general concentrate in giving a general and easy to follow advice, 
they can also provide information on specific substances, such as BPA. In the 2015 campaign for 
pregnant, it is for example recommended to take extra care of the unborn child given their 
vulnerability to even small amounts of chemicals. Concerning BPA, it is mentioned that there is 
an ongoing debate concerning BPA’s low-dose effects and recommend to stay away from 
handling thermal paper during pregnancy (Miljøstyrelsen, 2015e). The campaign’s website also 
includes a link to the food agency’s information website, where it is advised to avoid food 
packing made out of polycarbonate plastic and canned food during pregnancy and infancy on 
precautionary grounds: “Bisphenol-A is an endocrine disruptor. Infants and pregnant women 
especially, should therefore, as a preventive measure, choose a wrapping that does not contain 
bisphenol-A, when possible”(Fødevarestyrelsen, 2015). 
5.3.3 Collaborations among stakeholders 
At the same time, one can argue that the Danish framework on EDs has also encouraged 
collaboration and network-building of otherwise more distant stakeholders. The particular context 
                                                                                                                                                                            
on how to minimize chemical exposures. Available at: http://mst.dk/borger/kemikalier-i-hverdagen/kampagne-
gravid-kend-kemien/  
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 Available at: http://www.foedevarestyrelsen.dk/kampagner/madmedmindrekemi/Sider/default.aspx 
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 The three campaigns have been “Nine good habits for pregnant and nursing mothers” (9 gode vaner) from 2006, 
“Ready for the stork” (klar til storken) from 2012 and “Pregnant, know the chemistry” (Gravid? Kend kemien” from 
2015 
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in Denmark (perhaps together with this country’s deliberative culture) has contributed to pull 
more actors into the debate concerning the regulation of EDs (and BPA). As an example of how 
these different actors have been interacting at different levels and in different ways in the 
regulatory processes (be it hard policy or soft policy measures) will be presented below:  
The Danish EPA has, for example, been experimenting with new types of consumer information 
through collaborations with NGOs. Such an example is the joint project with the consumer 
organization  the Danish Consumer Council - dealing with consumers’ right to be informed about 
the chemical content of products (Miljøstyrelsen, 2014c).
99
  Another example is the financial 
support and collaboration with chemical watchdogs, such as Chemistry Watch (“Kemiwatch”) - 
whose objective is to give advice to consumers and put extra pressure in the industry: “The Danes 
will have a new watchdog, who shall help consumers to find their way in the jungle of chemicals, 
and simultaneously keep a firm grip on the industry”(Miljøstyrelsen, 2014b).100 These chemical 
watchdogs usually used a wider safety margin than the authorities – thinking on those consumers 
that want to be extra careful (IMS, 2009). Chemistry Watch conducts chemical analyses of 
different consumer products and publishes tests that help consumers to avoid problematic 
chemicals. They also give advice and spread information on chemicals through their website, 
social media and via a hotline (Forbrugerrådet, 2015).  
At the same time, the Danish Consumer Council and the Ecological Council  (the other Danish 
NGO working on EDs) are also good at bridging what is going on at the national level and at the 
European level with respect to EDs. They have for example been following the different 
European processes with respect to the development of criteria for the identification of EDs and 
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 The campaign refers in particular to chemicals listed in the so-called Candidate List (See REACH section for more 
information).  REACH regulation article 33 which states that suppliers of articles that contain candidate list 
substances in a concentration above 0.1% weight/weight have the obligation to inform their customers about the 
content and safe use of the article in case of request. The answer must come within 45 days. Through an app, 
consumers are able to scan the barcode of an article and send a request to the manufacturers. A database compiles the 
answers so that the information is available to other consumers. The database also allows searching for articles that 
do not contain Candidate List substances, making it easier to identify and select this type of products.  For more 
information on the campaign, see http://www.tjekkemien.dk/ 
100
 Denmark has had a “chemical watchdog” since 2003: the Information center for Environment and Health 
(Informationscenter for Miljø & Sundhed – IMS). This center provided independent information and advice to 
consumers concerning chemicals in products (Regeringen, 2010). Its work complemented the general information 
from the authorities with specific product surveys and to identifying and naming the good and the less good products 
in the market (IMS, 2009). After, 10 years in operation, it closed in 2013 due to lack of funding (which came from 
the CAPs. The intense critique that this caused led to a new allocation of fund for Chemistry Watch in 2014) 
(Politiken, 2013).  
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have been active in the debate through their European sister organizations (personal 
communication with representatives of both NGOs). The Danish Consumer Council has for 
example encouraged Danish citizens to participate in the public hearing related to the impact 
assessment on EDs going on at the EU Commission.
101
 These two NGO’s have also been active 
in raising Danish awareness on broader processes that affect European (and thus Danish) 
chemical legislation such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
(Økologiske-råd, 2015).
 102
 They have also been working to strengthen consumer and political 
awareness in the EU through dissemination of the latest Danish research. In this respect, one can 
argue that the work of these actors has been supplementing the efforts of the Danish Government 
with respect to ED legislation at the EU level (Forbrugerrådet, 2015; Miljøstyrelsen, 2014b).  
Other types of collaborations among a broader range of stakeholders have also been proposed. In 
2013 a chemical forum (composed of authorities, industry, trade associations, retailers, consumer 
organizations and NGOs) was established to soften different perceptions among stakeholders 
concerning problematic chemicals, including EDs. The objective of the chemical forum is to 
promote communication and collaboration among stakeholders to find common solutions to the 
problem of hazardous chemicals in consumer products (Regeringen, 2013).
103
 
One can also argue that the Danish framework on EDs has been an incentive for business 
enthusiast to be frontrunners. In Denmark, as opposed to many other countries, the national 
context has enabled the development of a big market for health and environmentally friendly 
products. For some companies, the development of such products has been a great commercial 
success. For example, Denmark’s biggest retailer COOP has had for several years an internal 
policy to remove all EDs from its brand products, which in practice means that COOP’s 
requirements go many times further than current legislation (EurActiv, 2013).
104
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 Through common European campaigns such as: https://www.no2hormonedisruptingchemicals.org/da 
102
 The ongoing debate has been that American and European chemical regulation are very different and that 
acceptance of the TTIP (that is, the avoidance of trade barriers) might imply that Europe will have to adopt the 
weaker chemical safety standards of the US.  
103
 For example by facilitating the coupling of consumer’s demand for environmentally friendly products to the 
industry’s motivations for innovation, promoting voluntary phasing-outs and substitutions, etc. Even though there 
has been skepticisms from both NGOs and the industry on what can really be achieved by such forum (personal 
communication with representative of the Danish Consumer Council), it seems that the forum has finally found some 
common concrete demands. 
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 “COOP’s policy is that we really want to make use of the precautionary principle when we believe the legislation 
is imprecise or not strong enough and if we know that alternatives, that can be used, exist. Why wait for the 
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Finally, it should also be highlighted that occasionally the direct participation of the public has 
also taken place. In 2009 for example, Danish citizens were invited to participate in the public 
event “What do you think is good chemistry?”, organized by the then minister of environment 
Troels Lund Poulsen (from Venstre). During this event, the public could directly talk to the 
minister or simply vote for the chemical themes that they believed should be covered or solved 
by the chemical action plans (Miljøministeriet, 2009).
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5.3.4 A unified Danish position towards the EU 
In Denmark, as in any other country following the rules of the European single market, there is a 
big focus on EU level rules. The vast majority of chemical regulations in Denmark are the result 
of EU legislation, and at the same time, a large amount of chemicals come into the country from 
abroad (by trade or via the environment). As a result of this, it has for a long time been 
acknowledged that the best way of promoting Danish interests in the chemical field, is through an 
active participation at EU level. Besides, it is also recognized that European solutions promote 
longer environmental and health protection and a more efficient use of resources. This European 
focus is particularly evident in the work of the different Danish agencies, which are particularly 
reluctant in proposing national Danish rules (referring to hard regulatory measures). Instead, 
Danish authorities are commonly instructed to tackle chemical issues at EU level (Regeringen, 
2005, 2010, 2013).  
What is distinctive of the Danish contribution to the EU work is that, as explained in previous 
sections, the governance context in Denmark has promoted a rather common, unified and I would 
add, more influential Danish position. Danes are often seen as front runners, that come to 
Brussels with strong scientific arguments, expertise and motivation to influence and guide action 
at EU level (ChemicalWatch, 2014).  
As mention somewhere else, Denmark has been very active on ED-related work at the EU level 
including: the Danish criteria proposal for the identification of EDs, their work towards the 
inclusion of combination effects in future legislation, their efforts to improve REACH and more 
                                                                                                                                                                            
endocrine-disrupting substances to have an effect if we have the opportunity to use other substances?” (EurActiv, 
2013) 
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 For those that could not attend to the event, it was possible to participate and vote through the social media, 
EPA’s website or by meeting with the minister whose door was open for citizens on the last Friday of every month 
(Miljøministeriet, 2009).  
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recently, even a national expert has been sent to the EU Commission to contribute on the ongoing 
EU legislative work on EDs (Regeringen, 2013). Given the current evidence-based policy focus 
in the EU, it is easy to understand that the most valuable currency when negotiating policy issues 
at the EU Commission is “scientific evidence”. In this respect, Denmark’s interests have gotten 
an upper hand in Brussels.  
At the same time, Denmark has also used other political means to influence EU work on EDs 
such as the implementation of stricter national rules that challenge harmonized EU legislation 
(Dobel, 2011), suing the EU commission for delaying the establishment of ED criteria (HEAL, 
2015), through collaborations and joint initiatives with other equally minded countries to put 
collective pressure on the commission (including Norway)(ChemSec, 2014), through the work of 
Danish members of the European Parliament, and so on (Dagens, 2012). 
Danish influence, is however not limited to the traditionally official channels. As explained 
before, Danish NGOs (and Danish citizens) have also been calling for a stronger regulation of 
EDs at EU level (Økologiske-råd, 2013). For example, through the work of Danish NGOs, 
Danish citizens were able to participate in the EU Commission’s public consultation on defining 
criteria for identifying EDs (EC, 2015b).
106
 At the same time, Danish researches have also 
participated in different publications calling for action and highlighting the public health 
relevance of the regulation of EDs (Skakkebaek et al., 2011; Trasande et al., 2015). 
5.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued that the Danish framing of the ED-issue has a strong public health 
component, related to its medical origin and the work of Professor Skakkebæk. It is for example 
remarkable that in Denmark, very often, EDs are discussed in connection with well-known 
negative health trends in the country such as: bad semen quality (linked to decreased fertility), 
increase in the incidence of testicular cancer and more recently, Danish girls reaching puberty 
earlier (parliament and newspaper). This is not to say that the environmental dimension is 
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 A report summarizing the results of the public consultation reveal that “Individual responses (as opposed to 
responses of behalf of organizations) accounted for more than 90% of the responses received. Of these individual 
responses, 88% came from seven Member States (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom)” (EC, 2015b, p. 1)  
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forgotten, yet it seems that most of the research conducted in Denmark and most of the 
regulations proposed by Denmark have to do with human health implications.
107
 At the same time, 
an analysis of the different documents released by the center on endocrine disrupters and the 
Danish EPA, reveal that the ED-issue in Denmark is mainly based on what I have called an 
“endocrine-perspective”.  
 
At the same time I have claimed that the early political interest on EDs, in particular the 
establishment of the national strategy on EDs and the different chemical action plans has 
promoted the establishment of what I have called the “Danish framework on ED”. This refers to 
the country’s long-term strategy and objectives with respect to EDs. I argued that this action 
framework has also directly and indirectly, encouraged the development of different networks of 
actors and processes that have been interacting at different levels and in different ways towards 
the same overall goal – the better regulation of EDs.  
 
In this respect, the governance of EDs in Denmark is characterized by a multitude of processes 
and structures (actors and institutionalized procedures) which interact ‘to steer’ the national 
management of EDs (and many times also the international management of EDs). The processes 
refer mainly to how the problem is understood (and possibly solved), setting national priorities 
and coordinating action. I have for example highlighted the importance of the knowledge-
building process in Denmark. In particular, I have claimed that the national focus on ED-research 
has contributed to a common understanding of the problem and as a reference point for action. 
Such action (or initiatives) have in turned been ‘administered’ and organized through a variety of 
actors and different sets of established procedures.  
 
The actors - such as regulatory agencies, experts, NGOs, industry, politicians and the public - 
represent different perspectives and have different capacities to act. Most of the time, these actors 
act in accordance to institutionalized procedures - such as proposing regulation, publication and 
dissemination of scientific findings, raising awareness among the population, promoting political 
discussions at the parliament and participating in deliberative exercises, respectively. One can see 
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that the degree of formalization within the different institutionalized procedures varies a lot, with 
the action taken place at the public administration level being perhaps the most formal. In 
practice, it is difficult to accurately describe the governance mechanism given that the different 
processes and procedures are messy and often, the rules-in-paper differ from the rules-in-use, in 
particular when working towards trying to influence decisions at the EU level.  
 
At the same time, as explained in the theory chapter, the governance concept (and in particular 
risk governance) provides more than a descriptive model. With respect to tis normative 
dimension, risk governance calls for the development of more inclusive and deliberative 
governance models to deal with uncertain risk. In this respect, I will argue that in Denmark, the 
participation of a variety of actors and the development of a variety of processes has led to a 
more robust and resilience management of EDs. The diversity of actors has for example 
contributed with a variety of sources of information, logics of action, different normative 
standpoints, variety of perspectives and interests. This has promoted the development of different 
initiatives to manage ED-risk at different levels and based on different motivations. As illustrated 
throughout this chapter, several of these initiatives overlap in certain ways and create redundancy. 
I will claim that this redundancy results in less ED-vulnerability and consequently more 
resilience. For example, the “Danish framework on EDs” helps to coordinate initiatives at the 
administrative level, where regulatory agencies convey clear and consistent messages. This 
information is in turn complemented through the coordinated initiatives of other stakeholders. 
NGOs give consumers advice on specific questions (via hotlines and social media), help 
consumers find safer products, promote consumer participation in broader EU initiatives (dealing 
with ED-regulation). Danish experts, on its part, disseminate information on EDs and sometimes 
participate in call for regulatory action initiatives. Business forerunners are also seizing market 
opportunities with respect to the development of safer (certified) products.  Several members of 
the Danish Parliament are engaged in the political debate on how to best regulate EDs. And, at 
the same time, there are coordinated and unified efforts towards influencing regulation at the EU-
level.  
 
I will finally claim that the particular way EDs are ‘governed’ in Denmark has reinforced its 
political salience. In this respect is not surprising that these chemicals are many times discussed 
91 
 
in the Danish Parliament and that policy-decisions are taken at the political level. In the next 
chapter, I will explain how such political debates have dealt with questions of scientific 
uncertainty and acceptable level of risk, in particular when it comes to regulation of BPA.  
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6. The BPA-case in Denmark 
In this section I will look at the BPA policy process in Denmark. In particular, I will present the 
different proposals for regulation that have been introduced and debated at the Danish Parliament 
in the last six years. This gives a unique insight into how scientific uncertainty is dealt with in the 
political context. My analysis will be mainly based on “the precautionary model” as outlined in 
theory section (2.3.2.). The main idea of this model as presented by Funtowicz (2006)   , is that in 
cases of scientific uncertainty and inconclusiveness, policy-decisions can be complemented with 
precaution.  I will in particular explore two questions:  
1) Under which circumstances, and on which grounds should the precautionary principle be 
used?, and 2) How to weight the proportionality between the cost of regulation and the benefits of 
precaution?  
6.1 The political interest in EDs 
6.1.1. Danish politics and endocrine disruptors 
Political parties 
Denmark has a multi-party system with many political parties represented in the parliament. 
Broadly speaking the parties can be divided into two main blocs: a red bloc on the center-left of 
the political spectrum, and a blue bloc on the center-right.  
The main parties in the red bloc are: 
 The Social Democrats – Socialdemokraterne (S) 
 The Danish Social Liberal party – Radikale Venstre (RV) 
 The Socialist People’s party – Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) 
 The Red-Green Alliance – Enhedslisten (EL) 
And in the blue bloc: 
 The Liberal party of Denmark, Venstre – Venstre (V) 
 The Danish People’s party – Dansk Folkeparti (DF) 
 The Conservative People’s party – Det Konservative Folkeparti (DKF)  
 The Liberal Alliance – Liberal Alliance (LA) 
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Endocrine disruptors on the Danish political agenda 
One can say that in general there is a high political interest in the area of chemicals among 
Danish politicians – in particular when it comes to EDs. As can be seem from the continuous and 
unanimous support in the Danish Parliament – the “Folketing” – for the establishment of the 
national strategy on EDs and the renewal of the different chemical action plans 
(Planlægningsudvalget, 2002; Regeringen, 2005, 2010, 2013) .  
At the same time, several political parties, in particular those in the red block, seem to have an 
even stronger interest on EDs. For example, all red-block parties have explicit policy goals for 
EDs in their overall environmental policy objectives – even if their corresponding policy goals 
vary somehow among parties.  For the social democrats safe products are important 
(Socialdemokraterne, 2015), while, for the social liberals the focus should be on more research 
(since regulation only moves forward with scientific evidence)(RadikaleB, 2014). For the 
Socialist People’s party, it is absolutely necessary to improve European legislation on EDs (SF, 
2015) and the more radical Red-Green Alliance supports the prohibition of all EDs (when safer 
alternative are available). This small leftwing socialist party encourage the use of the 
precautionary principle in cases of scientific doubts and warns against compromising public 
health vis-à-vis the interests of the European single market. Not surprisingly, it is mainly the Red-
Green Alliance (and the Socialist party), sometimes with the support of other red-block parties, 
that has played the most active role in keeping EDs high on the political agenda of the Danish 
Parliament (Enhedslisten, 2015). This has been done through its work in the Parliamentary 
Committees, namely by constantly questioning the ministers on smaller and larger issues related 
to EDs and by regularly putting forward rather ambitious proposals for the regulation of EDs.
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Another important difference among the red-block parties concerns their overall European policy, 
namely that they have different opinions concerning whether regulations should take place at 
national or at EU level. For the EU-friendly parties (the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals 
and the Socialist People’s party), regulatory processes should preferably take place at EU level by 
contributing with scientific evidence, proposing stricter EU regulations and applying political 
pressure. For the Red-Green Alliance, a known European skeptic, regulatory processes should 
start at the national level (Folketinget, 2009b, 2009c).  
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For the blue block parties on the other hand, there seems to be less concrete interest on the topic, 
except maybe for the Danish People’s party (another known EU-skeptic) which, in general is 
positive to stricter regulations for children’s products (Folketinget, 2009b, 2009c). For the 
remaining parties in the blue-block, regulation should unequivocally take place at the EU and 
should be as industry-friendly as possible (Folketinget, 2015). 
Some of the above-mentioned general positions with respect to ED and EU policies have been 
reflected since the beginning of the ED-issue in Denmark. Namely, that the red-block parties 
have been more eager to go further when it comes to EDs. A quick analysis of the “political input 
to the national strategy on EDs”, reveals that the center-right government and supporting parties 
(the blue-block, which represented a majority) wanted to focus on research and EU work, while 
the opposition (the red-block, which represented a minority) saw a need to complement 
knowledge building activities with efforts on regulation based on the precautionary principle  
(Folketinget, 2002). For example, the Government demanded BPA to be included in the Danish 
EPA’s List Of Undesirable Substances (LOUS) – given the available evidence on its ED-
properties and the fact that has not been previously regulated (The LOUS is a signal list that 
signals which chemicals are in the scope of future regulation). The opposition on the other hand, 
wanted a BPA ban given that BPA was a “documented” ED according to the European list of 
EDs and that the available EU risk assessment had concluded that there were ongoing 
uncertainties (referring to the (SCF, 2002) assessment)(Folketinget, 2002). 
The Danish Parliament – the Folketing 
To understand the BPA case, it is necessary to understand some of the main traits of the Danish 
parliamentary situation. Denmark has a parliamentary tradition of minority government. This 
means that governments do not control a majority of seats in parliament (Andersen, 1997).  This 
means that sometimes, when EDs have been discussed in the Parliament, it has been possible to 
experience a so-called parliamentary “alternative majorities” – that is, a majority in the 
Parliament which has pressured the ruling government into introducing more ambitious policy 
goals that they would not otherwise have pursued. This has many times resulted in “top-down” 
national ED policies that have been decided at the Parliament (sometimes out winning the 
corresponding administration and challenging common European rules). One such example is the 
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ban on BPA (but it has been seen for other EDs such as parabens). These top-down decisions 
usually start with a proposal for parliamentary resolution. 
Proposal for Parliamentary resolution 
A proposal for a parliamentary resolution is a request to the Government to take action, such as 
introducing rules or preparing bills with a specific content. The proposals are prepared by one or 
several members of the Danish Parliament (MPs). They are usually subject to two readings in the 
Chamber (two political debates) with a stage in between where the work is further referred to the 
corresponding standing Committee (Folketinget, 2014b).
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In the committee, MPs keep working on the proposals and at the end of their work they issue a 
report which includes possible amendments and collects the positions of each political party. The 
committee can submit questions to the corresponding Minister and it can also receive visits from 
other interested stakeholders on the topic(Folketinget, 2014b). For BPA’s case, the Committee 
working on the different proposals has been that of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (Folketinget, 
2009b).
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Some proposals for parliamentary resolutions do not make it to a second reading at the Chamber 
and the case is either discarded or worked only at the committee level. For those proposals that 
do make it to a second reading, the political debate at the Chamber is based on the Committee’s 
report. Usually at this stage most details have fallen into place and the proposal for parliamentary 
resolution can proceed to a vote. If a majority of the Parliament supports the proposal for 
resolution, then the latter is officially adopted by Parliament. A large majority of the 
parliamentary resolutions are put forward by the opposition parties, which means that most of 
them are not adopted by the Parliament at the end (Folketinget, 2014b). Bisphenol A has been 
debated four times in the Danish Parliament in connection to four different proposals for 
parliamentary resolutions in a period spanning from 2009 to 2015 (Folketinget, 2009a, 2009b, 
2010a, 2015).  
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 The Danish Parliament has 23 different standing (or permanent) committees, each working on specific areas of 
competence (e.g. The Committee on Environment and Planning; The Committee on Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
and so on, with one committee for each ministry). The Chamber of the Danish Parliament is where MPs debate 
political issues and vote on bills and proposal for parliamentary resolution (Folketinget, 2014b) 
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 In the Committee, each political party is represented. The Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Committee’s areas of 
competence and responsibility correspond to that of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (Folketinget, 
2014b) 
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6.2 Bisphenol A in the Danish Parliament 
Bisphenol A’s proposals for parliamentary resolution: 
B101:  Proposal to ban BPA in baby bottles 
B42:  Proposal to ban BPA in food contact material for children aged 0-3 
B17:  Proposal to ban BPA in all food contact material 
B68:  Proposal to follow the recommendation from DTU-Food’s 2015 assessment on the safety 
of BPA 
During proposals B101 (2009), B42 (2009-2010) and B17 (2010), a blue bloc coalition between 
Venstre (V) and the Conservative People’s party (DKF) was in power, supported by the Danish 
People’s party (DF). For the most recent proposal, B68 (2015), a red bloc coalition between the 
Social Democrats (S) and the Danish Social Liberal party (RV) was in power, supported by the 
Socialist People’s party (SF) and the Red-Green Alliance (EL).  
6.2.1. Under which circumstances, and on which grounds should the precautionary 
principle be used? 
Proposal for parliamentary resolution B101 (2009)  
In February 2009, the Red-Green Alliance (EL) put forward the proposal for parliamentary 
resolution B101, where it is demanded: to stop the use and sale of products containing BPA by 
means of implementation of national regulation  (Folketinget, 2009d).  
The proponents of B101 justified the proposal based on the results from recent scientific 
assessments that had concluded either that: BPA posed a health risk to humans at current levels 
of exposure (Chapel Hill, 2007), or that there was “some concern” related to possible low-dose 
BPA effects (See NTP-CERHR, 2008 and Health Canada, 2008) (Figure 7). It was further noted 
that BPA was widely used and that babies and small children were particularly at risk. The 
proponents also mentioned that the American State of Chicago and Canada had banned the use of 
BPA in baby bottles, and that Nordic members of the EU Parliament had also started a petition to 
ban BPA in Europe. In particular, the Red-Green Alliance was of the idea that EU regulatory 
decisions (based on EFSA’s recommendations) should not prevent Denmark from having stricter 
environmental and health regulations. Instead, Denmark should use the opportunities that were in 
the EU system to protect its citizens, in particular by the use of the safeguard clauses in the EEA 
agreement (Folketinget, 2009d). 
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During the first reading of proposal B101 in the Chamber (in May 2009), the Red-Green Alliance 
proposal was welcomed and supported by the opposition (red-block parties), which also 
considered that there was enough evidence to support regulatory action on BPA (Folketinget, 
2009b).  
In particular, the Red-Green Alliance member of the Parliament (MP) highlighted that there was 
enough scientific evidence about the negative health effects of BPA at low doses. Consequently, 
this party wanted to make use of the precautionary principle and introduce special national 
regulation in this area. In their opinion, the reasoning of the precautionary principle prescribed 
that: when there were suspicions that a chemical was dangerous one could, on precautionary 
grounds, prohibit it until this was clarified – solving the problem of having to wait to have 
conclusive scientific evidence before acting (Folketinget, 2009b). 
This position was supported by the Social Democrats (S) who were willing to support a national 
BPA ban on food contact material (FCM) and to demand the Government to work towards 
strengthening EU regulation in this field. For the social democrat MP, the decision was based on 
the conclusions from a recent BPA workshop, organized by the German environmental 
authorities and including leading international experts on the field. Namely, that there was 
disagreement among scientists concerning the amount of BPA that was necessary to induce 
negative effects and as a results of this, it had been recommended to take a precautionary stance 
with respect to products that were in direct contact with people (such as FCM). At the same time, 
this MP also mentioned that he has been notified of the fact that BPA’s current tolerable daily 
intake (TDI) had been based on only two industry funded studies – while a big number of studies, 
done at independent university laboratories reporting effects at low doses have not been taken 
into consideration. This MP was also of the opinion that Denmark should not worry to get into 
troubles with the EU (if introducing national regulation on BPA) since there was enough 
evidence to invoke the precautionary principle to safeguard children’s health (Folketinget, 2009b).  
The Socialist People’s Party (SF) added that Denmark had precedent in introducing special 
national regulation to manage chemicals of concern to ensure high environmental and health 
standards. When this had happened, it was stressed, Danish national regulations ended up being 
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adopted by the rest of the EU. This party believed that the same would happen this time with 
BPA (Folketinget, 2009b).
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For the ruling Government and their collaborators, on the other hand, there was not enough 
scientific evidence of the possible risks posed by BPA, and at the same time, this was a problem 
that needed to be dealt with at EU level (Folketinget, 2009b).  
The Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries,  Eva Kjer Hansen (from Venstre) highlighted 
that EFSA’s 2008 scientific opinion on BPA had concluded that the current BPA exposure for 
babies and children was well below established safety limits and therefore safe. She 
acknowledged that uncertainties concerning the effects of BPA at very low exposures had been 
rising recently. Yet, she stressed that this problem had to be solved at the EU level. In this 
respect, she had already approached the EU Commission to demand more research to clarify the 
ongoing uncertainties. She noted that such investigations were under way and that EFSA would 
come with a new opinion in the beginning of 2010 (Folketinget, 2009b).  
The minister stressed that the introduction of special national regulation required that proper and 
well documented scientific evidence was available, showing a health risk at current levels of 
exposure. For the time being, she highlighted, such evidence did not exist and consequently, no 
BPA regulation could be considered. She argued that at present, there were only suspicions based 
on the fact that different studies had concluded differently with respect to the safety of BPA. Her 
position and that of the Government was to wait for EFSA’s coming opinion in order to have 
proper scientific documentation, and then work on a common European regulatory decision based 
on that. It was particularly emphasized that working at the EU level was part of Denmark’s EU 
agreement – namely, to respect common EU regulation and to comply with the rules of the 
internal market (Folketinget, 2009b). 
The MP from the Conservative people’s party (DKF) emphasized that it was particularly 
problematic that “EU-friendly parties” (such as the socialist people’s party , the social liberals but 
in particular, the social democrats) wanted to introduce national special rules – knowing that 
these were against EU cooperation principles and that Denmark could risk ending up with a 
dispute in the European Court of Justice. For this MP efforts should be directed towards more 
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 In particular, the socialist people’s party referred to a ban on phthalates in toys for toddlers from 1998 introduced 
by the Social Democrat Minister of Environment Svend Auken. 
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developing the scientific basis for deliberation instead of looking into national regulation 
(Folketinget, 2009b).    
However, the MP from Venstre noted that the Government wanted to address the uncertainties 
that had been reported in the media concerning BPA in baby bottles and was going to look into a 
voluntary agreement with the industry to reduce the use of BPA in such a product (Folketinget, 
2009b).  
Given that the opposition (S, SF, RV and EL) was supporting the proposal and the Government 
coalition (V, DKF) was against the proposal, the position of the remaining Danish People’s Party 
(DF) – a known skeptic of the EU system – became very important (since this party’s votes 
would define the majority in the Parliament) (Folketinget, 2009b).  
The Danish People’s party MP expressed that his party was very concerned about small 
children’s exposure to BPA, which were the most affected by the possible negative health effects 
of BPA. As a result of this, they were positive to remove BPA from baby bottles as soon as 
possible. They saw that parts of the proposal were very close to the party’s vision (namely that 
Denmark should not depend on EU-based decisions to protect small children from BPA), but 
could not support the resolution the way it was formulated at that moment (i.e. a total stop of the 
use and sale of products containing BPA)(Folketinget, 2009b).  
After the political debate, the proposal for resolution B101 was referred to the Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries Committee where two amendments were proposed. The first, proposed by the 
social democrats, was to limit the ban to FCM (i.e. the ban should only cover food-related 
products, including plastic bottles). The second amendment, proposed by the Danish People party, 
was to restrict the proposal even more, just to cover a ban in baby bottles. After the amendments, 
the new proposal from the Parliament was: to introduce a national ban against the use of BPA in 
baby bottles and at the same time work at EU level to ensure a stricter regulation of BPA. This 
new version was submitted to a vote and was supported by a majority of the Parliament.  The 
opposition was particularly pleased to see that there was a majority in the Parliament willing to 
act on BPA by taking preventive political decisions related to public health (Folketinget, 2009c, 
2009e).  
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Proposal for parliamentary resolution B42 (2009-2010) 
Just some months after the adoption of B101 by the Parliament, a united opposition (EL, S, SF 
and RV) presented a new proposal for parliamentary resolution concerning a BPA ban in all food 
contact materials in Denmark (the B42 proposal). This proposal also stipulated to work together 
with other member states and the Commission to promote a BPA ban on FCM at the EU level 
(Folketinget, 2009a). 
During the first reading of B42 in the Chamber, the minister of Food explained that in order to 
introduce special national regulations, a number of very clear requirements – which were 
specified in the environmental safeguard clause – needed to be fulfilled. Among those 
requirements, was the need to provide new scientific evidence documenting a health risk. Yet, the 
minister noted, in the case of BPA the available scientific evidence did not prove that BPA was 
dangerous and neither was there new scientific information proving the possible harmful effects 
of BPA (Folketinget, 2009a).   
Consequently, the Government had decided not to follow parliamentary resolution B101 
concerning the national BPA ban on baby bottles, as this was seen to go against Denmark’s 
binding obligations under EU law. The same applied to the new proposal for resolution B42 
related to a national BPA ban on FCMs. The MP from Venstre added that B101 and B42 would 
injure the Government’s responsibilities by imposing resolutions that would bring Denmark in 
conflict with EU rules related to the internal market (Folketinget, 2009a).  
The opposition on the other hand, considered again that there was enough scientific evidence to 
call for the implementation of the precautionary principle.   
The Red-Green Alliance stressed that one should not expect to have one scientific truth 
concerning the safety of BPA. And that, the EU system opened for the invocation of the 
precautionary principle in situations where there was scientific disagreement and the risk was 
substantial. It was also pointed to the political dimension of the problem, namely that politicians 
could have a saying concerning the level of risk that was socially desirable: ”[T]here is also the 
political reality, that we sometimes say, that we are not willing to accept any risks, that we 
believe are too big” (Per Clausen) (Folketinget, 2009a) 
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For the Social Democrats the conditions to use the precautionary principle were also met. They 
noted that there were many assessments and many ways to evaluate BPA. There was information 
showing that there was a problem and also information showing the opposite. They 
acknowledged that there was always going to be disagreement between experts and thus, it was a 
political decision to decide whether the precautionary principle should be invoked (Folketinget, 
2009a).  Likewise, for the Social Liberal party, precaution should be invoked in cases of doubt, 
and particularly, when there is so much at stake in terms of public health (Folketinget, 2009a). 
The opposition also questioned the implicit understanding among the parties in the Government 
that only EFSA’s scientific evidence could be used as the basis to decide on BPA’s regulation, 
and for this sake to decide on whether or not one could invoke the precautionary principle. Some 
members of the opposition were also very critical to EFSA’s conclusions, pointing to the 
particular political-economic context in which this institution operated and to the fact that the 
majority of the studies showing low-dose effects were not accounted for in EFSA’s risk 
assessment of BPA: “[W]e must simply acknowledge, that when the European Food Safety 
Authority rejects 698 studies of bisphenol A – they will not even look at it, because they do not 
comply with the demands, that EFSA places on studies – we have indeed a real problem. We 
should perhaps look at the way, in which studies are assessed in the European Food Safety 
Authority, so that minor studies will also have an effect. Studies from The Centre on Endocrine 
Disruptors, located at Copenhagen University Hospital, who have a broad knowledge in this field, 
has time and again said, that bisphenol A is a big problem.” (Pia Olsen Dyhr) (Folketinget, 
2009a). 
The opposition’s EU-friendly parties noted that their parties in general want to follow EU rules 
but that in BPA’s they could not afford ignoring the warnings. Plus, they noted that it would be 
hard for the EU to file a court case against a member state for protecting the health of its 
population (Folketinget, 2009a).  
The position of The Danish People’s party (DF) was again crucial for the future of proposal B42 
(as it had been for the previous B101), namely that the votes of this party were decisive to gather 
a majority in Parliament. This party kept noting that they were still very nervous with respect to 
small children and BPA. Therefore they were willing to use the precautionary principle for 
products that were intended for children between 0-3 years of age. However, they would not 
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consider a general ban on FCM until EFSA’s 2010 opinion was published. Since they were afraid 
of using the precautionary principle too much: ”[T]here are unfortunately many different answers 
in this area [...] I am therefore becoming a little nervous that we might end up using this 
precautionary principle too much if we remove entirely in an entire field, that is – also in the 
adult field, to put it that way, because we might suddenly use this in many products.” (Rene 
Christensen)(Folketinget, 2009a). 
The proposal for resolution B42 was referred to the Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Committee 
where one amendment proposed by the Danish People’s party was included. During the second 
reading in the Chamber, the proposal was modified one more time to narrow the scope from all 
products for children to just FCM for children. After these amendments, the new proposal from 
the Parliament was: to ban BPA in FCM for children between 0 and 3 years of age (Folketinget, 
2010c).  
In the time between the two readings at the Parliament, the opposition raised the question to the 
Commission via a member of the EU parliament, of whether or not Denmark could use the 
precautionary principle in BPA’s case. The answer was that Denmark could use it if they had new 
scientific evidence to justify its use. Hence much of the discussion in the second reading of B42 
was about which scientific evidence counted to justify the usage of the precautionary principle. 
For the government, there was no hesitation, it was only EFSA’s or DTU-Food’s documentation 
that were valid (Folketinget, 2010c).   
During the second reading of the new version of B42 in the Chamber, the minister stressed that 
the implementation of the precautionary principle demanded more than just emotions. She argued 
that scientific documentation concerning the health risk of BPA was required in order to call for a 
ban based on precautionary grounds: “[…] according to the rules we play by in the EU, there 
must be some particular precise reasons, for us to apply the environmental clause, and if we are to 
use the environmental guarantee there are clear demands, as to what must be fulfilled with 
regards to documentation[…]”(Eva Kjer Hansen)(Folketinget, 2010c). 
However, one can note a change of attitude in the Government’s and the minister’s position. 
There is in general less emphasis on common EU regulatory decisions and more emphasis in 
getting a hold of such required documentation to justify the use of the precautionary principle: 
103 
 
“Let me end by saying, that we in Venstre would very much like to take part in in effectuating a 
ban and to stand alone on that [in the EU], but it requires that we have the necessary 
documentation.” (Henrik Høegh)(Folketinget, 2010c) 
 
This change in attitude can be explained by the fact that the government is confronted with a 
clear majority in Parliament who support the new version of B42 – and also to the fact that it 
would be hard to ignore, for a second time, the demands of a parliamentary resolution concerning 
BPA.
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The MP from Venstre noted that the government had succeeded in establishing a voluntary 
agreement with the industry to remove baby bottles containing BPA from the Danish market. 
And that the European metallic can association was working to find substitutes for BPA in 
metallic cans (which was one the main sources of exposure to BPA in FCM) (Folketinget, 2009a). 
The minister added that she had been putting pressure on EFSA to make sure that all relevant 
evidence is taken into consideration in the ongoing European evaluation (including research 
conducted in Denmark). Yet, she noted that the Danish government was not happy with the long 
response period of EFSA and that it has been decided to ask the Danish experts at the National 
Food Institute (DTU-Food) to make a rapid evaluation of BPA that was expected to be ready just 
within some weeks. If this Danish evaluation concluded that there was a risk, the minister would 
then introduce special national regulation: “If the Danish analysis, that will come in the end of 
March, shows that there is a risk, then I will on those grounds seize the precautionary principle 
and use it to create a special rule for Denmark.” (Eva Kjer Hansen)(Folketinget, 2010c). 
The opposition on the other hand, could not understand why the government wanted to wait for 
more evidence before deciding on the regulation of BPA. They even saw this as a tactic to delay 
preventive action. Some parties even accused the Government for prioritizing industry’s interests 
over consumer’s interests. For the opposition there was enough evidence to back up the usage of 
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 The Red-Green Alliance (EL) was also very critical to the fact that the Government has decided not to follow the 
resolution that has been previously adopted by the Parliament (B101). It was argued that the government could not 
just ignore a majority in the Parliament, even in situations when the government disagreed with the resolutions. This 
was against the principles of the parliamentary and democratic system in Denmark. The opposition was going to 
keep an eye on the Government to make sure that parliamentary resolution B42 was followed up.  
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the precautionary principle, and that evidence was mainly based in the ongoing disagreement 
between experts and the resulting doubts concerning the safety of BPA (Folketinget, 2010c).  
For the Red-Green Alliance, for example, the need for more proof of harm in order to invoke the 
precautionary principle rendered the whole principle useless, since it could not be used in its 
intended preventive way anymore: ”But the reality is however, that if one should use the 
precautionary principle for anything at all, it should then precisely be used in those situations, 
where one does not have grounds for instating a ban with reference to, that it has been proved, 
that something is hazardous, because then it only needs to be banned. It is precisely when there is 
a number of scientific studies, that show, that it is hazardous, and there is also a number of 
scientific studies, that claim, that it is doubtful, whether or not it is hazardous, that the 
precautionary principle ought to be applied.” (Per Clausen)(Folketinget, 2010c). 
For the Social Democrats the use of the precautionary principle was a political decision. 
Scientists will always disagree, that is why they are scientists, they said. However, the EU system 
gives the possibility of making political decisions based on those disagreements by means of the 
precautionary principle and the safeguard clauses: ”[S]hould it be the case, that one politically 
considers, that there is a problem, we do have the means of action, which is stated through, 
among other things, replies from the European commission, that we indeed can challenge the 
matters at hand and instate special rules for Denmark.” (Benny Engelbrecht)(Folketinget, 2010c). 
At the same time, the Social Democrat MP was also very receptive to the comments of Danish 
experts on the topic: “Much has been said about scientific basis. When one of the world’s leading 
professors, professor Niels Erik Skakkebæk contacts the Committee on Food , Agriculture and 
Fisheries, and points out the risks connected with bisphenol A, then this has a vast significance 
for the social democratic position. We speak not of any given professor, but of the second most 
quoted researcher in the world, when it comes to endocrine disruptors. That counts.” (Benny 
Engelbrecht)(Folketinget, 2010c). 
At the end of the political debate, the majority of the Parliament supported the new version of 
B42, showing again that there was majority in the Danish Parliament that meant that BPA was a 
health problem. The final resolution adopted by the Parliament was that the government should 
introduce a national ban against the use of BPA in FCM for children between 0-3 years of age. 
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However, the opposition noted that a major disadvantage to the new adopted B42 version (ban on 
FCM for small children) - as opposed to the original B42 version (ban on all FCM) – was that the 
new version did not cover yet an equally vulnerable group, namely unborn babies and their 
mothers (Folketinget, 2010c).  
DTU-Food March 2010 evaluation 
On March 2010, DTU-Food’s awaited assessment on BPA was released (See Danish National 
Food Institute evaluation 2010 in the Background chapter). DTU-Food assessed a new industry 
study which was expected to resolve the ongoing uncertainties regarding potential low dose effect 
of BPA in the nervous system (namely, Stump (2009)) (DTU-Food, 2010; Miljøstyrelsen, 2014a). 
DTU-Food noted that this standard study by Stump (2009) had a “very significant weaknesses”, 
in particular that it has not been designed taking into consideration the previously reported 
observations of possible low-dose BPA effect on neurotoxicity (Miljøstyrelsen, 2014a, p. 29). It 
was also noted that even if the study did not provide clear evidence that BPA had harmful effects 
on the types of behavior examined, it raised some uncertainty with respect to effects on learning 
ability.
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 DTU-Food’s overall conclusions were that the study did not clarify or change the 
uncertainties related to BPA’s neurotoxicity at low doses (DTU-Food, 2010). 
This evaluation was used in by Denmark as the scientific basis to justify the temporary national 
ban on BPA in food contact materials for the 0 to 3 years-old (covering: infant feeding bottles, 
feeding cups and packaging for baby food) (Miljøstyrelsen, 2014a). After this decision, Denmark 
became the first member state in the EU to regulate BPA.  
In the Danish EU notification message one can read that the justification to implement a national 
BPA ban is based on the uncertainty found in a hazard evaluation of the substance, however the 
actual risk was not assessed (i.e. a quantitative risk assessment taking into consideration current 
levels of exposure):  “The regulations prohibiting Bisphenol A in all products specifically for 0-3 
year olds are issued as a result of new, extensive rat experiments on the substance. The 
experiments have been assessed by The Ministry of Food’s adviser on risk evaluations, The 
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 DTU-Food identified impaired learning ability in male offspring at low dose exposure to BPA. However, this 
effect was just seen at the lowest dose and not on animals exposed to higher doses of BPA. That meant that there was 
not a "normal" dose-response relationship. The assessor noted that since the mechanisms behind BPA’s potential 
effect on brain development remained unknown, it was not possible to predict how the dose-response curve should 
look like. It was thus concluded that the found impaired learning ability in male offspring, might be a sign of a low-
dose effect of BPA, but it could also be an incidental finding (DTU-Food, 2010).  
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National Food Institute, The Technical University of Denmark. The Institute considers that 
findings of impaired learning capacity in young males at low dosages can be an indication of a 
low dosage effect, but can also be an incidental finding. The new investigations are therefore 
considered to raise uncertainties with respect to the harmful effects in particular on children. 
Ensuring acceptable safety levels is very important, in particular for the section of the population 
that is as vulnerable as small children. A prohibition of the use of the substance Bisphenol A in 
materials which come into contact with food which are marketed in particular for 0-3 year olds, 
or which are already in contact with food particularly destined for babies and small children has 
therefore been prepared. Evaluations show that other substances will be able to replace Bisphenol 
A in materials which come into contact with food”(Miljøstyrelsen, 2014a, pp. 29-30). 
EFSA’s 2010 opinion 
Just some months later, the also awaited EFSA opinion from 2010 was released. This updated 
opinion was the results of a request from the EU Commission where the agency was asked to 
review all new scientific evidence (including low-dose studies) and assess whether the later 
affected previous opinions on the safety of BPA. EFSA reviewed approximately 800 studies and 
concluded that they could not identify any new evidence which would lead to modify the current 
TDI established by EFSA in 2006. The panel noted that recent studies have reported adverse 
effects on animals exposed to BPA during fetal development at doses below the current TDI – 
such as changes in the central nervous system, effects on the immune system and enhanced 
susceptibility to breast cancer. However the panel considered that these studies had many 
limitations and their relevance for human health could not be assessed. A panel member 
expressed a minority opinion stressing the uncertainties related to low-dose effects and suggested 
to see the TDI as temporary until new studies could clarify the uncertainties. EFSA also 
concluded that it was not possible to assess whether or not there was a possible effect on learning 
ability at low-dose exposure to BPA (as DTU-Food had expressed) – given that these effects 
could not be statistically confirmed nor excluded (EFSA, 2010a). 
EU ban on baby bottles 
By November 2010 the Commission was also considering whether or not to prohibit the use of 
BPA in baby bottles through an amendment in the FCM Directive (Folketinget, 2010a). This was 
a difficult policy decision given that EFSA’s 2010 opinion had clearly concluded that there were 
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no scientific grounds to worry about the safety of BPA (EFSA 2010). By that time, Denmark and 
France had already taken national measures to restrict the use of BPA and Belgium was under 
way. In January 2011, the EU Commission finally adopted Directive 2011/8/EU prohibiting the 
manufacture in the EU of baby bottles containing BPA and banning the placing on the market 
and importing into the EU of such products. “June 1 (2011) is a milestone in our efforts to better 
protect the health of EU citizens, in particular the health of our children. Due to the fact that there 
are uncertainties concerning the effect of the exposure of infants to Bisphenol A, the Commission 
deemed it both necessary and appropriate to take action. The aim is to further reduce the exposure 
of the most vulnerable part of our population – i.e. infants.” (Health and Consumer Policy 
Commissioner, John Dalli) (EC, 2011) 
Yet this ban did not encounter much opposition given that most producers had already phased out 
BPA due to consumer’s concerns.  
6.2.2. On proportionality and how to weight the benefits of precaution against the costs of 
regulation 
Proposal for parliamentary resolution B17 (2010)  
Meanwhile, in the Danish Parliament, the Red-Green Alliance, the Socialist People’s party and 
the Social liberals put forward proposal resolution B17 (which is a reintroduction of B42), 
demanding a BPA ban on all FCM in Denmark. It was also demanded that the Danish 
government should work together with member states and the Commission in order to ban BPA 
from FCMs in Europe (Folketinget, 2010b).   
For the proponents of B17, EFSA’s latest opinion (2010) could resolve the remaining 
uncertainties concerning the safety of BPA – such as possible low-dose, non-monotonic dose-
response relationships and combination effects (Folketinget, 2010b). At the same time, the 
proponents argued that the study used as basis for the Danish ban (Stump, 2009) was a study that 
exposed rats while they were in the womb and nursing, which meant that the real risk was not for 
only for the 0-3 year old children (as suggested by the scope of the Danish ban) but for the 
unborn babies. Yet, the current ban did not cover that vulnerable group, the fetuses. The 
proponents thus claimed that further regulatory action was needed to protect pregnant women and 
their unborn babies from BPA exposures through the diet (Folketinget, 2010a).  The proponents 
were of the idea that the government should thus support a broader BPA ban based on the still 
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ongoing uncertainties instead of instead of waiting until conclusive scientific evidence was 
available to regulate. The precautionary principle again be invoke to reduce the pregnant 
women’s exposure to BPA (Folketinget, 2010b).  
During the first reading of B17 in the Chamber, the new Minister of Food (Henrik Høegh from 
Venstre) explained that the current BPA ban on FCM aimed at 0-3 year olds was based on the 
conclusions of DTU-Food’s assessment of a new BPA study. Namely, that DTU-Food had 
concluded that the study raised uncertainties as to effects on learning ability following low doses 
exposure to BPA. Based on those conclusions, the Danish Veterinary and Food Agency (DVFA)  
invoked the use of the precautionary principle as a protective measure for small children until 
new studies could clarify whether low doses of BPA had effects on the development of the 
nervous system and/or behavior (Folketinget, 2010a).  
In particular, the Minister stressed, that DVFA had assessed that the ban was proportional to the 
degree of uncertainty that was found in connection with BPA’s possible effects on the 
development of the nervous system and behavior in rats. Denmark’s temporary ban was 
considered to be sensible as it covered a well-defined range of products: baby bottles, sippy cups 
and glass jars with baby food (Folketinget, 2010a): ”I abide by those researchers, who claim – 
and the The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration, who recommend – that the ban we have 
today, in foodstuff material for 0-3-years old, is proportional with what, we have found from the 
results of research, it has been.” (Henrik Høegh)(Folketinget, 2010a). 
The Minister also noted that EFSA’s awaited 2010 opinion concluded that there was no new data 
that justified a change in the current TDI of BPA. He stressed that there was not enough scientific 
evidence to support a broader ban covering all FCM. Such a ban would include all food in cans 
and glass, soft drinks, beers, water containers, kitchen utensils and food equipment, tanks to store 
food, and many more. The minister argued that such a broad ban would be disproportionate with 
respect to the current degree of uncertainty. The impact on the food industry would be substantial 
and it would also represent a problem for consumers since their food choices would be restricted 
without evidence of increased health protection. The government proposed instead to keep 
encouraging the work on the development of substitutes, so that BPA could be replaced by safe 
alternatives in the future. In the meantime, the minister was going to follow the scientific 
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developments in the area and would if necessary consider regulatory measures that were in 
proportion to the level of uncertainty (Folketinget, 2010a).  
At the same time, the MP from Venstre all noted that it was mainly DTU-Food and EFSA’s 
opinions that should be taken into consideration for regulation: ”Of course there will be different 
studies from different places, but then again we do have our institutes, that we base our work on 
here in the Parliament, and I believe that we should hold on to that.” ”Selvfølgelig kan der 
komme forskellige undersøgelser fra forskellige steder, men så har vi jo lige præcis vores 
institutter, som vi baserer vores arbejde på her i Folketinget, og det synes jeg vi skal fastholde.” 
(Erling Bonnesen)(Folketinget, 2010a). 
Even if the Social Democrats and the Danish people’s party supported the intention of the 
proposal and considered that pregnant women’s exposure was something that required attention. 
These two parties were not really willing to introduce another ban for the time being.  Yet, the 
opposition (S, SF, RV and EL) and the Danish people’s party agreed that one should continue to 
challenge the EU system (when it came to public health) and that the strategy that had led to the 
EU BPA ban on baby bottles could be used again in the future. Proposal resolution B17 was not 
supported by a majority in the Parliament (Folketinget, 2010a).  
In the meantime there was a change of government in Denmark and from February 2014 to June 
2015, it was the red block that was in government. The cabinet was a coalition between the Social 
Democrats (S) and the Social Liberal Party (RV), supported by the Red-Green Alliance (EL) and 
the Socialist People’s party (SF). 
EFSA’s reevaluation of BPA safety (January 2015) 
In 2012, EFSA decided to conduct a full re-evaluation of the safety of BPA. This was motivated 
by the significant amount of new publications that had become available in recent years (and I 
will add the still ongoing scientific uncertainties). In 2015, EFSA concluded that the TDI need to 
be lower to 4µg/kg bw/day (twelve and a half times lower than the previous one) and that total 
exposures estimates were also very low (lower than previously calculated). This meant that 
exposures were still 3 to 5 times below the new TDI. The overall conclusion was thus that BPA 
poses no health risk to consumers (including babies and children). Yet the new TDI is only 
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temporary and depends on the results of an ongoing long-term study that will help reduce 
remaining uncertainties (EFSA 2015). 
Danish National Food Institute’s recommendation concerning BPA safety (February 2015) 
Shortly after EFSA’s release, DTU-Food was asked to examine EFSA’s assessment to determine 
whether the agency’s new t-TDI was sufficiently protective. DTU-Food’s main conclusion was 
that the TDI should be 0.7 µg/kg bw/day or lower to adequately protect consumers against ED-
effects of BPA (DTU-Food, 2015).  
Proposal for parliamentary resolution B68 (2015) 
In the winter 2015, the Red-Green Alliance put forward proposal for parliamentary resolution, 
B68, demanding the Government to follow DTU-Food’s recommendation concerning how much 
BPA exposure should be regarded as safe (i.e. DTU-Food’s TDI) - instead of following EFSA’s 
recommendation. It was noted that even if the proposal did not concerned a ban per se, it was 
understood that in order to conform with the TDI proposed by DTU-Food, BPA would need to be 
phased out from some products. The proponents also noted that some of brightest researchers in 
EDs were Danish and worked at DTU-Food, and if they recommended a lower TDI, on 
precautionary grounds, one should follow their recommendations - at the same time, the Red-
Green Alliance did not see why EFSA’s assessment should be more trustworthy.114 (Folketinget, 
2015) 
During the first read of B68 in the Chamber, the then minister of Food - Dan Jørgensen (from the 
Social Democrats) - and the government, agreed with the Red-Green Alliance in that consumers’ 
BPA intake should be lowered so that no one was exposed to more BPA than what DTU-Food 
deemed safe. However they did not think that additional national regulation on BPA was the best 
solution. In particular they were concerned that such a measure would promote the substitution of 
BPA with chemicals that were less studied and perhaps even more problematic.  
“The problem with this solution is, that there are not always safe alternatives to bisphenol A. We 
then risk moving out of the frying pan and into the fire, because other chemicals will be used 
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 The red-green alliance MP in particular pointed to discussions in the EU Parliament where EFSA’s potential 
conflicts of interest had been discussed. It was also suggested that EFSA’s previous rejection of studies indicating 
negative effects on human health at low dose exposures suggested that the agency was more busy protecting industry 
interests than public health (Folketinget, 2015). 
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instead, that can turn out to be even more harmful for the Danes.” (Karin Gaardsted) (Folketinget, 
2015) 
For them, the best and fastest way to reduce the population’s BPA exposure was by means of a 
voluntary agreement with the industry to phase out the use of BPA in FCM in those areas were 
safe alternatives were available. However, there were no safe alternatives for all FCMs where 
BPA was used, in particular when it came to conserves.
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 In case the government failed to 
establish an agreement with the industry to reach their goal (reducing the population’s exposure 
to BPA), the minister would reconsider further legislation in the area. It was however noted that 
this could take some time since alternatives needed to be thoroughly tested before being placed in 
the market (Folketinget, 2015).
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For the other party in the government, the Social Liberal Party (RV), the solution was to invest 
more in research on BPA to press for stricter EU regulations, since it was only this type of 
common European regulations that could drive businesses to invest in safer alternatives. At the 
same time, the social liberal MP noted that there were no safe alternatives for a big number of 
products and that in those cases it was better to take a pragmatic approach to the problem: ”[W]e 
devout attention to trying to make something, that works out in the real world, not to make 
something, meaning, that there will be a worse alternative in the real world. Thereby we must say, 
that this is something we must live with for some time, and which we all think is problematic. 
But if we create a bigger problem by going the wrong way, we think, that it is wrong to choose 
this solution.” (Ida Auken)(Folketinget, 2015) 
The Danish People’s party noted that they have become more skeptical about bans given that 
alternatives could be more problematic than the substances that were regulated.  This MP in 
particular mentioned that BPA has over the years been replaced by bisphenol S which had almost 
the same properties: ”I have up until today spoken of our last resolution proposal (B42) as a big 
success, but I have become somewhat uncertain, whether it has been the success that we set up 
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 It was in particular mentioned that BPA was used for sour and salty foods, such as: pickled cucumbers and 
tomatoes both in cans and in glass, soft-drinks and alcoholic drinks in cans, etc, and that there were no safe 
alternatives in these areas.  
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 At the end of the debate the Red-Green Alliance and the Socialist People’s party agreed to join the work on a 
voluntary phase-out strategy together with the industry, but both parties stressed that they wanted to put clear 
political pressure on the industry and do not depend only on the industry’s good will (Folketinget, 2015). 
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for. So I am really expressing gratitude, that this resolution proposal has been advanced. I think 
that it might make quite a few of us wiser, with regards to what we have done.” (Rene 
Christensen)(Folketinget, 2015). For DF it was time to work at EU level and in cooperation with 
the industry.  
The opposition – this time represented by the blue block:  Venstre (V), the Conservatives (DKF) 
and the Liberal Alliance (LA) – did not support DTU-Food’s recommendation and preferred to 
base their decisions on EFSA’s 2015 assessment (Folketinget, 2015).  According to which all 
segments of the population were adequately protected against BPA. Besides, EFSA’s assessment 
was based on a thorough review of many scientific studies and the final assessment had also 
taken into consideration DTU-Foods comments and criticisms (raised during EFSA’s public 
hearing). But in particular, they acknowledged that adhering to EU science and decisions offered 
a more fair playing ground for the Danish industry: ”It is after all strange with the EU, because 
we have from the side of the Liberal Alliance a skeptical approach to the EU and believe, that the 
EU interfere in much more, than the EU ought to interfere with. But sometimes the EU is actually 
good to lean on, in the sense that EU makes some assessments, which enforces, if we abide by 
them, that we can ensure that we also from the Danish side have reasonable competitive terms, 
with regards whatever trade that might take place within the borders of the EU.” (Mette Bock) 
(Folketinget, 2015). 
On the other hand, these parties stressed that the Department of Food and Resource Economics at 
the University of Copenhagen had calculated that DTU-Food’s recommendation would cost the 
Danish industry 350 million Danish crowns. It was claimed that further regulation would injure 
the competitiveness of the Danish industry and its possibilities to find safer solutions. 
Additionally, they also commented the problem with the lack of safe alternatives for BPA and the 
risk of creating the opposite effect, namely exposing the population to nastier substances. So, all 
in all, it was better to keep things as they were (Folketinget, 2015). 
At the end of the debate, the majority of the Parliament agreed to continue working on the case at 
the Committee level where more details concerning the voluntary agreement with the industry 
could be clarified – in particular the situation concerning BPA’s possible alternatives: 
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”I thought that the minister of Food, Fisheries and Agriculture referred to, that there at least in 
France was a common understanding, that there were safe alternatives on a great part of those 
products, that used bisphenol A, while other speakers today have nearly expressed, there there 
was no such alternatives in any place, and that it was all one big armageddon, where the only 
consequence, that there could be of passing the proposal of the Red-Green Alliance, would be, 
that people would live a more uncertain and dangerous life.” (Per Clausen)(Folketinget, 2015)  
The proposal resolution B68 was then sent for further work at the Committee.  
6.3 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued that EDs have been a politically relevant topic in Denmark for a 
long period. It seems that a generous media coverage together with other channels of information 
dissemination (e.g. such as expert hearings, scientific opinions and NGO-related work) have 
contributed to keep politicians interested and informed (personal communication with 
representative of the Red-Green Alliance party in the Parliament).  At the same time, there seems 
to be a genuine public interest in the topic. According to a survey conducted by the Danish 
Consumer Council, 80% of the public wants to prohibit EDs (if there is only suspicion that they 
are EDs) and more recent survey by the consulting company Gallup revealed that 90% of the 
population supported national regulations even when if that means going against EU 
legislation.
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One could hypothesize that the high public interest, together with the unstable parliamentary 
situation in Denmark has had a strong impact on ED-policy - by promoting competition among 
the political parties which are trying to appear most ‘consumer-friendly’. At the same time, it has 
been experienced in several occasions that there is a real possibility of gathering an ‘alternative 
majority’ in Parliament in support of stricter ED-policies. 
In the particular case of BPA, this chapter has shown that the Danish Parliament has played the 
most important role in policy-decisions. I have argued that some political parties have been 
particularly eager to impose more ambitious targets concerning the regulation of this chemical, 
that would the ruling government. The chapter also describes how in two occasions an 
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‘alternative majority’ in Parliament passed two different parliamentary resolutions (B101 and 
B42) calling for a stricter national regulation of BPA (even if one of them, B101, was never 
implemented). Such policy-decisions were justified based on the ongoing scientific uncertainties 
and on the invocation of the precautionary principle and resulted in a national BPA ban in food 
contact materials for children aged between 0 and 3 years of age.  
During the political debates, much of the discussions revolved around the question of: on which 
grounds and under which circumstances should the precautionary principle be used.  In proposals 
for parliamentary resolution B101 and B42, it can be observed that for the supporters of the 
proposals (all the red-bloc parties plus the Danish People’s party), the ongoing scientific 
disagreements and the high public health stakes were enough ground to act precautionary. In their 
opinion scientific uncertainty represented an early warning that should not be ignored. At the 
same time, their understanding of the application of precautionary principle solved the problem 
of having to wait for more evidence and could be enacted through the EU safeguard clauses. 
Besides, some MPs supporting these proposals highlighted that the deliberation about whether 
and when to exercise precaution was not only a scientific question. It also involved value 
judgments concerning the ‘acceptable’ level of risk and this, in their opinion, was an intrinsically 
political decision.  
For the opponents of proposals B101 and B42 on the other hand, the invocation of the 
precautionary principle required proper, well-documented scientific evidence of BPA’s risk (e.g. 
in the form of a quantifiable risk assessment) and that precautionary measures were cost-effective. 
They saw the call for precaution as emotional and based on suspicions. For the opponents, the 
preferred way of addressing the ongoing scientific uncertainties was through a call for more 
research. They saw the situation as one in which there was a lack of evidence of harm (and I 
would add, one in which final scientific certainty could be reached).  
 
One can also observe that political decisions are further complicated by the EU-policy dimension. 
That is, whether is best to go for an immediate domestic regulation or to wait for a regulatory 
processes at the EU level. The answer to this question seemed to depend on several aspects. For 
those against national regulation, the arguments were: that Denmark could risk ending up with a 
court case in the European Court of Justice for not complying with EU law, that regulation at EU 
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level gave a better incentive to the industry to replace BPA, that common regulation offered a 
more fair competition to the Danish industry, but particularly that complying with the rules of the 
single marker was a binding obligation for all member states. On the other hand, for those 
supporting a national BPA ban, the arguments were: that Brussels should not always decide on 
the level of protection of Danish citizens, that national regulation could work as an incentive for 
the EU Commission to propose stricter common regulations and that the threat of the European 
Court of Justice was not actual when acting in the promotion of public health.  
 
In the following proposals for parliamentary resolution B17 and B68, one can observe that it 
becomes much harder to act precautionary when confronted with questions of proportionality 
between the cost of regulation and the benefits of precautionary regulatory measures. In B17, it is 
stressed that the proposed broader BPA ban covering all food contact materials would be 
disproportionate with the level of uncertainty. And, at the same time, it would have a significant 
economic impact on the food industry without clear evidence of increased health protection. In 
B68, it is further highlighted that there are no available alternatives to substitute BPA in several 
food contact applications and that one could risk substituting with equally or more problematic 
chemicals. Here again, the excessive documented cost of regulation does not seem to be 
proportional to the ‘unknown’ (questionable) health benefits. At the end, both proposal B17 and 
B68 were discarded.  
Overall, it can be concluded that in order to gather a majority to pass a proposal in the Parliament, 
policy-decisions need to accommodate a mix of symbolic politics (willingness to meet society’s 
concerns), real politics (pragmatic solutions) and other political compromises. And, that in order 
to act precautionary, a defined set of requirements need to be met. For proposals B101 and B42, 
one can observe that it was possible to gather a majority in the Parliament to act against BPA. In 
those occasions, the proposed regulations seemed to be proportional to the level of uncertainty 
and a political compromise was reached to protect those aged between 0 and 3 years. Yet, the fact 
that Parliamentary policy-decisions depend on political compromises and in a definition of 
precaution framed in terms of cost-benefit evaluations, means that policy solutions are not always 
coherent. Namely, if that if the aim was to protect the most vulnerable in the population, then 
regulation to protect pregnant women and their unborn babies should have also been 
implemented.   
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7. Endocrine Disruptors in Norway 
In Norway, as opposed to Denmark, there is at present no overarching national strategy to 
systematically tackle human health and environmental risks in relation to chemicals (although the 
Government is currently working on an action plan for a toxic free environment (Energi- og 
miljøkomiteen, 2015)). In Norway (as in Denmark) most of the work in the chemical sector (EDs 
included) is conducted by the environmental authorities and follows a sector-based approach. The 
overall objectives of Norway’s chemical policy are outlined in a white paper from 2006 entitled 
“Norwegian chemical policy for a non-toxic future”. The aim of this section is firstly to analyze 
this document (and more recent updates from the Norwegian Environment Agency) to explain 
how the ED problem is understood and addressed by the environmental authorities. Secondly, to 
briefly present some of the main actors that participate in the management of chemicals in 
Norway.   
7.1 Endocrine Disruption – an environmental concern  
7.1.1 White paper no. 14 - Norwegian chemical policy for a non-toxic future  
In December 2006, the Ministry of Environment in cooperation with the political leadership 
(Stoltenberg II’s Government) presented the white paper no.14 – entitled “Working together 
towards a non-toxic environment and a safer future – Norway’s chemicals policy” – to the 
Norwegian Parliament. This document presented by the red-green government outlined a very 
ambitious policy for a non-toxic environment, both in terms of its grounding principles and its 
goals – which received broad support from the parliament (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 2006). In what follows I will describe the most relevant points of Norway’s 
chemical policy with respect to EDs (and to the posterior analysis of the BPA policy case in 
Norway).  
The precautionary principle  
According to the white paper, Norwegian chemical policy would be based on the precautionary 
principle, meaning that action will be taken when threats are identified, even if scientific facts are 
uncertain. This was particularly motivated by the realization that often, the knowledge basis on 
the hazardous properties, the effects and the exposure to dangerous chemicals is uncertain: 
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“When a specific threat to health or the environment from chemicals is identified, the 
precautionary principle calls for action to be taken to reduce or eliminate this threat, even if there 
are uncertainties in the knowledge base. Thus, application of the precautionary principle does not 
mean that scientific facts are ignored, nor that we fail to make scientific risk assessments. On the 
contrary, it provides a guideline for the situations where we lack full scientific certainty. Since 
there is often uncertainty about the risks associated with chemicals, the precautionary principle is 
particularly relevant in chemical policy” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 15).   
It is especially noted that in order to achieve the objectives introduced by the white paper, 
regulatory action has to take place when the precautionary principle applies. Even though the way 
the precautionary principle is formulated in the white paper is quite general, it is stressed that any 
Norwegian regulation based on the precautionary principle will have to follow the guideline of 
the EU’s Communication on the precautionary principle. This means that the measures have to be 
proportional (between the measure and the chosen level of protection), non-discriminatory, based 
on a cost-benefit analysis and reviewed in light of scientific developments (Norwegian Ministry 
of the Environment, 2006). 
National regulatory goals for hazardous substances (including EDs)  
The white paper points to “miljøgifter” (hazardous substances) as the greatest long-term threat for 
the environment and for human health. Hazardous substances are referred to as substances that 
are persistent (take very long time to degrade in the environment), bio-accumulative (can 
accumulate in organisms, the food chain and the environment) and/or toxic (for example harmful 
to reproduction). These substances are seen as a particular threat to the health of future 
generations, to the environment and to food safety. They can accumulate in organisms and be 
passed on to their offspring, they can pollute the environment and they can have (or promote) 
unknown long term consequences (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006).
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In order to address the problems posed by hazardous substances, the government put forward a 
very specific goal for these types of chemicals: The emission and use of hazardous substances 
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 For example, a well-known group of hazardous substances for the Government are PCBs (polychlorinated 
biphenyls) which were heavily used before the 80’s when they were banned. These chemicals have many negative 
health and environmental effects, are very persistent and bioaccumulative. They have polluted many aquatic 
environments such as fjords and lakes, which had led to strict dietary recommendations for fish coming from these 
places. Places polluted with PCBs, such as sediments, have also been very difficult, lengthy and costly to remediate.  
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will be continuously reduced with the goal of eliminating them by 2020. This goal is usually 
referred to as the generation goal.
119
 It is based on the reasoning that since hazardous substances 
have the capacity to accumulate in the environment, even low environmental emissions can pose 
a threat to health and the environment. It is also argued that it is difficult to estimate acceptable 
emission levels – given that they can accumulate and reach high concentrations in food chains 
and living organisms over time (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006). 
In the white paper, it is clarified that the specific substances that will be covered by the 
generation goal are those which are included in the national priority list of hazardous substances. 
These are identified by means of specific predefined criteria, namely: 
1.  Substances that are persistent and bioaccumulative, and that either: a) have serious long-
term health effects, or b) show high ecotoxicity. 
2.  Substances that are very persistent and very bioaccumulative (no requirement for known 
toxic effects). 
3.  Substances found in the food chain in levels that give rise to an equivalent level of 
concern. 
4.  Other substances that give rise to an equivalent level of concern, such as endocrine 
disruptors and heavy metals.  
In addition, the Government proposed an adjustment to the criteria that had been used before. 
Namely, that hazardous substances could now be included in the priority list if they were found in 
the environment at levels that gave cause for concern – without the need to document that they 
posed a risk to health and the environment. This change, based on a precautionary thinking, was 
thought to help to identify substance at an early, more manageable, stage (Norwegian Ministry of 
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 The generation goal is based on The Convention for the Protection of the marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic (the ‘OSPAR Convention'). This convention from 1992 was ratified by 15 countries, including Norway and 
the European Commission. The parties are committed to work on stopping the emissions of a number of specific 
pollutants by 2020 – that is, one generation after the Convention was signed (NOU, 2010). A similar goal was also 
formulated in the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 – namely, that the adverse 
effects on human health and the environment from the use and production of chemicals was going to be minimized 
by 2020 (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006). 
119 
 
the Environment, 2006, p. 18 box 13.15). It can be defined as a hazard approach, and it is in line 
with the ambitious goals set for hazardous substances in the white paper.
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On the basis of new information and the above mentioned new criteria, five new hazardous 
substances were identified at that time and added to the national priority list (and thus became 
subject to the generation goal). Among these new substances was bisphenol A.  
BPA fulfills criteria No. 4, namely that it is an endocrine disruptor and at the same time, it is 
found in the outer environment at levels of concern. Based on the new adjustment to the criteria, 
one can also deduce that it was not necessary to conduct a quantitative risk assessment – rather, it 
was included based on its intrinsic hazard evaluation and the fact that it was widespread in the 
environment (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006).   
Reflections on the expression “miljøgifter” 
It is interesting to note that the white paper makes a distinction between: “Helse- og miljøfarlige 
kjemikalier” and “miljøgifter”. The distinction being that “miljøgifter” are a subcategory of 
particularly problematic “helse- og miljøfarlige kjemikalier” and as mentioned, it is only 
“miljøgifter” that are covered by the concrete objectives of the generation goal.  
During my interviews, it was brought to my attention that the English translation for “miljøgifter” 
(translated as ecological toxins in the white paper) was not adequate and that the term should be 
translated as hazardous substances (personal communication with professor in biology). During 
my analysis, I will thus translate “miljøgifter” as “hazardous substances” and otherwise keep 
similar expressions closer to its direct translation.  
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 It indeed signals that the government considers these substances so problematic that it is justified be as 
precautious as possible. Because in general, the white paper notes that the fact that a chemical is found in people or 
the environment does not necessarily implied that there was a risk to health of the environment, and specifies that 
“[…] whether a substance poses a risk depends not only on its hazardous properties but also on how much is released 
and the degree of exposure” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 9) This is more in line with a 
quantitative risk assessment, rather than a hazard approach.   
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Figure 8: Classification of chemicals according to the Norwegian Environmental Authorities. 
 Adapted from www.miljostatus.no 
 
Moreover, it is important to note that these “discursive” refinements are more than just a 
technical clarification. The expression “miljøgifter” has strong implications for Norwegian 
chemical policy as these substances seem to be usually conceptualized in a very specific way – 
namely, persistent, bioaccumulative, long-transported chemicals. Yet, according to the white 
paper’s identification criteria for hazardous substances, EDs should also be considered a 
“miljøgift” (hazardous substance), given that they give rise to an “equivalent level of concern” as 
persistent and bioaccumulative chemicals.
121
 However, in the white paper the term endocrine 
disruptor is almost not used at all, EDs are included in the hazardous substances category and are 
referred to as “miljøgifter” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006). For those EDs that 
happened to be persistent, bioaccumulative and also toxic (based on their effects on the endocrine 
system) this is unproblematic (such as for most persistent organic pollutants). However, I will 
claim that for those EDs that are only toxic but not persistent and not bioaccumulative (such as 
BPA), this could be problematic since they might not be seen as the typical “miljøgift” 
(hazardous substance) and at the same time there would be no other “discursive” category to 
classify them. This would be particularly so for people outside the technical and scientific world 
(such as the media, politicians, NGOs). At the same time, given that at present there is no 
universally agreed criteria for the identification of EDs (see background section 4.2.3-4.2.4), even 
experts, scientists and regulators might have problems defining whether BPA is an ED and thus 
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 This is similar to article 57(f) in REACH, were EDs are also seen as substances of “equivalent level of concern” 
due to their effects to human health (and/or) the environment. Yet in the lack of generally agreed upon criteria for the 
identification of EDs, it is difficult to operationalize this article.  
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whether it can in turn be classified as a “miljøgift”. This is illustrated in the different terms used 
by the environmental authorities in Norway (who refer to BPA as an endocrine disruptor) 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2015a), and the food and health authorities (who refer to BPA as an endocrine 
active substance)(Folkehelseinstituttet, 2015).  
At the same time, on the discourse level, one can claim that a “miljøgift” – literally translated, an 
environmental poison (miljø: environmental, gift: poison) – is understood as a substance that has 
the potential to harm the environment. The fact that only the environmental dimension is captured 
by this expression, might also contribute to blurring the direct implications of “miljøgifter” for 
human health in the perception of the “everyday” people (this will be further discussed in the 
political debate on the white paper). As opposed to in Denmark, where the term ‘endocrine 
disruptor’ is exclusively used, it can be argued that both framing BPA as a “miljøgift” and 
attempting to rule it out of such a definition, can function to obscure its human health effects.  
Pollution does not stop at national borders 
Another main characteristic of the white paper, and somehow related to the above, is that this 
document emphasizes the significance of international efforts to secure a safer management of 
chemicals in Norway. 
In several occasions it is stressed that many hazardous substances, such as POPs and heavy 
metals, can be transported over long distances and end up concentrating in the Norwegian Arctic. 
Dominant patterns of air and ocean currents make Norway particularly prone to transboundary 
pollution.
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 As a response to this, the Government proposes to concentrate efforts on the 
implementation of stricter international regulations (by means of global legally binding 
agreements) in order to decrease the pollution burden of Norway. This would mean that research 
and monitoring activities in the High North would to be prioritized given the necessity of 
developing the scientific basis for establishing strict international regulations of hazardous 
substances (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006).
123
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 As an example, the white paper notes than more than half of the lead and mercury pollution in Norway comes 
from abroad. And, in the case of mercury, it is believed that the largest source of pollution is coal-fired power plants 
in Asia. 
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 The Arctic is often referred to as “a barometer of global chemical pollution” where one can follow time trends of 
existing hazardous substances and can also identify new substances of concern (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 2006, p. 25) 
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Yet, one can claim that Norway’s interests in developing international agreements to counteract 
the degradation of the Norwegian environment caused by long-range pollution are much older. 
According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data from 
1993, Norway might have been the OECD member country most exposed to transboundary 
pollution – explained by its downwind and downstream position with respect to Europe (OECD, 
1993, p. 111). Andersen (1997) reports that already at that time, Norway was seen both as a 
pusher and a forerunner Norway in international environmental cooperation . 
Moreover, the white paper proposed not only to actively work at the international level but also at 
the European level. The white paper notes that everyday products have become a major source of 
emissions of hazardous substances and that trade contributes to the global dispersal of these 
substances. Importers and retailers often had very limited knowledge concerning the chemical 
content of the products they put in the market. And, the rising consumption patterns in Norway 
meant that there was an ever increasing number of (unknown) chemicals in circulation. At the 
same time, most products in Norway come from abroad and the EEA agreement limited 
Norway’s freedom to implement more restrictive national regulations - in particular for areas that 
are fully harmonized. In these respects, working towards a strong common European legislation 
was an important move to ensure safer products and less emission of hazardous substances in 
Norway. The government expects in particular that REACH would solve many of the ongoing 
problems concerning the deficit of information on chemicals and that would promote a better 
regulation for the most hazardous substances. It was thus proposed that the environmental 
authorities should focus on making REACH as ambitious as possible (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 2006).
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Regulatory measures to achieve the generation goal 
a) Ban on hazardous substances in consumer products 
Even if the white paper notes in several occasions that it might be difficult to introduce stricter 
regulations in Norway than in the rest of Europe. This document also notes that the Government 
was considering a broad ban on the most hazardous substances in ordinary consumer products. It 
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 When the white paper was being written, the European Parliament and the Council were still negotiating the final 
version of REACH. The latter was adopted two days after the white paper no.14 was presented to the Norwegian 
Parliament. REACH finally entered into force on June 2007  
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is mentioned that the release of dangerous chemicals from products had been rising in 
comparison to more traditional sources of pollution such as industrial processes. And that a large 
amount of consumer products contained hazardous substances that had the potential to spread 
quite widely since these were released during manufacture, under usage and when products were 
discarded as waste. A broad ban on consumer products was being considered in order to achieve 
the objectives of the generation goal (i.e. that the hazardous substances that were included in the 
national priority list would be eliminated by 2020), to decrease hazardous waste and to ensure 
that safer products were placed in the market (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006).  
Shortly after the white paper was released, the Ministry of Environment commissioned the 
Norwegian Pollution control Authority (SFT) to work on such a possible ban.
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 SFT proposed a 
ban on 21 hazardous substances from the national priority list which have been detected in the 
environment in appreciable concentrations (including BPA). This chemical had only recently 
been included in the national priority list and its use had not previously been regulated in 
products in Norway (SFT, 2006b).
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One year later, the ban proposal has already been reduced to 18 substances (but BPA was still on 
the list) (Miljøverndepartementet, 2007). From an analysis of the impact assessment submitted by 
the Norwegian environmental authorities to the EFTA Surveillance Authority
127
 it is easy to see 
what is the standing point of the environmental authorities with respect to hazardous substances 
(EFTA, 2007).  
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 In connection to the ban, it was noted that exemptions would be consider for those products where no adequate 
alternatives were available; where the use of the substances posed no risk to health or the environment; or when the 
regulation introduced costly barriers to trade. Concerning this last point, it was specifically noted that regulatory 
measures would had to be consistent with Norway’s international obligations concerning trade. In particular, it was 
specified that “Under the EEA Agreement, Norwegian and EU chemicals legislation is harmonized. This means that 
as a general rule, the same requirements apply in both Norway and the EU, but there is some room for national 
regulation of a number of specific substances and areas of use. Norway has most room for maneuver in areas where 
the legislation is not fully harmonized. It is more difficult for Norway to lay down stricter rules than the EU for 
substances and areas of use that are specifically regulated in fully harmonized regulations and directives, although 
there are possibilities for doing so” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 73) 
126
 In 2006 there were two European regulations concerning BPA. One was related to the food contact materials and 
the other, to the Cosmetics regulation. In Norway, these regulations were administered by the food agency 
127 The European Economic Area (EEA) is composed of the Member States of the European Union and three 
European Free Trade Associations (EFTA) States: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The EFTA Surveillance 
Authority’s role is to ensure that EFTA States respect their obligations under the EEA Agreement, in particular with 
relation to the functioning of the internal market.  
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The Norwegian environmental authorities stressed that it was extremely important to reduce the 
emissions of prioritized hazardous substances. These were substances that were persistent, 
bioaccumulative and/or toxic (for example harmful to reproduction) and which could have 
irreversible effects. At the same time, it was noted that the properties of these substances made it 
difficult to intervene before damage had already arisen. It was mentioned that hazardous 
substances could accumulate in nature and in food chains and were thus a serious threat to food 
security, the health of future generations and the environment. Besides, monitoring data from 
Norway had shown a substantial spread of the proposed hazardous substances in the environment 
(Note in particular that the description is the same as the typical “miljøgift” (hazardous substance) 
and that there is no reference to hormonal properties) (EFTA, 2007).  
It was further noted that consumer products were an important source of emissions and 
consumers lacked the necessary knowledge to protect themselves or the environment against 
these substances. Besides, the entire population (including the most vulnerable) was exposed to 
the emission of hazardous substances through the usage of consumer products or via the 
environment (EFTA, 2007).  
SFT also stressed that in order to achieve Norway’s objectives in the chemical area, namely to 
achieve the generation goal, it was needed to have a reduction in the emission of hazardous 
substances from products. It also stressed that it was important to act precautionary even if the 
uncertainties were large and it was impossible to quantify the possible health and environmental 
damage using the available knowledge.  At the same time it was also difficult to predict the exact 
costs of such a regulation. It was estimated that an extremely long time would be required to get 
sufficiently reliable evidence of the long-term effect of these substances and given the possible 
serious consequences. The authorities did not want to wait for that and proposed instead that, 
based on the precautionary principle; the ban ought to be carried out as soon as possible based on 
existing information (EFTA, 2007).
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 SFT had estimated that for most application areas there were alternative products on the market that satisfied the 
proposed requirement. Besides, a number of application areas were also exempted from the regulation when: 1) there 
were no present alternatives or the costs were too high, 2) when the areas of application were already subjected to 
total harmonization regulations at EU level or 3) when the application areas belonged to regulatory areas which were 
not administered by the environmental authorities (EFTA, 2007).  
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The prohibition proposal was sent out for consultation to stakeholders at the national and 
international level on May 2007. After the consultation process, the agency received a very large 
number of consultative statements, the large majority of which were objections (including strong 
criticism from the surveillance organ of EFTA). After the consultation, it was decided to shorten 
the list of proposed substances to 10 candidates, including BPA (SFT, 2008b). 
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 In the coming 
years, the original ban proposal was further reduced to only four substances 
(Miljøverndepartementet, 2010b) . Finally, eight years after, in the summer of 2014, the only 
national ban based on this regulatory initiative entered into force concerning the substance PFOA 
(Perfluorooctanoic acid) (Miljødirektoratet, 2013) - the regulation of which is currently being 
challenged by EFTA surveillance authority.
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b) Information on hazardous substances 
The white paper also highlighted that it was very hard to make safe, informed purchases since 
there was scare information on the chemical content of products and consumers have limited 
knowledge about chemicals. The Government was thus considering improving the information of 
the content and the properties of chemicals used in consumer products. So that consumers could 
choose safer products, and in that way, protect their health and the environment (Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment, 2006).  
It was noted that vulnerable groups, such as children, would benefit from such information so that 
their parents could make safe choices to protect their health: “Children, like adults, are exposed to 
hazardous substances in products. They are particularly vulnerable group because they are still 
developing and are therefore even more susceptible to the harmful effects of hazardous 
substances. Some substances can cause permanent damage or serious illnesses later in the life of 
an individual who has been exposed to high concentrations of these substances in childhood or 
before birth” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 71). As a response to this, the 
Government was considering launching information campaigns and establishing a website to give 
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 The agency also decided to make some changes to the original proposal concerning the proposed limit values and 
the areas of use that were subjected to exemptions. Some of the substances that SFT removed from the list were 
being subjected to different EU regulation processes at the time and it was decided that it was better to wait for those 
results.  Still SFT wanted to maintain the ban proposal for the remaining 10 substances but that depended on the 
endorsement from the Ministry of Environment (SFT, 2008b). 
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 The regulation of PFOA has a transitional period lasting until January 2018 – allowing the import and sale of 
products manufactured before 1 June 2014.  
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advice to consumers. In connection to this, the Government saw it desirable to enhance the 
cooperation between the environmental, health and consumer authorities (Note that the 
environmental authorities mention that it is high concentrations that are harmful) (Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment, 2006).  
In 2006, Klif prepared a campaign on “Children’s chemical daily lives” (Barns kjemiske 
hverdag), which gave advice to parents and others working with children on how to minimize 
unnecessary exposures to everyday chemicals. The brochure was going to be distributed at the 
health centers and was available in several languages. The campaign was based on the Danish 
campaign “Chemistry in children’s daily lives” from 2001 (SFT, 2006a). The Norwegian 
brochure was updated and re-printed in 2012. This is the only information campaign on 
chemicals in Norway that I am aware of. During my interviews I was notified that this work has 
not been expanded due to a lack of economic resources (personal communication with a 
representative of NEA).  
In 2010 the website “Erdetfarlig.no” was launched by the environmental agency to inform 
consumers on chemicals and give advice on safer products. This was done after the release of an 
study that concluded that “Six out of ten Norwegians feel that the information they receive on 
hazardous substances to humans and environment is to poor.” (Jørgensen, 2010, p. 1) The site 
was the result of a collaboration between the environmental, the food agency and the Nordic 
ecolabel (with support of two consumer NGOs).  
At the same time, both the Norwegian Food Safety Authority and the Norwegian Institute of 
Public Health have also their own website where they inform about general food safety and 
health issues (including chemicals in food) and public-health related topics (such as chemical 
safety).
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Possible Health connection 
Most of the document is discussed in terms of hazardous substances and dangerous chemicals, 
and although many EDs form part of the hazardous substances category - according to the 
proposed official criteria (see section: Goals for hazardous substances) – little reference is made 
to endocrine disruptors as a category of chemical on itself. It is important to mention that many 
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 http://www.matportalen.no/ (Food and Health authorities) 
http://www.fhi.no/ (Health authorities) 
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endocrine disruptors can also be very persistent and bioaccumulative such as, the well-known 
PCBs and DDT (and many other pops). It is however their persistence and bioaccumulation that 
are stressed in the white paper and not so much the fact that they have endocrine activity 
(Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006).  
There is one small subsection in the white paper that refers to some of the health problems related 
to endocrine disruptors. In here, it is noted that Norway has the highest prevalence of testicular 
cancer in the world and that there has been an increase in the incidence of baby boys born with 
undescended testicles and the document points to EDs as a one of the several possible causes 
behind these rising numbers.  
“Exposure to chemicals that are hazardous to health and environment, such as substances that can 
disrupt the hormonal balance, is one of many factors suspected of having significance for the 
increase of cancer, for example could exposure at the embryonic stage have significance for the 
development of testicular cancer.” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 10). 
However, it also noted that there is not a clear link between exposure to endocrine disruptors and 
health effects yet: 
“There are no clearly established links between disruption of the hormonal system and exposure 
to chemicals in humans, but the question has been asked on whether reduced sperm quality, 
disruptions in sexual development and the increasing frequency of testicular cancer could be 
related to exposure to chemicals.” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 10). 
This is interesting because, as will be seen in the rest of the analysis, it is very seldom that EDs 
are connected to these possible effects in the public discourse in Norway (as opposed to 
Denmark). Actually, in the same year that the white paper was release, the influential Norwegian 
Academy of Science and Letters published a volume on endocrine disruptors where the possible 
implications for male reproductive health from EDs were further challenged:  
“It should be emphasized that there is no evidence for a decrease in male fertility, and that the 
decrease in fertility rates is mainly due to socioeconomic factors. Furthermore, no evidence for a 
uniform temporal increase in hypospadias, cryptorchidism, or a decline in sperm quality has been 
found. Although studies have shown effect of EDs on male reproductive health, the hypothesis 
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that EDs represent a threat to male reproduction still remains controversial. Other factors, 
including diet and lifestyle, should also be considered as risk factors” (Haugen, 2006, p. 154) 
However, four years later, in 2010, the same author (the leader of a research group on male 
reproductive health in the Oslo and Akershus University College of applied sciences), noted that 
although it was still debate whether environmental chemicals were a real threat for male 
reproductive health, it was advised to use a precautionary approach when dealing with this 
chemicals (Haugen, 2010, p. 52).  
On the website of her research group one can read today: 
“There are indications that male reproductive problems have increased world-wide during the last 
decades. Furthermore, it seems that Norway is especially subjected to this, as it has among the 
highest occurrences of testicular cancer in the world and the lowest sperm quality of the Nordic 
countries, along with Denmark. Embryonic life is assumed to be a critical period for the 
formation of testicular cancer, malformations in male reproductive organs such as hypospadias 
(an abnormally placed urinary hole), cryptorchidism (undescended testis) and some cases of 
lowered sperm quality. Disruptions in the balance between male and female sex hormones, 
androgens and estrogens, can contribute to an irregular development of male reproductive organs, 
and a genetic predisposition is probably decisive for the development of disease.” (HIOA, 2015) 
7.1.2 Update on the environmental authorities’ work on endocrine disruptors 
In September 2014, following a demand from the allocation letter of the Ministry of Climate and 
Environment, The Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) prepared an assessment on how best 
to reduce the use of EDs in relation to the ongoing EU work (Miljødirektoratet, 2014f). In their 
assessment, the environmental agency noted that humans and animals were exposed to many 
different EDs and other harmful chemicals on a daily base and expressed concern about the 
possible long term effect of such combined exposures (large on EDS). They explained that 
Norway has had focus on EDs identification and regulation in particular in relation to 
environmental effects (Miljødirektoratet, 2014d). In this more recent document we see that the 
environmental agency now refers to EDs as such an not as ‘hazardous substances’ (miljøgifter).  
“Norway has for a long time been concerned identifying and regulating the use of endocrine 
disruptors with a main focus on endocrine disruptors in the environment. Endocrine disruptors 
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constitute a serious threat to health and environment and have been placed on the Norwegian 
priority list.”(Miljødirektoratet, 2014d, p. 2) 
It is further explained that even very small quantities of EDs can cause serious and long term 
effects in animals and humans exposed during early development. But perhaps most interesting is 
that the agency makes it clear now that well-known long-transported persistent hazardous 
substances (such as DDT, PCB, endosulfan, dieldrin) have endocrine disrupting properties. It is 
however still emphasized that the environmental authorities’ focus is on environmental effects 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2014d).  
The agency also mentions that current standard test guidelines (OECD) to identify environmental 
and health effects of EDs have limitations and therefore it is necessary to complement the 
information required for regulatory work with non-standard research-based studies: 
“It is supposed […] when using standard test methods that there is a threshold for effects also for 
endocrine disrupting qualities. Such threshold values are however scientifically difficult to 
determine. This places a limit to the validated OECD test methods that are available to study 
endocrine disruptive qualities. It is therefore important to include information from research 
based studies […] when assessing a substance’ endocrine disruptive qualitites.”(Miljødirektoratet, 
2014d, p. 15). 
It is also explained that the national work on EDs is split among several authorities and that under 
such circumstances it is important to have a tighter coordination across the different ministries 
and agencies to have a coherent regulatory work: “In Norway, several ministries and their 
underlying agencies have responsibility for chemical regulation that covers endocrine disruptors, 
for example agricultural and food administration (pesticides, cosmetics, food contact material) 
and human- and veterinary medical products. In the effort to reduce usage of endocrine disruptors, 
it is important that we nationally ensure a closer dialogue across ministries and agencies to 
sustain expert assessments that are coordinated and build on similar principles for regulation.” 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2014d, p. 14) 
There is also need for further national research on the topic and is mentioned that the Norwegian 
research council does not have special programs for this type of research in the council’s 
portfolio at present (Miljødirektoratet, 2014d).  
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With respect to regulation, the agency notes that they can influence EU work on EDs by working 
on expert and working groups at EU level. It is stressed that it would be very hard for Norway to 
introduce national regulation on the use or sale of EDs that come under the scope of REACH, 
given that this is a harmonized legislation. However, it is also noted that what is exactly 
harmonized though REACH is open to discussion, yet it would become very costly to prove that 
a new national regulation is in accordance to the EEA agreement (Miljødirektoratet, 2014f).  
“Norway was early with a strict regulation of many hazardous substances, but we now have very 
small prospects to make national bans. This is limited by EEA-regulations. […] In order to 
reduce use and emissions of endocrine disruptors, we must strengthen Norwegian efforts in the 
EU in this area.”(Miljødirektoratet, 2014c, p. 1) 
We can see then that the regulation of EDs will most likely take place at EU level. However, it is 
also well-known that in order to participate in chemical policy at this level, Norway has to work 
at the early stages of policy proposals at the expert’s group and committee level. But most 
importantly is that, in order to have some influence, one must have “high level of expertise, 
sound scientific arguments and agreed Norwegian positions”(Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 2006, p. 108). 
7.2 Main actors in the management of chemical in Norway  
7.2.1. Norwegian public chemical administration  
Chemicals are used extensively in many sectors of society and the Norwegian chemical 
administration/management involves many different authorities.
132
 Chemical policy is relevant 
within environmental policy, health policy, food safety policy, working environment policy and 
many more.  
This means that several ministries and their underlying agencies have responsibilities concerning 
chemical use and regulation. However, in many cases, these chemical-related tasks often 
comprise just a small part of their workload and are just one among other major responsibilities – 
except maybe for the Ministry of Environment. 
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 In lack of a good translation for the more precise term “kjemikalieforvaltning” in Norwegian and Danish, I shall 
use the term “public chemical administration/management”. That is to say how the public sector regulates, informs, 
advises and exert the political decisions on chemicals.  
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In several official documents such as the white paper n°14 it is noted that as a result of this split 
organization, it has happened that different regulatory agencies have conducted different risk 
evaluations and have reached different conclusions concerning chemical safety depending on 
whether the study was related to risk for: the environment, patients, ordinary consumer or 
workers. This fragmentation has thus led to situations where the same substance has been 
regulated differently in different products. It also meant that usually health and environmental 
considerations were not fully integrated in the final assessments, leading to inconsistent health 
and environmental risk reduction measures, particularly when it came to cosmetics and medicines.  
In 2001, Statskonsult133 also published a review concerning the distribution of responsibilities and 
the level of cooperation between the different agencies involved in chemicals management.  An 
important conclusion was that at the time there was not a satisfactory “unified” policy on 
chemicals (Statskonsult, 2001)(and we might add: little has changed). 
The Statskonsult document explains that the different ministries and agencies that are in charge 
of chemical management have been set up to safeguard different public interests such as for 
example: protecting the natural environment, the health of consumers or that of workers, 
facilitating commercial activity, wealth creation and profitability for different industries.  As a 
result of this, they work with different types of chemical “risk” and prioritize their work on 
chemicals differently (Statskonsult, 2001). 
At the same time, the different authorities (and their related knowledge organizations), are 
different in terms of knowledge and expertise, access to resources and in their administrative and 
regulatory traditions. This division of responsibilities in several “policy” sectors presents special 
challenges in terms of coordination, in particular when it comes to balancing the various social 
interests against each other and achieving a coherent and unified Norwegian chemical policy 
(Statskonsult, 2001).  
As an example, it was noted that the environmental authorities and the working authorities ended 
sometimes in situations where there are difficult tradeoffs to be made, given that what is good for 
the working environment will not always be the best for the natural environment, making it 
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 Statskonsult, or its administrative field, lies today under the Agency for Public Management and eGovernment 
(Difi) (www.difi.no) 
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especially important to have a good level of understanding and cooperation between the different 
agencies (Statskonsult, 2001).   
Among the general advices of the Statskonsult were to establish more formalized and binding 
cooperation arrangements between the agencies and their knowledge organizations, and pointing 
out that this work should be prioritized highly and that the ministries should have the 
responsibility for such cooperation (Statskonsult, 2001).  
It was also advised to define the responsibilities between the authorities unambiguously and to 
gather more responsibility for the basic chemical legislation on the Norwegian environmental 
agency – similar to the Danish system where the Danish EPA is the main actor in chemical policy 
(Statskonsult, 2001).
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But perhaps the most important message from the Statskonsult document and the white paper 
when it comes to chemical management in Norway was the need for a unified Norwegian 
position towards the EU. This is very relevant because it is at the expert level and working group 
level (refereeing to both the scientific and agency level) and during the initial stages of the 
regulatory work on chemicals that Norway has an opportunity to influence EU chemical 
regulations - regulations that will later on be incorporated into Norwegian law. In this respect, 
Norwegian agencies working with chemicals should be able to cooperate well with a view of 
being able to speak with one voice to the EU (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006; 
Statskonsult, 2001). This will ensure that “Norway provides well-founded input and puts forward 
consistent views in initiatives for the development of effective rules in various forums” 
(Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 105).  
 
The Norwegian Food Authorities 
The case of food control in Norway is quite particular given than, as opposed to the 
environmental sector, the responsibility is divided between three ministries and one agency.   
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 As an example, it was recommended to shift the responsibility for the pesticide regulation to the environmental 
authorities instead of being placed under the agricultural authorities, given that the environmental authorities had 
already the responsibility for biocides (a closely related field) and to avoid the danger of conflict of interests 
(Statskonsult, 2001) 
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Several authors Elvbakken and Rykkja (2006) have claimed that traditionally food safety in 
Norway has been seen as a health issue under the responsibility of the health authorities but that 
gradually, the ministry of agriculture has gained more influence in food safety – at the expense of 
the ministry of health.  
“The interest and influence of the agricultural state administration in food control has increased, 
and the agricultural administration, with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in front, has taken 
over the main responsibility. The Ministries of Health and Fisheries are still there as professional 
ministries (that cover the field), but the Ministry of Food and Agriculture must be understood as 
leading, both administratively and professionally.” (Elvbakken & Rykkja, 2006, p. 133) 
Since 1988, the “professional” and political responsibility for food control in Norway has been 
shared between the Ministry of health, the Ministry of agriculture and the Ministry of fisheries.  
In his paper on “coordination and regulation of food safety in Norway” (Lie, 2006), Lie notes that 
in 1996 a public commission was charged with analyzing food safety regulation in Norway 
(NOU 1996:10). The commission’s final report advised to establish one law, one ministry and 
one regulatory agency to take care of food safety in Norway, and also suggested that the natural 
ministerial affiliation for such a task would be with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (as 
it was called back then). The commission also acknowledge that the ministries of Agriculture and 
Fisheries had legitimate interests in the field of food safety and it was thus important to establish 
good professional cooperation between the three ministries however, they concluded that food 
safety regulation should be separated from business interests (that were found to be more 
prevalent in these other two ministries)(Lie, 2006). 
“In order not to weaken the legitimacy and trust of the controls, the commission made clear that 
the responsibility should not be handed to any of the industry-based ministries.” (Elvbakken & 
Rykkja, 2006, p. 127).  
In 2003, a new Food Law covering the entire food production chain from “earth/sea to table” was 
introduced (Lie, 2011, p. 407). This, together with an ongoing reorganization in the public 
administration, led in 2004 to the establishment of the Norwegian Food Safety Authority 
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(NFSA)
135
 and the Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety (VKM)(Lie, 2006). At the 
same time - and similar to the new European model on food safety – the food safety reform in 
Norway also called for a separation between risk assessment and risk management, and allocated 
the two roles to different organizations. VKM, which was an independent organ under the 
Ministry of Health, was going to be in charge of the scientific risk assessment tasks. Concerning 
the risk management, Lie notes that “NFSA has operational and professional responsibility for 
risk management, while the three ministries have overall political responsibility” (Lie, 2011, p. 
408). 
The literature also notes that at the time there were lively discussions concerning which would be 
the best ministerial affiliation for the new food agency: the ministry of health (as advised by the 
public commission) or the ministry of agriculture.
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 According to Lie “whether food is primary 
related to health or related to agriculture has been a dilemma in the debate” (Lie, 2006, p. 3). 
According to Elvbakken and Hellebø Rykkja in this discussion, it seemed to be equally important 
to ensure consumer’s health and to create favorable conditions for the industry (Elvbakken & 
Rykkja, 2006).  
At the end, it was decided that the professional responsibility would continue to be shared by the 
three ministries and that the administrative responsibility
137
 would be with the Ministry of 
agriculture. NFSA’s tasks were going to be preparing draft legislation, making inspections, 
informing about legislation and giving advice to the ministries (Elvbakken & Rykkja, 2006).   
In Lie’s work it is also mentioned that the agency’s professionals would be in charge of day-to-
day issues and that the ministries would pay more attention to the political leadership: such as 
frame steering, broader policy questions and general guidelines – rather than being involved in 
individual cases (Lie, 2006).    
In a recent publication by Lie (2011) dealing with the effects of the reorganization of food safety 
in Norway, this author concludes that even though the division of labor between the three 
ministries is not very clear and the “three ministries have different agendas” (in particular that the 
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 Which was formed after merging the former: Norwegian animal health authority, the department of seafood of the 
directorate of fisheries, the Norwegian food control authority, the municipal food control authorities and the 
Norwegian agricultural inspection service, into a bigger agency (Lie, 2006).   
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 The ministry of fisheries has been the third player but has had a less prominent role in the debate. 
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 Understood as steering dialog between the ministries and NFSA and managing the budget 
135 
 
ministry of agriculture and the ministry of fisheries have focus on business interests in addition to 
food safety; and the ministry of health focuses on health in addition to food safety), conflicts are 
rare. The author explains that there is good coordination between the three ministries and that 
“the ministries discuss questions and disagreements at their meetings, and conflicts are therefore 
rare” (Lie, 2011, p. 409). 
When exploring this topic during my interviews, I receive a similar answer to what Lie (2011) 
reports. I was in particular wondering whether there were situations where the interests and 
position of the Ministry of Health and Care Services diverged from the interests and positions of 
the other two Ministries – especially when formulating a national position concerning the 
legislation on food contact materials vis-a-vis the EU. To what I was told, that unified Norwegian 
positions with respect to the legislation on FCMs were unproblematic (personal communication 
with representative of NFSA). 
With this short introduction in mind, I will now present the main authorities in charge of food 
policy in Norway (including the regulation of chemical in food): the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Health and Care Services, the 
Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA) and the Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food 
Safety (VKM). 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
This ministry is responsible for food and agricultural policy.
138
 It has been noted that food safety 
has become one of the main political objectives for the ministry, together with setting up the right 
conditions for the agricultural industry:  
“The Ministry of Agriculture has the responsibility for food and agricultural policy […]: Safe and 
healthy food with good quality and satisfied customers, an internationally obligating cooperation, 
an emphasis on quality all along the chain of food articles and transparency for and participation 
from consumers based on the best available knowledge.” (Statskonsult, 2001, p. 10) “The 
principle objectives of the ministry are then connected to food safety for the Norwegian 
population, but also to the conditions for the industry actors in the agricultural industry.” 
(Statskonsult, 2001, p. 16). 
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 When I speak of the ministries here I will use their current names corresponding to their administrative areas. 
When spoken of historically, or in quotes, I use the names they had at the time.  
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With respect to its work on chemicals, it has been noted that “The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Food has the responsibility to minimize health- and environmental risk by using pesticides” 
(NOU, 2010, p. 58) 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 
This ministry is responsible for industrial and seafood policy: “The collective value creation 
nationwide is what determines prosperity and well-being in Norway. The objective of the 
Government’s industrial and seafood policy, therefore, is to maximise value creation in the 
Norwegian economy.” (Regjeringen, 2014b). 
With respect to their work on chemicals:  
“The Ministry of Fisheries and Costal Affairs has through The Norwegian Coastal 
Administration responsibility for public security in cases of acute contamination.” (NOU, 2010, p. 
58). 
Ministry of Health and Care Services 
This ministry has several chief responsibilities among which health policy, public health, health 
services, and health legislation (Regjeringen, 2014a).  
As previously explained, it has been noted that, when it comes to food safety, the influence of the 
health authorities has retrieved at the expense of other interests in the field and also due to other 
bigger responsibilities to take care of. But most importantly for my analysis, is the prioritization 
of chemical work in this ministry, which seems neither to be on the top list. The ministry of 
health’s role in chemicals management lies in its responsibility for safeguarding public health, 
particularly from a preventive perspective. Yet, chemicals do not seem to figure among its key 
policy objectives (Statskonsult, 2001). 
“The role of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in chemical administration lies in their 
responsibility to ensure that the population’s health is taken care of. The focus will then be 
towards how it is possible to limit harm to the population’s health as a consequence of the use of 
chemicals. […] Chemicals that are hazardous to health and environment seems however not to 
have a central place in political propositions of objectives and policy documents from the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs” (Statskonsult, 2001, p. 15) 
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The Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA) 
The Norwegian Food Safety Authority is the subordinate agency under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food. This agency works both on the development and the implementation of 
legislation in the food sector, and supervises and monitors a whole range of activities along the 
chain of food production. It also provides advice to the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food and the Ministry of Health and Care Services (Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 80).  
The agency’s objectives are “(…) to ensure that food and drinking water are as safe and healthy 
as possible for consumers (…)” and “ (…) to contribute to value creation in the food sector” 
(slide 15) (Mattilsynet, 2015a).  
NFSA administers several chemical-related legislations, among other things, the legislation on 
pesticides, the legislation on food contact materials (FCM) and the legislation on cosmetic 
products. These legislations are administered by NFSA but they are under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Health and Care Services. The legislation on FCM and cosmetics are included, 
and harmonized, in the EEA Agreement to which Norway is bound (Mattilsynet, 2015a).  
The Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety (VKM) 
The Norwegian Food Safety Authority in turn depends on the scientific input from the 
Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety (VKM) to give advice to the relevant ministries 
and for its regulatory responsibilities (e.g. policy proposals). VKM conducts risk assessments for 
NFSA across the agency’s field of responsibility. These assessments are conducted following 
“(…) current international standards and methodology in the respective fields of responsibility 
for VKMs panels.” As mentioned before, VKM was established in 2004 following the European 
frame of risk analysis, namely that scientific risk assessments needed to be separated from risk 
management activities: “Neither the Ministry of Health and Care Services, other ministries, 
NFSA, the Norwegian Environment Agency or others may interfere in the scientific work of the 
committee” (VKM, 2015a, p. 1). 
7.2.1.2 The Norwegian Environmental Authorities 
Ministry of Climate and Environment 
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This ministry has the main responsibility for ensuring integrated governmental climate and 
environmental policies (Regjeringen, 2015).  
When it comes to chemicals: “The Ministry of Environment has a responsibility to ensure that the 
natural environment is looked after in chemical policy. In addition, the ministry is the responsible 
authority on consumer policy.” (Statskonsult, 2001, p. 13) 
In the white paper it is specified that the Ministry of Environment is responsible for “all 
regulation relating to both health and environmental effects of chemicals where no separate 
regulatory measures have been laid down. Medicines, cosmetics, plant protection products and 
chemicals for occupational use are some types of uses or products that are separately regulated” 
(Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 105).  The same applies to food contact 
materials which are regulated by the NFSA.  
However, in the case of cosmetics for example, the Ministry of Climate and Environment is 
responsible for chemicals in cosmetics that are hazardous to the environment but it is the Ministry 
of Health and Care Services that has the responsibility for chemicals in cosmetics that are 
hazardous to health. This is due to the fact that the “legislation administered by the health 
authorities contains provisions designed to prevent direct injury to health” (Norwegian Ministry 
of the Environment, 2006, p. 106).  
In the case of Food Contact Materials, which is of most relevance for the study of the regulation 
of BPA, the responsibility boundaries are less evident (as will be revealed in the analysis of BPA 
regulation in Norway). The legislation on FCM is administered by the NFSA and this agency has 
the responsibility for chemicals in FCM that are hazardous to health. However, FCMs (and the 
chemicals included in these diverse food packaging) also end up as waste, which is an area of 
responsibility of the environmental authorities. At the same time, these same chemicals can also 
be used in other consumer products, which are then regulated by the environmental authorities 
(both in terms of environmental and health effects). This means that in some cases there can be 
two different assessment of the health effect of one chemical.  
The Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) 
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The “new” agency was created in 2013 when the former Directorate for Nature Management and 
the Climate and Pollution Agency were merged.
139
 The agency is subordinate to the Ministry of 
Climate and Environment. It is in charge of the implementation of chemical policy and on 
advising on the development of chemical policy goals - with the objective of limiting the usage 
and spread of dangerous chemicals (Miljødirektoratet, 2015c). Besides preventing pollution, the 
agency has also other important tasks such as taking care of the Norwegian climate policy, 
managing Norwegian nature and coordinating the integration of environmental considerations 
across sectors (Miljødirektoratet, 2015c).  
The framework for the agency’s activities are set up by the annual letter of allocation, white 
papers, parliamentary bills, legislation and other political instructions, which determine among 
other things expenditure budgets and prioritization: “It is the Stortinget and the government that 
determine the level of ambition and instruments of climate and environmental policy (…)” 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2015c, p. 2). 
The environmental agency has the responsibility of the administration of the REACH legislation 
in Norway and the biocide legislation, among others (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 
2006). 
Scientific advisors for the environmental authorities 
The NEA also depends on the expert input of different scientific bodies to conduct its regulatory 
activities. During my interviews I was informed that among the scientific bodies that provide 
such scientific input are: the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI), The Norwegian Institute 
for Water Research (NIVA) and Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU) (personal 
communication with representative of NEA). 
7.2.2. Political actors 
During the discussion of the white paper in the Parliament, we can note that in general there was 
a broad agreement concerning the goals of the white paper and its initiatives. It can also be noted 
that “hazardous substances” (miljøgifter) were of concern, in particular, the fact that these 
chemicals were persistent in nature and that they could readily accumulate in the ecosystem and 
                                                     
139
 As with the ministries, I will use their current names, but when spoken of historically, or in quotes, I use the 
names they had at the time. 
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in organisms (Stortinget, 2007). The different interventions emphasized that there was need for 
international solutions and that the Norwegian Arctic was particularly vulnerable: 
“Hazardous substances know no territorial boundaries and actually constitute a not so 
insignificant global problem. Norway and ‘The High North’ are especially at risk for hazardous 
substances that come with ocean currents and wind from other countries and continents. Again 
there is little help in strict bans here at home, as long as our vulnerable Arctic region functions as 
the world’s disposal for poisonous substances. This is in other words also an important global 
challenge.” (Stortinget, 2007, p. 2997) 
“I would like to say a few words about the polar bear […] it has been measured steadily 
increasing levels of chemicals in polar bears in The High North. These poisonous chemicals 
come up through the food chain, generally through fish to seal and to polar bear. […] The 
consequence of the high level of chemicals is that the polar bear will have problems with its 
ability to reproduce. But even though the polar bear is found in areas that are considered as 
Norwegian, most of the chemicals come from other parts of the world. This shows that it is 
important to have a significant dedication in international negotiations, because this challenge 
cannot be solved in Norway alone.” (Stortinget, 2007, p. 2999). 
It might be that the emphasis on effects for arctic organisms was related to the fact that the 
Committee had been on a study trip to Svalbard where politicians could “experience” the effects 
of these chemical on the polar environment. In either case, it is important to mention that 
although a link to human health was always present, this was not as emphasized or described. 
Concerning one of the concrete interventions on human health concerning the presence of 
hazardous substances in breastmilk, it was pointed that: 
“We still know very little about how the tiny amounts of these dangerous substances impact our 
bodies and health, but it is important to be attentive to it and try to avoid having them around. I 
am therefore content with the measures that the Government now takes to get more information 
out, so that people can choose not to choose hazardous substances” (p. 3001) (Stortinget, 2007, p. 
3001) 
Another dominant topic during the discussion was that of remediation action plans to “remediate 
old sins committed to the environment” (Stortinget, 2007, p. 2998). It was noted that once 
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persistent hazardous substances are released into the environment, it is very difficult and 
expensive to remove them. Many members pointed that the negative long term consequences of 
pollution and the elevated costs of remediation justified an active use of the precautionary 
principle to ensure that the same mistakes were not committed again (Stortinget, 2007).  
7.2.3. On expertise and research 
One of the main remarks of the white paper was the serious lack of basic knowledge concerning 
the health and environmental effects of most chemicals in the market (and those being constantly 
introduced). “We lack adequate information on 65 % of all substances that are produced in or 
imported to Norway in amounts of more than one tone every year, and have no information on 
21 % of them” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 39). This lack of information 
concerned  the chemicals’ properties, hazardousness, short and long-term effects on health and 
ecosystems, their usage in everyday products, their level of spread in the environment and the 
effects of combined exposures and the existence of possible substitutes.  
That means that there was (and maybe there still is) inadequate information on 86% of the 
substances in the Norwegian market (produced or imported over a tone per year). The 
Government was aware that this lack of information made it difficult to inform consumers, 
challenged the development of regulations both nationally and internationally and was an 
important for public health: 
“To prevent injury to health and damage to the environment we must have adequate knowledge 
about the effects of chemicals on health and the environment. Building up this type of knowledge 
is one important aspect of public health work”(Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 
81). 
In connection to this, the white paper proposes to build up expertise “(…) both by expanding 
research activities in this field and by building up the research institutions and public bodies that 
are involved in evaluating documentation and information on hazardous substances” (Norwegian 
Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 41);  to promote cooperation between institutions dealing 
with health, environmental and occupational concerns “Cooperation between different disciplines 
and between experts in different sectors will be very valuable in further research on chemicals” 
(Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006, p. 42), and to strengthen research and monitoring 
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programs on dangerous chemicals – in particular hazardous substances. Priority will be given to 
research about the Arctic environment given its strategic importance in the promotion of stricter 
international regulation (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2006). 
7.3 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have seen that most of the work done on EDs is conducted by the 
environmental authorities. One can mention that 1) the particular definition of EDs as hazardous 
substances (miljøgifter) has had visible consequences, 2) that most of the political attention has 
been on persistent, bioaccumulative, long-transported EDs, 3) that the stressed focus on the 
environment has gone at the expense of health effects, 4) that the specific category “endocrine 
disruptor” has not been an explicit part of the ‘discourse’ when it comes to chemical policy. 5) 
the efforts in research have largely been in research on nature, and much of this in the arctic 
region. 
I have argued that in the absence of a national action plan on chemicals, white paper no.14 has 
been the document guiding Norway’s chemical policy in the last decade. An analysis of this 
document reveals that Norwegian chemical policy is based on a precautionary thinking – 
particularly so when it comes to hazardous substances. At the same time, the white paper 
specifies clear regulatory objectives for the environmental authorities with respect to hazardous 
substances (including EDs) – namely that their use is going to be reduced as much as possible by 
2020, according to the generation goal. It is further specified that the risk associated with this 
particular type of chemicals calls for a hazard (precautionary) approach, where risk does not have 
to be quantified but is instead based on the intrinsic properties of these chemicals. This is justified 
given that it would be hard to establish safe limits for chemicals that keep accumulating in the 
environment, which at the same time can have substantial and irreversible effects and where the 
posterior costs of remediation can be very high.  It is also specified that these national chemical 
policy objectives should apply to all sectors.  In order to achieve the objectives of the white paper, 
the environmental authorities propose stricter national regulation for those substances listed in the 
national priority list, among which is BPA.   
One can also see that there is not much emphasis on ED’s health effects. When it comes to male 
reproductive disorders for example, this connection is challenged at the time when the white 
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paper was released, even if one can see a change of attitude in the following years. This is also 
evident at the political level, where most of the discussions have to do with the environmental 
consequences and the need to remediate locations that have previously been contaminated with 
hazardous substances.  Here again one could claim that recently, in particular in connection with 
the ongoing work on an action plan for a toxic free every day, there has been more emphasis on 
the health implications. However, in recent updates, the environmental agency has clarified that 
the agency’s emphasis when it comes to EDs is on their environmental effects.  
But in particular at the administrative level one can see that chemical policy is fragmented 
between several public bodies. The report from the Statskonsult especially mentions that each of 
these public bodies have a particular way of defining chemical risk that depends on their 
particular expertise, their particular regulatory traditions, the interest that they are meant to 
protect and the resources they have to act on it. As a result of this, they can end up having 
different management preferences when it comes to chemicals.  When it comes to bisphenol A, 
the main actors are the health, the food and the environmental authorities (this will be analyzed 
more in detail in next chapter).  
It is interesting to mention the particular situation of the food agency, when it comes to chemical 
management. As mentioned in this chapter, the NFSA is the subordinate agency of three different 
ministries and is in charge of administrating several pieces of legislation for the Ministry of 
Health and Care Services in connection to chemicals. Among these pieces of legislation we have 
the ones related to cosmetics and food contact materials. From the way it is formulated in the 
different documents that were analyzed, one can understand that the food agency is in charge of 
taking care of the human health dimension, whereas the environmental agency looks into the 
environmental effects. However, as explained in this chapter, the environmental agency is also in 
charge of assessing the human health implications of chemicals in consumer products. Given that 
many of the chemicals that are used in cosmetic and food contact materials, are also used in 
consumer products (which are the responsibility of the environmental agency), it becomes 
ambiguous who has the ultimate responsibility of such health-evaluation. At the same time, it has 
also been mentioned that chemicals do not rank very high in the list of priorities of the Ministry 
of Health and Care Services, which adds to the ambiguity of who is accountable for the health 
dimension when it comes to chemicals used in cosmetics, food contact materials (and that are 
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also found in other consumer products). Furthermore, and as will be seen in next chapter, each 
agency has its own group of experts. This means that the scientific input may be different from 
one agency to the other, which again might add to the differences between the agencies.  
Finally it is worth to mention that, until very recently, there has not been much political attention 
on the topic, and in general, political parties have not included chemicals (even less so endocrine 
disruptors) in their overall environmental policy objectives (with the exception of Venstre and the 
Green Party). On the NGO side, there is a current effort to put chemicals back into the 
environmental agenda, but the work is rather limited in economic and manpower resources 
(personal communication with representative of Bellona). The Norwegian Consumer council has 
maybe been one of the most active players when it comes to chemicals, but has received constant 
critics and even been sued from the cosmetic industry for developing an app to identify EDs in 
cosmetics. In general it can be said that there is little public awareness on the topic in Norway.  
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8. The BPA-case in Norway 
As explained in the previous chapter, Norway’s chemical policy is divided between several 
administrative bodies. When it comes to the regulation of BPA, it is in particular the 
environmental, the health and the food authorities that have responsibility for the legislation 
concerning this chemical. In particular, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority (NFSA) 
administers the legislation for food contact materials (FCM) – which is the area of responsibility 
of the Ministry of Health and Care Services. And, the Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) 
administers the much broader REACH chemical legislation (covering consumer products) - 
which is the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Climate and Environment. In this chapter I 
will start by presenting the initial regulatory interest on BPA from the part of the environmental 
authorities. In the second part I will chronologically present the debate that took place between 
the three above-mentioned administrative bodies concerning the posterior regulation of BPA in 
Norway.   
8.1 Environmental authorities interest in regulating BPA 
BPA was included in the national priority list of hazardous substances in 2006. It was included 
because it fulfilled the criteria proposed for the identification of substances of concern. Namely, 
the criterion of “equivalent level of concern” based on its endocrine disrupting effects and the 
fact that it was found in the Norwegian environment and biota. BPA’s listing meant that this 
chemical came under the generation goal, namely that: BPA emissions were going to be 
continuously reduced with the view to eliminating them by 2020 (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 2006).   
At the time of inclusion little consumption and emission data was available. It was known that 
BPA was not – and is still not – produced in Norway. It was imported as raw material and in 
finished products and had a widespread commercial use. BPA is mainly used in the manufacture 
of polycarbonate plastic but it is also used in paints, adhesives and varnishes (Klif, 2010). The 
registered consumption of BPA in 2013 was estimated to be 15 tons.
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 However, the real 
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 This estimation comes from the product register which is the official register for chemical products in Norway. 
One of the limitations of the product register is that it does not adequately cover the content of hazardous substances 
in imported finished products. This can lead to an underestimation of the emissions when finished products represent 
the dominant source of emissions (Klif 2012) 
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consumption of BPA in Norway is expected to be significantly larger. This is due to the fact that 
the available estimations do not include imported finished products, which are believe to 
represent the largest share of BPA in the country (Miljødirektoratet, 2015b). It is also mentioned 
that consumption in the EU is likely to increase in the next years, which could lead to a national 
increase in the consumption of BPA, again, in the form of imported finished products 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2014g). Concerning the national emissions of BPA, there is still very limited 
data. This makes it hard to estimate how far the authorities are from achieving the generation goal 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2015b). However, it has been noted that BPA emissions in Norway are 
significant and that plastic waste is likely the main culprit (Miljødirektoratet, 2014g). 
The environmental authorities have described BPA as an endocrine disruptor with estrogenic 
activity. BPA can affect growth, reproduction and development in aquatic organisms 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2014a) and may also have endocrine disrupting effects on snails at very low 
concentrations (Miljødirektoratet, 2015b). They also point to the fact that a number of mammal 
studies have shown that low dose exposure to BPA during pregnancy can affect fetal 
development and learning ability. BPA is classified as harmful to eyes, irritating to the 
respiratory tract, allergenic by skin contact and suspected of damaging fertility.  It degrades 
relatively easy and does not bioaccumulates (Miljødirektoratet, 2015b). 
For over a decade, BPA has been included in several monitoring programs to estimate the 
prevalence of this substance in the Norwegian aquatic environment. BPA has constantly been 
found in effluents and sewage sludge from water treatment plants, and in landfill leachates in 
relatively large amounts
141
 (Klif, 2012). It has also been found in lake sediments and sediments 
along the coast – as far as the southern and eastern Barents Sea.142 At the same time, BPA has 
been found in fish, mussels and cod liver in Norwegian waters. The monitoring programs reveal 
that the concentration of BPA in the aquatic environment can be very high in the proximity of 
local sources of emission where the chemical might cause adverse effects to the environment 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2015b). It has recently been suggested that additional measures might be 
needed to prevent unwanted spreading from landfills’ leachates (Miljødirektoratet, 2014g).  
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 The sewage sludge is usually further used for agricultural purposes, where BPA can also be dispersed to the 
terrestrial compartment (Klif 2012) 
142
 Yet, for the time being, BPA has not been detected in sediment, fish or seabirds analysed in the Artic region. 
However, since it is produced in so large quantities it is a good idea to keep monitoring it  
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More recently, other bisphenols such as bisphenol F, bisphenol S, bisphenol BP and bisphenol 
AF have also been monitored in the environment. Bisphenols are a group of chemicals that are 
structurally similar to BPA. They are also used in the manufacturing of plastic, in particular, as a 
replacement for BPA. Some of them have also been found to possess estrogenic activity - similar 
to that of BPA. For others, there is no ecotoxicological data available. BPA is still the dominant 
bisphenol when it comes to environmental occurrence in Norway. However, at the time being, it 
is hard to estimate the combined risk to the environment from this group of chemicals 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2014e). 
Concerning BPA’s regulation, this chemical is regulated in the national legislation for food 
contact materials (Forskrift om materialer og gjenstander i kontakt med næringsmidler, 1993-12-
21 nr 1381) with a specific migration limit (SML) of 0.6 mg/kg food (VKM, 2008). As a result of 
the implementation of European directive (2011/8/EU), BPA has also been banned in baby 
bottles since summer 2011. It is the NFSA that is responsible for all regulations related to food.  
With respect to products, from summer 2015, the limit values of BPA in toys for children under 3 
will be reduced and there is ongoing work on a restriction on thermal paper at EU level (a stricter 
regulation). Other than that, BPA is monitored by the environmental authorities in leachates.  
The NEA communicates with NFSA concerning the regulation of BPA (Miljødirektoratet, 
2014g).  
8.1.1 Environmental authorities’ ban proposal for 21 substances (part I, December 2006) 
At the end of 2006 and in connection to the environmental objectives put forward by the white 
paper no.14, the Ministry of Environment commissioned SFT to work on a possible ban on 
hazardous substances in consumer products.  SFT proposed a ban
143
 on 21 hazardous substances 
– among which BPA.  The chemical had only recently been included in the national priority list 
and its use had not previously been regulated in products in Norway
144
 (SFT, 2006b). 
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 The ban covered manufacture, import, export and sale of consumer products containing selected hazardous 
substances  
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 In 2006 there were two European regulations concerning BPA. One was related to the food contact materials and 
the other, to the Cosmetics regulation. In Norway, these regulations were administered by the food agency (EFTA, 
2007) 
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By 2007 the ban proposal has been reduced to 18 hazardous substances but BPA was still on the 
list (Miljøverndepartementet, 2007). In the impact assessment available at the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority website
145
, the Norwegian environmental authorities stressed that it was extremely 
important to reduce the emissions of prioritized hazardous substances. These were substances that 
were persistent, bioaccumulative and/or toxic (for example harmful to reproduction) and the 
proponents of the ban saw their effects as irreversible. The properties of these substances made it 
difficult to intervene before damage had already arisen. It was mentioned that hazardous 
substances could accumulate in nature and in food chains and were thus a serious threat to food 
security, the health of future generations and the environment. At the same time, monitoring data 
from Norway had shown a substantial spread of the proposed hazardous substances in the 
environment (EFTA, 2007).  
Consumer products were an important source of emissions and consumers lacked the necessary 
knowledge to protect themselves or the environment against these substances.  The entire 
population, including the most vulnerable groups were exposed to the emission of hazardous 
substances either directly through usage of consumer products or indirectly via the environment. 
The regulation was also going to contribute to reduce the quantity of hazardous waste in Norway 
(EFTA, 2007).  
It was further argued that in order to achieve Norway’s objectives in the chemical area, namely to 
achieve the generation goal, it was needed to have a reduction in the emission of hazardous 
substances from products (EFTA, 2007).  
The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) also stressed that it was important to act 
precautionary. They were aware that for all the substances the uncertainties were large and it was 
impossible to quantify the possible health and environmental damage using the available 
knowledge.  At the same time it was also difficult to predict the exact costs of such a regulation. 
It was estimated that an extremely long time would be required to get sufficiently reliable 
evidence of the long-term effect of these substances and given the possible serious consequences, 
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Authority’s role is to ensure that EFTA States respect their obligations under the EEA Agreement, in particular with 
relation to the functioning of the internal market. (http://www.eftasurv.int/about-the-authority/the-authority-at-a-
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the authorities did not want to wait for that. Instead, they proposed that, based on the 
precautionary principle, the ban ought to be carried out as soon as possible based on existing 
information (EFTA, 2007).  
SFT had estimated that for most application areas there were alternative products on the market 
that satisfied the proposed requirement. Besides, a number of application areas were also 
exempted from the regulation when there were no present alternatives or the costs were too high, 
when the areas of application were already subjected to total harmonization regulations at EU 
level or when the application areas belonged to regulatory areas which were not administered by 
the environmental authorities (EFTA, 2007).  
With respect to BPA it was stressed that this chemical was included in the priority list due to its 
endocrine disrupting properties, and that it can be found at levels of concern in the Norwegian 
environment. The ban was intended to cover, among others, polycarbonate plastics, epoxy resins, 
paint, varnish, glue and PVC. The proposal for regulation was based on limit values, where 
products exceeding the proposed limits were going to be prohibited.  Other products such as 
thermal paper and tooth filling were exempted due the apparent lack of alternatives and related 
high costs and BPA’s applications in the area of food contact materials were not included in the 
proposal given that this area was not regulated by the environmental authorities (EFTA, 2007) 
The prohibition proposal was sent out for consultation to stakeholders at the national and 
international level on May 2007  
8.1.2 Risk assessment of bisphenol A in Norway 
Updated European Risk Assessment of BPA and effects on developmental neurotoxicity (April 
2008) 
In the meantime, the European Chemicals Bureau (ECB) updated the European Union Risk 
Assessment Report (RAR) of BPA, in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) 793/93.
146
 The 
assessment concluded, with regards to the environmental risk, that there remained uncertainties 
related to the potential effects of BPA on freshwater snails (EU-RAR, 2008a). Concerning the 
human health assessment, it was concluded that: there were no risk for consumers with regards to 
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 This regulation relates to the European Union’s program for the evaluation and control of the risks of existing 
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all effects considered and all exposure scenarios, and that no further information or testing was 
needed. ECB proposed a NOAEL of 50 mg/kg bw/day for regulatory purposes (EU-RAR, 2008b). 
However, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens forurensningstilsyn, SFT) together 
with the other Nordic environmental authorities disagreed with this conclusion - in particular with 
the fact that the proposed NOAEL also covered developmental neurotoxicity effects at low levels 
of BPA exposure (EU-RAR, 2008b)..  
In recent years, several scientific groups had been studying the effects of BPA on neurological 
development. The authors of the EU RAR (2008) report used a weight of evidence approach to 
assess the reliability and consistency of the available evidence in the hazard assessment of BPA.  
With respect to developmental neurotoxicity, the panel noted that the area was “relatively new 
and not fully established area in regulatory toxicity […] and therefore experience in the conduct 
and interpretation of the studies is limited” (EU-RAR, 2008b, p. 116). The OECD guideline for 
developmental neurotoxicity testing – OECD Guideline 426 – was under development. 
When the rapporteurs evaluated the DNT (developmental neurotoxicity) database for BPA,
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they concluded that there was on overall low level of confidence in the reliability of the studies 
and a lack of consistency in the results. Some studies have used tests similar to those 
recommended by the draft of guideline OECD 426, but others have used techniques that 
according to the reviewers had no established role in regulatory toxicity.  Consequently, no firm 
conclusion could be drawn concerning the possible developmental neurotoxicity effects of BPA 
at low levels of exposure (EU-RAR, 2008b). 
“Confidence in the reliability of the developmental neurotoxicity database is low because of 
limitations in the design and reporting in all of the available studies. These limitations include 
small group size, inappropriate statistical analysis, brief reporting of methods and results, lack of 
compliance with GLP and use of one BPA dose level. […]. The consistency assessment shows 
that there is no discernable and reproducible pattern to the behavioural testing results. […] 
Overall, taking together the low confidence in the reliability of the developmental neurotoxicity 
studies and the lack of consistency in the results of behavioural testing, no conclusions can be 
drawn from these studies. This opinion is very similar to that of EFSA (2006), who reviewed nine 
of the developmental neurotoxicity studies” (EU-RAR, 2008b, p. 120). 
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 That is, all the available studies looking into developmental neurotoxicity effects. 
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However, this conclusion was challenged by the representatives of the Nordic Environmental 
Agencies (Sweden, Denmark and Norway). In particular, these members strongly disagreed with 
the conclusion that a NOAEL of 50 mg/kg bw/day covered developmental neurotoxicity effect at 
low-dose exposures. In their opinion four of the studies in the DNT database could and should be 
use for regulatory purposes. These studies indicated a possible risk for developmental 
neurotoxicity at low levels of exposure that warranted concern. Instead, the Nordic members 
advocated for a conclusion where either: the identified four studies were included in the risk 
assessment, or that the conclusion included a demand for extra information to clarify the ongoing 
uncertainties. However, this position was not supported by the majority of the European Member 
States and the Nordic position was only included as a footnote in the final report: 
“Denmark, Sweden and Norway do not agree with this conclusion. These countries find that 
some of the studies in the DNT database are sufficiently reliable for regulatory use: Negishi 2004, 
Carr 2003, Ryan and Vandenberg 2006 and Adriani 2003. The reliability of these studies is 
judged to be adequate because the behavioural testing has been conducted according to 
acceptable methods, the group sizes are quite close or equal to those recommended in the OECD 
TG 426, and the litter has been used as the statistical unit. The effects found in these studies 
indicate that there is a possible risk for developmental neurotoxicity of BPA at very low exposure 
levels (0.1-0.25 mg/kg/d). These effects cannot be dismissed based on the other unreliable studies 
in the DNT database. The above mentioned countries would therefore prefer one of two possible 
conclusions: 1) the available, but limited data are used for the risk assessment or 2) there is a 
need for further information (the countries certainly evaluate the database as sufficient to justify a 
concern warranting further investigation of developmental neurotoxicity), similarly to the 
proposed conclusion in the final expert panel report on the reproductive and developmental 
toxicity of BPA performed by NTP, US in November 2007.” (EU-RAR, 2008b, pp. 120-121 
(footnote))  
VKM’s assessment of four studies on developmental neurotoxicity of BPA (June 2008)  
After the release of the EU RAR 2008, the NFSA requested to the Norwegian Scientific 
Committee for Food Safety (Vitenskapskomitéen for mattrygghet, VKM) to assess whether the 
four above mentioned studies on developmental neurotoxicity at low doses provided sufficient 
evidence to set a lower NOAEL in the hazard characterization of BPA. VKM was further 
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requested to evaluate a Norwegian exposure scenario based on available dietary and 
environmental data.  The assessment was performed by the Scientific Panel on Food Additives, 
Flavourings, Processing Aids, Materials in Contact with Food and Cosmetics (Panel 4) and 
released in June 2008 (VKM, 2008).  
In the assessment it was mentioned that this scientific request was related to the ongoing BPA 
ban proposal in Norway (i.e. the environmental authorities’ ban proposal for 18 hazardous 
substances in consumer products) and the recent disagreement concerning the safety of BPA 
during the EU RAR (2008) assessment: “The request from the NFSA to VKM is categorized as 
an urgent matter due to the situation that the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment at the 
moment are considering a ban on BPA in consumer products and the fact that the SFT has 
disagreed upon the NOAEL for developmental toxicity in the revised EU RAR” (VKM, 2008) 
The NFSA asked VKM to include the environmental exposure data proposed by SFT during the 
EU RAR assessment in order to derive a Norwegian exposure scenario. In relation to children’s 
exposure, SFT had identified that some plastic mittens in the Norwegian market contained high 
levels of residual BPA (VKM, 2008). 
SFT was of the opinion that if small children placed in their mouths such mittens, this could lead 
to an additional exposure of BPA. This information had been submitted during the update work 
of the EU RAR (2008) but was not included in the final assessment since the use of mittens was 
not considered to be representative across the Member States in the European Union (VKM, 
2008).  According to VKM’s assessment, BPA exposure via the mittens resulted in an additional 
exposure of 3.3 μg/kg bw/day148 for children between 1.5 and 4.5 years – considering a 
conservative worst case scenario (VKM, 2008).  
In relation to the general population, SFT had analyzed the content of BPA in fish from several 
Norwegian lakes, rivers and fjords. In some cases, the levels found in Norwegian fish were 10 
times higher than the average levels of BPA in fish used in the EU RAR (2008) assessment.  
These additional conservative estimates were also included in VKM’s assessment (VKM, 2008).  
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 The estimation is based on a value of 98.2 μg residual BPA/g mittens and the assumption that the complete 
amount of residual BPA from 50 g mittens is ingested over a period of 100 days per year. 
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With respect to the evaluation of the four developmental neurotoxicity studies, the panel 
concluded that they did not provide enough evidence to change the current NOAEL of 5 mg/kg 
bw/day established by EFSA in 2006149 given that the studies had important design and reporting 
shortcomings. Yet the panel expressed some concern about the potential neurotoxic effects of 
BPA at low doses and recommended to conduct a standardized study to clarify the doubts – 
namely, a GLP compliant study according to OECD test guideline 426) (VKM, 2008).  
With respect to the Norwegian exposure scenario, it was noted, as usual, that infants and children 
were exposed to higher levels of BPA per kg body weight than the rest of the population. 
However, it was concluded that, in general, exposure levels to BPA in Norway were low and that 
estimated exposure for children and adults were well below EFSA’s current TDI at 50 μg/kg 
bw/day (VKM, 2008).  
Even though it is clearly stated that VKM’s evaluation was not going to address recent 
international assessments on BPA in their report, one could always wonder if the conclusions 
reached from VKM’s panel were not influenced by the results of such international evaluations, 
in particular those carried out in Canada and the USA. Scientific panels in these countries have 
recently expressed “concern” for certain BPA’s effects and Canada was even considering 
regulatory measures (FIND REF: NTP-CERHR 2008, Health Canada 2008). On the other hand, 
in Europe, both EFSA and the ECB, have concluded without reservations, that BPA was safe. 
VKM’s conclusions were in between these two, they found that the assessed evidence had several 
deficiencies and did not support a change in the current TDI (i.e. EFSA’s TDI) and at the same 
time the population’s exposure was low, meaning that there was no health risk. Yet the panel 
expressed some concern concerning neurodevelopmental toxicity effects at low dose exposure to 
BPA (VKM, 2008).    
Moreover, in the report it is also noted that it was the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI) 
that was in charge of giving scientific advice to the SFT concerning the toxicity of BPA, and that 
it is VKM who gave the corresponding scientific advice to the NFSA. And that it is possible that 
the assessments from these two different bodies might be at variance.  
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 ECB identified and used a NOAEL of 50 mg/kg bw/day for reproductive and general toxicity (based on effects on 
body weight, liver and kidney) in their assessment, while EFSA based the 2006 TDI on a NOAEL of 5 mg/kg 
bw/day based on increased incidence of centrilobular hepatocyte hypertrophy, identified during their assessment  
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“The NFSA assumes that VKM will coordinate their work with the department of the Norwegian 
Institute of Public Health giving scientific advice to the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority 
on this matter, in such a way that the risk management in Norway could be as uniform as possible, 
independent of the source of exposure.”(VKM, 2008, p. 10) 
One can also notice a good collaboration between the two agencies. For example, the fact that the 
NFSA asked VKM to conduct a risk assessment of BPA taking into consideration the Norwegian 
exposure data and the concerns coming from the SFT (taking into consideration both 
environmental and dietary exposures). Additionally, Norwegian experts (from FHI and VKM) 
should cooperate on a “common” scientific evaluation of the ongoing uncertainties. But most 
importantly, it was mentioned that if the assessment concluded that there was a risk, the NFSA 
would modify national regulation accordingly.  
“The assessment should make the NFSA able to establish a new risk-based migration limit for 
bisphenol A in the national legislation on food contact materials. The NFSA will, until the 
opinion from VKM is finished, act in accordance with the EFSA opinion from 2006” (VKM, 
2008, p. 10).  
Given that the panel did not recommend any regulatory changes, it is assumed that the NFSA 
decided to adhere to EFSA’s recommendation on BPA.  
8.1.3 Environmental authorities’ ban proposal for 21 substances (part II, July 2008) 
During the consultation process of SFT’s proposal (to regulate hazardous substances in consumer 
products), the agency received a very large number of consultative statements, the large majority 
of which were objections (including strong criticism from the surveillance organ of EFTA). It 
was reported that most of the comments concerned six substances, among which BPA. Many of 
the comments came from the plastic industry. During the interviews at NEA, it was mentioned 
that a big number of lawyers from the plastic industry came to Norway concerning the ban 
proposal for BPA which demonstrates the high stakes in the regulation of this chemical (personal 
communication with representative of NEA). 
After the consultation, it was decided to shorten the list of proposed substances to 10 candidates, 
including BPA. The agency also decided to make some changes to the original proposal 
concerning the proposed limit values and the areas of use that were subjected to exemptions. 
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Some of the substances that SFT removed from the list were being subjected to different EU 
regulation processes at the time and it was decided that it was better to wait for those results.  
Still SFT wanted to maintain the ban proposal for the remaining 10 substances which was 
depended on the Ministry of Environment endorsement (SFT, 2008b).  
Concerning the legal criticisms, it was question that Norway had the right to introduce national 
prohibitions in the context of the EEA Agreement and the WTO regulations – these issues were 
going to be evaluated by the Ministry of Environment (SFT, 2008a).  
With respect to the technical evaluation conducted by SFT, the opponents pointed to the fact that 
the different European risk assessments have concluded that there were no risks for human health 
or the environment concerning BPA – meaning that there was no need to prohibit or restrict the 
use of BPA in consumer products. Some of them meant that SFT was ignoring the existing 
scientific data and that Norway had no proof of health risk for consumers at current exposure 
levels. They also stressed that the proposed regulation would have large financial and social 
consequences for the Norwegian industry and for Norwegian consumers (SFT, 2008a).  
SFT, on the other hand, saw BPA as a substance whose production and consumption in the EU 
was extremely high. The agency clarify that they were not proposing a total ban on BPA in 
consumer products but a regulation based on limit values – so that residual BPA (BPA that was 
not bound to the product) did not exceed specified acceptable levels. SFT’s analyses had shown 
that consumer products could have a wide range of residual BPA, with some products presenting 
rather high levels. The agency argued that these products have not been taken into consideration 
in the different EU risk assessments available at the moment and that was the reason why they 
were maintaining the proposed regulation (SFT, 2008a).   
It was also highlighted that there were uncertainties with respect to neurotoxic effects on humans 
at low-doses and also uncertainties with respect to possible effects on snails at low-dose exposure 
in the environment.  The Nordic environmental authorities were of the idea that low-dose effects 
should not be ignored. In addition, Norway was of the opinion that “the lower limit values from 
applicable studies that show effects on learning and memory in offspring at extremely low doses 
must be used until possible new, adequate studies of neurotoxic effects are available” (SFT, 
2008a, p. 6). This was in contrast to what the recent EU RAR (2008) assessment had concluded, 
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namely that there was no health risk and no need for further testing (EU-RAR, 2008b). 
Additionally, there was also the question of combined effects following the simultaneous 
exposure to multiple EDs which was not capture in any of the available European risk 
assessments (SFT, 2008a). 
SFT was of the opinion that current safety margins were too low in the different risk assessments 
(the margin between the TDI – or other reference dose – and the actual exposure). In particular 
with respect to children’s exposure and the ongoing uncertainties concerning effects at low-doses 
(SFT, 2008a).   
It was also noted that VKM had concluded that the results of some of the available studies on 
neurotoxicity gave reasons for concern. The scientific panel proposed to conduct a new study to 
clarify the ongoing uncertainties but it was going to take at least 2-3 years before the results were 
ready. SFT was of the opinion that this was too long and, based on a precautionary thinking 
concerning BPA’s endocrine disruptive effects, wanted to maintaining the proposal to limit the 
content of BPA in consumer products (SFT, 2008a).  
In the next years, what can be seen is that the original list of hazardous substances was further 
reduced to four substances and BPA was removed from the proposal (Miljøverndepartementet, 
2010b). Finally, eight years after the original proposal, in the summer of 2014, the only national 
ban based on this regulatory initiative entered into force concerning the substance PFOA 
(Perfluorooctanoic acid) (Miljødirektoratet, 2013), the regulation of which is currently being 
challenged by EFTA surveillance authority
150
  
8.2 Chronological outline of the debate on regulation of BPA in Norway  
8.2.1 BPA in baby bottles (fall 2009) 
In the fall 2009, the national TV show on NRK, “Consumer Inspectors” (Forbrukerinspektørene, 
(FBI)), broadcasted a show dealing with BPA in baby bottles. Around the same time and under 
the initiative of FBI, the Norwegian NGO “Grønn Hverdag” sampled baby bottles and pacifiers 
in the Norwegian market in order to check the occurrence of this chemical.  The random 
sampling revealed that two thirds of the pacifiers and almost half of the bottles contained BPA 
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(Risberg, Hødnebø, & Sommerset, 2009). As a consequence of the show and the media attention, 
more than 4000 Norwegian food stores voluntarily decided to stop the sale of baby bottles that 
contained BPA (Hødnebø & Laustsen, 2010).  
At that time, the NFSA noted that although BPA was a controversial substance, the current 
exposure was so small that the Food authorities did not consider it a health threat to small 
children. The Health authorities also believed that a ban was not necessary:  
“Assistant Director Jan Alexander of the FHI, who also lead the risk assessment of bisphenol A 
for VKM, believes that there is not enough evidence to ban the baby bottles with BPA, even if 
the research is controversial and show different results.” (Risberg et al., 2009, p. 1) 
After all the media attention, the NFSA also stated that they were going to look closer into the 
case and evaluate if there was need for regulation. Specifically, the agency was to send an 
assessment and a recommendation to the Ministry of Health and Care Services concerning how 
best to follow up the BPA case (Sommerset, 2009). I was unfortunately denied access to this 
document by the Ministry, based on the Freedom of Information Act (Offentleglova) § 15. 3. 
Yet, the media coverage also revealed that the SFT wanted to ban BPA on consumer products, 
since it was on the national priority list of hazardous substances that were to be phased out by 
2020 – something which increased the confusion around this chemical: 
“They create confusion. Everyone who in Norway has a responsibility for people’s health should 
take a clear stance on this substance. The precautionary principle is the only solution, who is a 
doctor and researcher on hazardous substances among children. […] The Ministry of Health and 
Care Services should have taken control and banned this substance in baby bottles until there is 
sufficient knowledge. […] It is irresponsible of the NFSA to approve of a substance that SFT 
wants to ban, says Odland, who sees an obvious conflict between the two agencies.” (Risberg et 
al., 2009, p. 1) 
It is interesting to note that many VKM panel members on food additives (Faggruppen for 
tilsetningsstoffer, aroma, matemballasje og kosmetikk) – dealing with food contact materials – 
are also working at the Department of Food, Water and Cosmetics (division of environmental 
medicine) at FHI. Some of these people have also been working on the same issues with EFSA. 
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For BPA for example, Professor Jan Alexander was the leader of the group assessing the safety of 
BPA at VKM and also the assistant director of FHI – which might imply that both in the food 
sector and in the health sector there is the same understanding of the safety of this chemical – 
based in a quantitative risk assessment and a particular way of looking at the evidence and the 
uncertainties.   
We can see the same in the latest BPA risk assessment in 2015, where one of the panel members 
at VKM, Dr Trine Husøy, was also leading the working group on BPA at EFSA and is also 
working at the department of Food, Water and Cosmetics at FHI. In a way ensuring the same 
understanding of BPA’s safety in these three contexts: EFSA, VKM (and thus also NFSA) and in 
the health context (FHI). 
Remark on cocktail effects 
Something similar can also be seen for a slightly different, but much related topic, namely that of 
cocktail effects. VKM has assessed this topic in Norway two times and has come to the 
conclusion that the risk of cocktail effect is “small” or “not worrisome” (Mattilsynet, 2014; VKM, 
2013). This was based on the assumption that the likelihood of combined toxic effects of multiple 
exposures, at dose levels below the thresholds for effect, was low: 
“Even though VKM only to a limited extent have had cocktail effects in consideration in their 
risk assessments up to now, VKM does not see this as a cause for concern. VKM concludes that 
synergetic effects in practice is a minor problem in Norway today, and that it is normally not to 
be expected that hazardous synergetic effects will occur if the substances are ingested in small 
doses and at levels beneath their respectively acceptable values. The reason is that these values 
for chemical substances have a big safety margin, and that many substances do not have a greater 
effect when they appear together than when they appear alone.” (Mattilsynet, 2014, p. 1) 
Yet, VKM notes that the exception is substances exhibiting similar modes of action (substances 
that have the same effect in the body). In these cases, multiple exposures can lead to dose 
addition effects even if the exposure to individual substances in the mixture is below their 
respective accepted or tolerable daily intakes (TDIs). In these cases, the risk assessment should 
take this into account (Mattilsynet, 2014). 
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Based on VKM’s scientific advice, the Norwegian Food authorities (and one could also claim 
Health authorities) have interpreted this to mean that there is no risk of cocktail effects if the 
exposures are below the accepted safety values for each individual substance: 
“NFSA interprets this to say that if the threshold values in our regulation are kept, there is little 
cause for concern. If we are exposed to higher doses of xenobiotic [foreign] substances, that is to 
say doses that surpass the threshold values, the situation is different. According to VKM, such 
instances must be considered case by case.” (Mattilsynet, 2014, p. 1) 
A problem that should be noted here is that for the vast majority of chemicals in the market, their 
specific modes of action are not known, so that their contribution to possible cocktail effects has 
not been operationalized in this argument. At the same time, there is no procedure commonly 
agreed upon to group chemicals together to potentially take their combined effects into 
consideration. 
Yet, over the last years, research on cocktail effects has revealed that the health risk of certain 
individual chemicals (in particular EDs) can be underestimated when combination effects are not 
taken into consideration (even when exposures are below the accepted safety values). In response 
to this, practical ways to account for combination effects have started to be used, both in 
assessing the risk and proposing regulation, specifically in Denmark  (DTU-Food, 2015a). 
The stand point of the Health authorities 
Some weeks later, in an article published in the Government’s website by the Ministry of Health 
and Care Services, it is stated that although BPA’s safety has been questioned recently, there are 
no reasons for concern: 
“NFSA did some years ago a study on bisphenol A in pacifiers and came, together with VKM, to 
the conclusion that there could not be detected amounts of the substances that gave cause for 
concern, at normal use.” (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2009, p. 1) 
VKM’s “concerns” about the potential neurotoxic effect of BPA at low doses, does not really 
seem to challenge the “official” safety of this chemical. 
In the article, the Health authorities also tried to clarify the differences between SFT and NFSA 
with respect to BPA. It is noted that BPA in baby bottles is regulated by the Food authorities and 
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thus not part of SFT’s BPA proposal for regulation in consumer products. It is noted with regards 
to this: 
“According to the Ministry of Environment the government has an elevated focus on the 
hazardous substance bisphenol A. It is a national goal to stop the emissions and applications of 
bisphenol A by 2020. Bisphenol A is a prioritized hazardous substance because it is an endocrine 
disruptor. Hormonal effects have been shown in fish and snails in the environment, and there is a 
concern that the substance may affect the human reproductive ability.” (Helse- og 
omsorgsdepartementet, 2009) 
The fact that it refers to the generation goal’s objectives as “according to the Ministry of 
Environment” can be interpreted to mean that the Ministry of Health does not feel a binding 
obligation to the government’s white paper on chemical policy, even when this document states 
that its objectives apply to all sectors and when these are precisely aiming at better protecting 
human health.  
8.2.2 Collaboration between Klif and NFSA on BPA (2010) 
In June 2010, in a letter from the Ministry of Environment to Klif, it is stated that there has been 
contact between the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Health and Care Services, Klif and 
NFSA concerning BPA and other hazardous substances (Miljøverndepartementet, 2010a). 
It is mentioned that Klif and NFSA should strengthen their collaboration on their work with 
chemicals of concern, and come up with a plan for future cooperation within the next 3 months, 
in particular with respect to BPA. In particular, the environmental authorities found that it would 
be beneficial to make a new gathered assessment on how BPA should be followed up. It is 
stressed that both the environmental and health authorities have a responsibility for BPA since 
the chemical is used in products belonging to the areas of responsibility of both authorities 
(Miljøverndepartementet, 2010a). 
By the end of August 2010, an email from Klif shows that the cooperation plan between NFSA 
and Klif with respect to BPA has been postponed. This was due to the fact that NFSA wanted to 
wait for EFSA’s latest assessment before formulating NFSA’s opinion to the following work 
(OEP, 2015c). 
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In August 2010 a new piece on BPA hit the media, this time concerning the presence of BPA in 
screw caps (lids) for glass jars, used in commercial baby food. In the NRK (FBI) article it is 
stressed that Norway allows products for children with BPA, while Denmark has decided to 
withdraw them from the market. When interviewed, the spokesperson from NFSA confirmed that: 
“When it comes to safety of using BPA in products under NFSA’s area of responsibility, the 
NFSA await the conclusion of the EU’s scientific committee EFSA.” (Hødnebø & Laustsen, 
2010, p. 1) 
He also mentioned that after the voluntary withdrawal of baby bottles with BPA, the potential 
risk was also eliminated: 
“As is known, the baby bottles with BPA were withdrawn from the market, and thereby any 
possible risk for harming the undeveloped nervous system in infants was also removed. The 
NFSA did therefore not see a reason to take action, neither towards these products nor the other 
that contributed much less to exposure.”(Hødnebø & Laustsen, 2010, p. 1) 
At the end of this piece, Klif comments that they wish to phase out the use of BPA in consumer 
products, and in the meantime they have created a website to give advice to consumers on how to 
avoid exposure to this, and other chemicals. It is however noted that when it comes to FCM, the 
responsibility for regulation is with NFSA (OEP, 2015a).  
Around this time, organizations such as the Norwegian Consumer Council (Forbrukerrådet) and 
the NGO Grønn Hverdag state that they cannot understand why member states can regulate BPA, 
while Norway which is outside of the EU, must comply with EU regulation (Forbrukerrådet, 
2010; Hødnebø & Laustsen, 2010). 
They further find the attitude of NFSA too passive, referring to the fact that the agency prefers to 
follow EU regulations instead of taking a more precautionary stance, as other member states 
(particularly Denmark) (Hødnebø & Laustsen, 2010).  
By the end of September 2010, EFSA’s awaited opinion is finally released. The European 
Agency concluded that the panel could not identify any new evidence to modify the current TDI 
of 50 µg/kg body weight (EFSA, 2010a).  
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In November 2010, in a communication between NFSA and Klif concerning a meeting in 
Brussels, it is mentioned that there is much discussion at the Commission concerning BPA and a 
possible BPA ban on baby bottles – but that the outcome of such discussions was not sure. In 
particular, the discussion related to the fact that there were no scientific grounds to invoke the 
precautionary principle, based on EFSA’s latest assessment (which had reaffirm that BPA was 
safe for all the population). It is mentioned that the Commission finds the case difficult and that 
in case they propose a ban, this will be limited only to baby bottles (and no other food contact 
materials) (OEP, 2015b).  
Most importantly, it is stated that “Norway will not take any independent initiative in this case 
but will wait to see what happens at the Commission. This position has been agreed with the 
Ministry of Health and Care Services and the Ministry of food, agriculture and Fisheries”(OEP, 
2015b, p. Merethe Steen). 
The position of the Ministry of Health and Care Services is further explained in an “official 
response” from the health minister, Anne-Grethe Strøm-Erichsen (Ap), to a question in the 
Norwegian Parliament on November 17
th
 2010, by the Christian Party (KrF), concerning small 
children’s exposure to BPA (Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2010).  
The minister explained that BPA is discussed both in a health and an environmental context. The 
latter being the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment.  
“There has been attention around possible health effects from the fact that food contact material, 
for example baby bottles and lids for children’s food containers, can emit traces of BPA. There 
has also been attention around environmental effects of BPA in water and sediments […]” 
(Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2010, p. 1). 
With respect to potential health effects, the minister notes that most Norwegian retailers have 
stopped selling baby bottles containing BPA, after the TV show “Forbrukerinspektørene (FBI)” 
in the fall of 2009. Additionally, EFSA had recently concluded that there were no health hazards 
related to exposure to BPA and no scientific grounds to revise the current TDI of BPA. Yet there 
were ongoing discussions at the Commission with respect to a potential ban on baby bottles, 
where the legal grounds and the health considerations were being discussed. The minister 
concludes that Norway will wait for the recommendations at EU level, given that the Food 
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Contact Material legislation is part of the EEA agreement and is an area that is harmonized 
(Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2010).
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From this answer one can understand that the Health authorities are committed to follow the 
requirements of European legislation, and that they will not try to influence decision-making at 
EU level (which anyway would be hard since Norway’s affiliation to the EU does not allow to 
participate in the final voting of EU legislations) – even when this would go against Norway 
chemical’s policy goals.   
8.2.3 EU ban on baby bottles (2011) 
In January 2011, the commission finally decides to put forward a BPA ban on baby bottles, 
entering into force in June 2011 (EC, 2011).  
In March 2011, Klif reports to the Ministry of Environment on the assignment of putting forward 
a cooperation plan with NFSA concerning the regulation of BPA.  
Klif reports that the two agencies have had several meetings concerning BPA, but have come to 
different assessments for the need of a more extensive regulation of BPA (Klif, 2011a). 
Specifically, Klif expresses concern for possible adverse health effects on children, and therefore 
wants to have a common and wide BPA ban on products for small children (in order to keep their 
exposure as low as possible): 
“It has been shown that BPA has serious effects, and that children are particularly exposed. There 
are also studies that indicate serious effects at very low doses. There is uncertainty concerning the 
levels where BPA have effect, and whether today's threshold values give sufficient protection. 
Furthermore it is uncertain when a satisfactory set of data will be available. Klif therefore 
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With respect to the obligations towards the EEA agreement and the harmonization of regulations, it is interesting 
to note that in December 2012 Sweden also passed a ban on the use of BPA in varnishes and coatings in the 
packaging of food for children between 0 and 3 years of age. The Swedish ban was less extensive than the Danish 
ban, which covers all food contact materials for children 0-3 years old. Concerning the legal scope of the regulation, 
Sweden recognizes that it is necessary to comply with the harmonized plastic food contact material regulation 
(10/2011/EU), but notes that: “…in the field of varnish and coating there is a lack of detailed EU legislation, and 
consequently this field is not regarded as being fully harmonised. This means that there is legal scope for taking 
national measures if the prerequisite conditions for this are judged to be in place” (p. 32-33) The Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency (2014) Background for national legislation on bisphenol A (BPA) in EU and 
EFTA countries, available at http://www2.mst.dk/Udgiv/publications/2014/03/978-87-93178-18-2.pdf  
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considers that the precautionary principle should be applied, even though there is so far no certain 
scientific evidence that there is a risk for harm.” (Klif, 2011a, p. 1). 
Such a wide ban should ideally cover products regulated by Klif (the product regulation i.e. toys, 
pacifiers, biting rings, mittens and other textiles for children) and also products regulated by 
NFSA (the FCM regulation i.e. baby bottles, packaging for baby food and plastic cups). It is 
reported that NFSA, on the other hand, does not to agree with the need for a wide food contact 
material ban for children’s products and wants to restricts its proposal to the implementation in 
Norway of the newly EU ban on baby bottles (Klif, 2011a).
152
  
Klif concludes that: “Klif considers, based on a precautionary line of thought, that in order to 
better protect children, there is a need for a more comprehensive regulation of BPA than the ban 
that NFSA has suggested.” (Klif, 2011a, p. 2). Klif will still consider a ban in products for small 
children in the regulations that are administered by the agency, even if such measures would have 
a limited effect compared to the protection offered from a wider ban. At this point, we see a shift 
to a greater emphasis on human health consequences of the use of BPA, rather than on its 
environmental implications (Klif, 2011a). 
In March 2011, in connection to NFSA’s public hearing on the implementation of the EU ban of 
BPA in baby bottles, Klif sent a comment discussing the same topics as before (and arguing for a 
broader ban). They emphasize the ongoing scientific uncertainties, such as possible additive 
effects coming from the simultaneous exposure to different estrogenic chemicals. They 
reaffirmed their position that a precautionary thinking should apply even if the actual risk could 
not be proven (Klif, 2011b). Yet, NFSA decided that it was enough to implement the EU ban on 
baby bottles without any further modification covering other FCM for small children.  
And in May 2011, we see a change of strategy from the environmental authorities to focus more 
on EU work, at the expense of the prospect of a national regulation. The Ministry of environment 
asked Klif for an assessment of the possibilities to strengthen the regulation of BPA at EU level 
and a proposal of how Norway can contribute to that work (Klif, 2011d).  
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 The EU ban prohibits the manufacture of baby bottles containing BPA, as well as placing it on the market and 
importing it into the EU. It refers to EU directive (2011/8/EU) adopted in late January 2001 and entered into force in 
March 2011 (EC, 2011). 
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Klif reports that the agency has already proposed a stronger threshold value for BPA in the toy 
directive and that there were some ongoing EU processes where the agency could participate 
(Klif, 2011d).  
Namely, BPA could be subject to substance evaluation given that it was produced in large 
volumes and there was uncertainty concerning risk – this could provide the opportunity to 
demand more evidence and propose risk reduction measures. The agency also suggests trying to 
get BPA on the Candidate List of REACH due to its endocrine disruptor properties – however 
this was dependent on having common EU criteria for EDs. And they suggested working on a 
restriction proposal for BPA under REACH (i.e. children's products, other consumer products 
such as thermal paper). This procedure would however demand thorough documentation on 
exposure and risk (Klif, 2011d).   
Collaboration between Klif and NFSA on chemical-related work (2011) 
In the “minutes” from a meeting between NFSA and Klif concerning their collaboration in the 
area of chemicals – in particular related to BPA and other chemicals in cosmetics – Klif explains 
the environmental authorities’ work on the generation goal and the role of the National priority 
list of hazardous substances. They emphasize that these national objectives apply to all sectors. 
With respect to their work on BPA, Klif informed that they had sent suggestions for further 
regulation to the Ministry of Environment (Klif, 2011c).  
On their side, NFSA noted that EFSA has carried out several evaluations of BPA and has 
consistently concluded that BPA is not harmful for small children, and that there is no basis for a 
more stringent FCM regulation. NFSA affirmed that the agency was going to follow development 
of the case at EU level and act accordingly: 
“NFSA deals exclusively with EU's scientific committees (EFSA for food safety and SCCS for 
cosmetics) and follows their recommendations. If special and distinctive Norwegian conditions 
calls for it, this will be taken to the Norwegian scientific committee (VKM) for consideration.” 
(Klif, 2011c, p. "case nr.3") . 
Concerning the future collaboration between the two agencies, it was highlighted that the 
agencies had different perspectives on the substances listed on the national priority list. For 
NFSA, the work on chemicals needed to be based on risk assessment. Yet the agency was aware 
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that different risk assessments could come to different conclusions, and therefore NFSA preferred 
to base their work on the overall assessments conducted at EFSA or VKM – given that these 
scientific committees had a good way of assessing the quality of the available evidence (Klif, 
2011c).  
“NFSA builds on results from VKM and the scientific committees in EU who conduct 
independent, scientific risk assessments. NFSA pointed out that, because toxicology is far from 
an exact science, using independent scientific committees is beneficial to further develop health-
related regulations. Different scientific environments and researchers can have broadly diverging 
views on the risks connected with the different use of various substances. The committees can in 
a good way assess the quality of the results of new research.” (Klif, 2011c, p. "case nr.10") . 
For Klif, on the other hand, it was important to act precautionary if chemicals gave rise to health 
concerns. These concerns were not always sufficiently accounted for in EFSA’s and VKM’s 
assessments and this could lead to divergent safety evaluations and regulatory actions. Klif 
suggested to keep working on those differences: 
“Klif puts great emphasis on using the “precautionary” principle when there are concerns that a 
compound might lead to harm, and wishes in several areas to apply this to a greater extent than 
the premises laid down by the scientific committees. This can result in different risk assessments 
and needs for action, which is both hard to communicate, and hard to understand for the world 
outside us. This is an important subject that we must discuss further.”(Klif, 2011c, p. "case 
nr.10").  
It was concluded that an annual meeting was needed between the two agencies to keep working 
on chemicals of concern (Klif, 2011c).  
8.2.4 BPA in canned food (April 2013) 
BPA was again in the news, this time in connection to canned food. Two members of the TV 
show FBI submitted themselves to a hermetic food diet for two days to show the increase of BPA 
levels in the body after consumption of diverse canned food. In connection to this, the Consumer 
Council asked for a BPA ban on food contact materials, based on the unclarified uncertainties. 
They pointing to the fact that Denmark, and now Sweden and France had put in place stronger 
regulations for this chemical (Høye, 2013).  
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On that occasion NFSA commented that the amount of BPA found in hermetic food is so low that 
it does not represent any problem for human health or food safety.  
“BPA is perhaps among the worst in class from an environmental concern, but we take it that it is 
both legal and safe within the current regulation” (Høye, 2013, p. 1) 
At the same time, it was pointed out that the regulation on FCM was quite strict and based on 
sound scientific assessments. The minister of Health, Jonas Gahr Støre (Ap), also confirmed that 
the authorities in Norway would wait for results at the EU level before any changes in the current 
FCM regulation are considered (Høye, 2013).  
8.2.5 EFSA newest risk assessment on BPA (January 2015) 
One day after EFSA’s press release on the new risk assessment of BPA, the websites of NFSA, 
Matportalen
153
, FHI and VKM were updated with the new information to the public, namely that 
BPA poses no health risk to any segment of the population at current levels of exposure. 
This might be connected to the fact that FHI’s and VKM’s articles were redacted by Dr. Trine 
Husøy, scientist at FHI, panel member of VKM’s Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings, 
Processing Aids, Materials in Contact with Food and Cosmetics and that also chair of EFSA’s 
working group on BPA. These linkages also suggest that the official Norwegian perspective on 
the safety of BPA – in relation to human health – is the same as that of EFSA.154  
NFSA and Matportalen 
With respect to the information itself, it is striking that in the press release of NFSA, none of the 
uncertainties expressed in EFSA’s opinion are mentioned, such as uncertainties related to the 
safety assessment of the aggregated exposure. And more importantly, it was not mentioned that 
the TDI was temporary until further studies can clarify the remaining scientific uncertainties 
(Mattilsynet, 2015b).  
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 Containing information about food and health from public authorities. 
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 It was however not possible to clarify this point during the interviews since Norway’s national expert on BPA, Dr. 
Husøy, after several attempts, could not talk to me about BPA. The head of communication at VKM wrote me: “I 
have talked to Trine, and in order to interview her about the Bisphenol-A case you will need to contact EFSA. 
According to her, the work is sensitive and she feels that she cannot give an interview without having clarified it with 
EFSA. In other words, I have to ask you to contact EFSA directly. I am sorry for not being able to help you”. It 
should be noted that at a later point, they changed their minds – it was however too late for me at this point to include 
their opinion in this paper. 
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Instead NFSA highlights that there is no risk to any segment of the population, that consideration 
of possible low-dose effects has already been included in the uncertainty factor and that 
consumer’s exposure is below the new TDI (Mattilsynet, 2015b). The same applies to the 
information on the Matportalen website. 
VKM 
On VKM’s blog, Dr. Husøy gives a slightly more technical explanation, were she explains that 
BPA is a so called “hormonhermende stoff” (that is literally translated as hormone mimicking), 
which means that this chemical can imitate the functioning of a natural hormone, but only if you 
are exposed to high concentrations: (VKM, 2015b). 
“BPA is a so-called hormone-mimicking substance. That means that it can have the same effect 
as the hormones that exist in humans and animals, but BPA would only be able to have a 
hormonal effect when you get high concentrations of the substance into your body.” (VKM, 
2015b) 
This is similar to what EFSA has stated with respect to BPA, namely that BPA is a “hormone 
active” substance and not an endocrine disruptor, given that, to date, there is no single clear 
explanation for the effects of BPA in humans. In order to be considered an endocrine disruptor, 
BPA should fulfill the following criteria: 1. the presence of an adverse effect, 2 .the presence of 
endocrine activity and most importantly, 3. a causal relationship between the two. It is 
particularly the third criterion that, according to EFSA, has not been sufficiently proven.  
So, BPA is then defined by the agency that gives scientific advice to both the food and the health 
authorities, as a hormone-mimicking substance, or “hormonhermende stoff” (a hormone active 
substance, in EFSA’s terminology) and not a “hormonforstyrrende stoff” (an endocrine disruptor). 
And this could have significant policy implications in Norway. Firstly, it could mean that BPA no 
longer fulfills the national criteria to be included in the national priority list of hazardous 
substances (given that it is not an endocrine disruptor). Secondly, the fact that it is expressed that 
only high concentrations are dangerous also challenges one of the main debated properties of 
EDs, namely that EDs can be active at low concentrations and that there might not even be 
possible to establish safety thresholds for these substances. It is timely to note how an area of 
scientific uncertainty gives room for such slight changes in terminology, that can have a 
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tremendous impact both in the regulatory context, and on how the concept of BPA is understood 
and regarded in the public debate.  
Norwegian Institute of Public Health (FHI) 
The information on the FHI article is more balanced, as it explains the uncertainties related to 
dermal exposure (leading to more active BPA in the body, as opposed to oral exposures) and its 
possible implications for human health. It also mentions that there is a health risk for newborn 
babies that make use of medical equipment containing BPA in the hospital. It still describes BPA 
as a hormone active substance that for the time being, poses not health risk to the population 
through the diet (FHI, 2015).   
An interesting point though is that when the article refers to the other risk assessments that have 
been conducted on BPA – in particular the assessment conducted by the French agency ANSES – 
it fails to report that other scientific committees have reached different conclusions than those of 
EFSA. The author rather points to the fact the American food agency (FDA) still affirms that the 
previous European TDI of 50 µg/kg of bw/day is safe (which is 12 times higher than the current 
European proposal): 
“Other national and international agencies have also assessed the risk of bisphenol A. For 
example Health Canada, ECHA, French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational 
Health & Safety (ANSES). Among other, the FDA (Food and drug administration) in USA 
published a new risk assessment in the end of 2014 where the kept the old threshold value of 50 
µg per kg of bodyweight. The EU commission, however, base their handling of bisphenol A on 
the advice from the EU's food safety agency EFSA.” (FHI, 2015, p. 1) 
The lack of scientific consensus on BPA can here again seen to be used as a tool in public 
information. It is easy to choose evidence for a message to be conveyed, and it is easy to leave 
out conflicting views.  
Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) 
With respect to EFSA’s ongoing re-evaluation of BPA, it is mentioned that NEA has been in 
touch with EFSA to express their concern about the effects of BPA, including environmental 
effects. However, from the formulation it is not clear whether NEA’s comments were related to 
health and environmental concerns or just to environmental concerns (It was not possible to find 
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NEA’s comments in the document published by EFSA concerning the public consultation on 
BPA).  It is also mentioned that NEA and NFSA “communicate” on the BPA case, also with 
respect to precautionary assessments, though it is not really clear what is mean by that 
(Miljødirektoratet, 2014g).  
“In Norway it is the NFSA that has the responsibility for regulation on food, and we have a 
dialog with NFSA in connection with effects of bisphenol A and precautionary considerations. 
NFSA have given comments to EFSA's risk assessment where we also raise a concern about the 
environmental effects of bisphenol A” (Miljødirektoratet, 2014g, p. 17). 
In the NEA’s consumer site “Erdetfarlig”, the information concerning BPA has not been updated 
six months after EFSA’s 2015 press release. They still refer to the preliminary results from EFSA 
and report that consumers get less BPA than previously assumed and that exposure is well below 
the tentative new TDI. The final outcome (after the public hearing) was however not reported. 
Neither is there much information with respect to the environmental effects of this chemical, 
other than that it can be harmful to aquatic life. And even if the aim of the website is to advise 
consumers on how to avoid chemicals of concern and select more environmentally friendly 
products, no explicit advice is given to avoid exposure to BPA (Miljødirektoratet, 2014b). 
So, overall, no “official information channel for consumers” provides balanced enough 
information on the current scientific situation with BPA. No one refers to the fact that experts still 
do not agree on the safety of this chemical – even after 10 or more years of intense scientific 
research and multiple evaluations. It is not well described which could be the most vulnerable 
groups and how could they avoid exposure, if wanted.  
NEA suggest to limit the intake of hermetic food and to choose glass instead of plastic, but we do 
not find for example information on one of the biggest sources of exposure – thermal paper – nor 
do we read about important situations to be precautious (i.e. during pregnancy and childhood) 
The Norwegian Consumer Council (Forbrukerrådet) 
The only one that gives a different picture of the situation is the Norwegian Consumer Council. 
In an article from February 2015, they explain that while EFSA gives green light to BPA, the 
Danish National Food Institute says that EFSA’s BPA tolerable daily intake is too high, based on 
the same scientific evidence (Forbrukerrådet, 2015).  
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“The researchers from DTU have, based on the same studies, come to a quite different conclusion. 
They say straight out that the consumers with EFSA's recommendations are not sufficiently 
protected against the hormone disruptive effects of bisphenol A.” (Forbrukerrådet, 2015) 
They further explain that Danish Food authorities are looking into a voluntary agreement with the 
industry to reduce the population’s exposure to BPA and thereof follow the recommendations of 
the Danish experts. At the same time, the food authorities are actively advising that children and 
pregnant, on precautionary grounds, try to avoid food packaging containing BPA when possible 
(Forbrukerrådet, 2015).  
The Consumer Council finally notes that for such a controversial substance like BPA, the 
information from the Norwegian authorities should have better reflected the ongoing 
uncertainties and scientific disagreements (Forbrukerrådet, 2015).  
8.3 Conclusions 
Chapter 8 describes the discrepancies between the food agency and the environmental agency 
concerning the assessment of the safety and the regulation of BPA in Norway. Namely, that the 
environmental authorities have wanted for a long time a stricter national regulation of BPA, 
whereas the food and health authorities has seems more satisfied with the regulatory standards set 
at EU level. It is the food agency who administrates the legislation on food contact materials, 
which is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and Care Services).   
One could argue that these discrepancies can be explained using an Institutional theory 
perspective. Much in line with the work of March and Olsen (2008) and Vatn (2005), these two 
agencies can be said to belong to two very well defined and different institutional settings. They 
represent two distinct administrative cultures based on different rules of appropriate behavior. 
These rules are based on particular understandings of the problem at hand, specific traditions for 
evaluating and interpreting scientific evidence, preferred ways of dealing with scientific 
uncertainty and what is considered to be an acceptable solution. At the same time, appropriate 
behavior also depends on the harmonization of cognitive and the (implicit) normative elements, 
namely: which interests are these agencies serving and defending? It is also important to 
remember that these agencies have different resources at their disposition (in terms of expertise, 
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money and influence), and at the end of the day these resources play a critical role in determining 
which actions are possible and which are not.  
We can recall from last chapter that chemical policy in Norway is based on a precautionary 
thinking, in particular when it comes to hazardous substances (such as EDs). At the same time, 
the white paper also establishes clear regulatory objectives for the environmental authorities with 
respect to EDs – namely that its use will be heavily reduced by 2020 (the generation goal). In this 
respect, I would claim that the white paper no.14 determines the frame for how the environmental 
authorities should understand the problem related to BPA, and that is that: 1) BPA is a hazardous 
substance that is listed in the national priority list, it is used in big amounts and is widespread in 
the Norwegian environment, 2) BPA is a substance covered by the generation goal and thus 
emissions need to be halted or significantly decreased by 2020, 3) A hazard based approach 
should be used to manage the risk posed by this substance.  
In accordance with this particular understanding of BPA, the Norwegian environmental agency 
proposed, in 2006, a broad national ban on BPA in consumer products which was finally 
abandoned due to severe criticisms from the plastic industry and the EFTA surveillance 
authority.
155
  
By analyzing the different proposals for regulation that the environmental agency has put forward 
in the last decade, one can get a clear picture of what was the agency’s stand point with respect to 
this chemical. Environmental regulators have noted that the production and consumption of BPA 
was high, and likely to increase in the coming years. At the same time, there were uncertainties 
with respect to low-dose effects, possible combination effects had not been accounted for in any 
of the available risk assessments, and safety margins were in general low (in particular for 
children). The agency also expressed in different occasions that they supported the consideration 
of results coming from non-standard studies in the risk assessment of BPA, and that they wanted 
to take a precautionary approach instead of waiting for definite scientific answers.   
In 2011, the environmental agency was still considering a stricter national regulation on BPA. At 
that time they proposed a broad ban on children's products, which ideally would also cover the 
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 In particular it was mentioned that there was no scientific evidence proving that BPA was dangerous (i.e. at that 
time the available risk assessments at EU level had concluded that BPA was safe) and that such a regulation would 
have significant economic consequences for the industry. 
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legislation administered by the food agency. Here again, the environmental agency's arguments 
were that there were still ongoing uncertainties with respect to low dose effects, and that these 
effects could be significant. The environmental agency wanted to take a precautionary stand, but 
this proposal was not supported by the food agency and was ultimately abandoned. In the last 
years, one can observe that the environmental agency has finally dropped any further plans for 
national regulation, and has instead focused on work at EU level – where a stricter regulation for 
BPA in the toy directive is proposed.  
The above illustrates the environmental agency’s logic of appropriateness at play. At the 
cognitive level, BPA is seen as an endocrine disruptor of regulatory significance (it is included in 
the national priority list and covered by the national generation goal) and has to be regulated 
using a hazard-based approach without the need to conduct a quantitative risk assessment. At the 
same time, low-dose effects, non-standard studies and combination effects should be taken into 
consideration when deciding on the safety of this chemical. At the normative level, the interests 
of the consumers (and the environment) are actively protected, and in case of scientific 
uncertainty, the precautionary principle should be used. There is more ambiguity with respect to 
whether regulations should take place at the national or at the European level, but it seems that 
the latest decision is to take it at EU level. 
When it comes to the food authorities, there was some promising cooperation between the two 
agencies at the beginning. For example, when in 2008 VKM assessed the four BPA non-standard 
studies identified by the environmental agency. In this occasion, the food agency noted that in 
case a risk was identified, the agency would modify national regulation according to the 
recommendations of VKM. Yet, at the time, the overall conclusion was that there was no enough 
evidence to propose any new regulatory measure (even if the panel also concluded with ‘some 
concern’ for low-dose effects on neurotoxicity).   
However, this initial ‘concern’ disappeared rather fast, in particular due to the fact that EFSA's 
advice has consistently been that BPA poses no risk for the population. From the documents 
analyzed, argue that NFSA adheres to EFSA's scientific assessments and advice when it comes to 
the regulation of BPA. This means that NFSA will also base its regulatory decisions on the 
results of the quantifiable risk assessments conducted at EU level.  
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In the last years, one can also observe that some VKM experts have also been working at EFSA 
on issues related to EDs, and in particular to BPA. The chair of EFSA's panel on the risk 
assessment of BPA was a Norwegian expert that also works at VKM (and the FHI). This 
common work ensures a common understanding of the problem. This is evident when it comes to 
the classification of BPA as an endocrine active substance (which is a classification that has been 
proposed by EFSA). As a result of this, during the last year, the food and the health authorities in 
Norway have been refereeing to BPA as endocrine active substance, while the environmental 
authorities keep refereeing to it as an endocrine disruptor.  
From the analysis presented in chapter 8, I argue that the food authority’s logic of 
appropriateness is very much based on EFSA’s scientific understanding of the problem. Namely 
1) that BPA regulation has to be based on the results of a risk assessment, 2) that standard studies 
are still the most reliable evidence to assess the safety of this chemical, 3) that for the time being 
it is sufficient to assess the safety of one chemical at the time, without taking into consideration 
possible combination effects and that scientific uncertainties could be addressed through the 
traditional risk approach (by adequately quantifying them). At the same time, and based on 
EFSA’s latest assessment, BPA has to be classified as an endocrine active substance (and not an 
ED). At the normative level it is hard to say how the opposing interests that NFSA is supposed to 
protect are weighted (namely, to ensure that food is safe for consumers and to contribute to value 
creation in the food sector), in particular in situations when the agency has to take a stance – such 
as when participating in regulatory processes at the EU level.  
I will conclude that given that these two authorities have very different ways of conceiving the 
safety of BPA. The overall decision of who has the main responsibility for the health effects of 
this chemical can be seen as a decision of regulatory policy on its own – since it would be 
expected that these two agencies would arrive at very different policy recommendations.   
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9. Discussion and conclusions 
9.1 Denmark 
In chapter 5, I have argued that the Danish framing of the ED-issue has a strong public health 
component and that in Denmark EDs are often discussed in connection with well-known negative 
health trends in the country (bad semen quality, increase in the incidence of testicular cancer and 
more recently, girls reaching puberty earlier). At the same time, I mentioned that the ED-issue in 
Denmark is mainly based on what I have called an “endocrine-perspective”. 
 
I also mentioned that the early political interest on EDs, in particular the establishment of the 
national strategy on EDs and the different chemical action plans has promoted the establishment 
of what I have called the “Danish framework on ED”. This refers to the country’s long-term 
strategy and objectives with respect to EDs. I argued that this action framework has also directly 
and indirectly, encouraged the development of different networks of actors and processes that 
have been interacting at different levels and in different ways towards the same overall goal – the 
better regulation of EDs.   
 
The governance of ED in Denmark is characterized by a multitude of processes and structures 
which interact in several ways to steer the national and international management of EDs. The 
processes refer mainly to how the problem is understood and possibly solved, setting national 
priorities and coordinating action. I have for example highlighted the importance of the 
knowledge-building process in Denmark. In particular, I have claimed that the national focus on 
ED-research has contributed to a common understanding of the problem and as a reference point 
for action. Such action (or initiatives) have in turned been organized and ‘administered’ through a 
variety of actors and different sets of established procedures. In section (5.4) some examples have 
been advanced.  
 
I have also argued that the inclusion of such a variety of actors and processes has given more 
resilience to the management of EDs, given that initiatives often overlap and create redundancy. 
And at the same time, this broader inclusion of interested parties has also contributed to a better 
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integration of relevant knowledge and relevant concern (related to the different perception of the 
potential risk), leading to more socially robust results.  
 
When it comes to the safety of BPA, I have claimed that this overarching frame has encouraged 
the development of a common understanding of the problem. All from the beginning, research on 
EDs has been high on the agenda and most of these knowledge building activities have been 
closely followed by the Danish EPA. I have argued that this close and long relationship between 
the national ED-research environment and the Danish EPA has promoted a common 
understanding and a common framing for action between experts and regulators. Where 
regulators have adopted an endocrine-science perspective on the issue, experts are particularly 
aware of the current limitations of the regulatory system, and where both experts and regulators 
work on projects with a long-sight view on regulation.  
  
From an institutional perspective one can claim that this particular socialization processes 
between scientists and regulators have promoted the establishment of mutually agreed (or 
institutionalized) rules that have been prescribing what is the appropriate way of dealing with 
EDs. They have developed common set of rules that prescribe which aspects have to be taken 
into account when assessing the safety of these chemicals, for example: assess one chemical at 
the time or a combination?, with exposures during infancy or adulthood?, relying on only on 
standardized studies or also in academic ones?. It has also contributed to particular ways of 
evaluating and interpreting the evidence, for example: are there safety threshold for EDs?, are 
non-monotonic dose-response curves and low-dose effects possible?. And, to common ways of 
dealing with the remaining uncertainties, for example the need for a larger safety margin, reduce 
possible risks by informing vulnerable groups, among others. At the same time, and also as 
explained by March and Olsen, institutions depend on resources, so the fact that scientific 
expertise and financial means are available, have also played a significant role in sustaining these 
rules and promoting the development of new ones.    
 
Taking the above into consideration, one could partially explain why Danish assessments on the 
safety of BPA have sometimes been at odds with more conventional (status quo) evaluations 
based on a different set of ‘appropriate rules’ (besides the natural scientific disagreement). At the 
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same time and in line with the thoughts of March and Olsen (2008) and Vatn (2005), such an 
institutionalization of knowledge and procedures has also a normative dimension to it. The latter 
is based on what is conceived to be the best solution for society, or as Vatn (2005) has described 
it, depends on which interests such ‘institutionalization’ is to protect.  I will give two brief examples 
of how the particular institutional setting in Denmark has influence how the BPA problem is understood 
and framed. I will in particular look at some aspects of the risk assessment conclusions concerning the 
safety of BPA. 
 
In 2010 the Danish National Food Institute was asked to give a scientific opinion on a study that 
was meant to resolve the uncertainties related to possible low-dose BPA effects on developmental 
neurotoxicity. In their evaluation of the Stump (2009) study, the experts at DTU-Food concluded 
that the study could not resolve the uncertainties related to neurotoxic effects, but that the study 
raised additional uncertainties with respect to possible impaired learning ability. 
  
When the authors of the Danish report were interviewed by the Danish newspaper Ingeniøren 
concerning the divergent scientific opinions between EFSA and DTU-Food, they mentioned that 
they ”[…] perhaps look at the data with a different perspective and consider, whether it can be 
ruled out, that bisphenol A is dangerous, whereas EFSA focuses on, whether it is proven, that it is 
dangerous.” (Bredsdorff, 2010, p. 1)  
 
This example shows that – given the many uncertainties in the risk assessment of BPA – shifting 
the burden of proof can lead to different conclusions regarding the safety of BPA. This is linked 
to the fact that it is not the same to assume that BPA could be dangerous until proving that it is 
safe, as DTU-Food suggests. Than the other way around, assume that BPA is presumably safe 
until ultimately proving that it is dangerous, as EFSA suggests. Since, as has been witnessed in 
the last 15 years of intense research on BPA, final evidence for either way might never come. 
From an institutional theory perspective, the allocation of the burden of proof depends on the 
normative dimension of the institutional setting. In this example the normative dimension refers 
to determining which party should benefit from the uncertainties: the consumers or the food 
industry?  
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The second example deals with the cognitive dimension of the institutional setting and is taken 
from DTU-Food’s 2015 opinion on the safety of BPA. In this opinion one can observe that the 
differences between DTU-Food and EFSA are also fundamentally rooted at the cognitive level, 
starting at the definition level. 
What is an endocrine disruptor? while DTU-Food sees BPA as an ED, EFSA describes BPA as 
endocrine active substance 
What is an adverse ED effect? while DTU-Food sees changes in anogenital distances (AGD) as 
an indication of reproductive problems, EFSA sees fertility as the adequate indication for 
reproductive problems 
What counts as evidence? while DTU-Food sees non-standard studies as reliable evidence (some 
of which are even authored by themselves), EFSA keeps relying on standard studies to derive 
safety guideline values 
Which safety margin should be used to account for remaining uncertainties? while DTU-Food 
considers that the real risk might be underestimated by not taking possible combination effects 
into consideration, EFSA stills relies on assessing the safety of one chemical at the time.  
 
From an institutional theory perspective, one can argue that such cognitive differences depend on 
what each actor considers being the appropriate thing to do when assessing the risk of BPA. 
These internalized rules depend on particular epistemological stand points, established guidelines, 
and common practices but could also be related to aspects of role and identity). In this respect, it 
should not be surprising that when two scientific organizations belonging to different institutional 
setting (thus having different set of rules of appropriate behavior) evaluate the safety of the same 
chemical, they can reach different conclusions.  In the post-normal science school, this situation - 
where different expert groups reach diverging risk assessment conclusions concerning the same 
problem - has been referred to as one where science speaking not one, but many conflicting truths 
to policy (Funtowicz & Strand, 2007). 
 
Funtowicz (2006) explains (as suggested by institutional theory) that these situations arise 
because scientific deliberations are framed with different set of assumptions (cognitive dimension) 
and implicit judgmental values (normative dimension). He notes that the framing model (Section 
2.3.4) has been advanced to deal precisely with these problems, where the main idea is to try to 
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reach consensus between the different groups of experts. Yet, as explained by the framing model, 
both DTU-Food’s conclusions and EFSA’s conclusions are equally legitimate, in that such a 
framing (I will say, such a set of rules of appropriate behavior) is an absolute necessity to be able 
to conduct a risk assessment. And, in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence to favor a 
particular framing over another, there will always be several legitimate descriptions of the same 
problem. However, policy-problems can arise when the particular conclusion of one of these 
actors are seen as invalid by the others.  
 
However, it is important to highlight that the fact that most actors in Denmark have a common 
scientific understanding does not mean that they also agree on what is the most appropriate way 
of regulating BPA. In this respect it can be expected that the Food agency in Denmark will agree 
more with EFSA that with the Danish EPA. However the fact that in Denmark many final 
regulatory decisions concerning BPA are taken at the political level renders the processes at the 
administrative level not that relevant for my analysis.    
 
In Chapter 6, I have concluded that EDs are a politically relevant topic in Denmark and that 
several members of the Danish Parliament have been particularly eager to impose more ambitious 
targets concerning the regulation of this chemical. This has been done through the introduction of 
proposal for Parliamentary resolutions.  
 
In particular I mentioned that in two occasions it has been possible to gather an ‘alternative 
majority’ in Parliament to impose stricter national regulations (namely in proposal for 
parliamentary resolution B101 and B42). This decision made Denmark the first country in the EU 
to pass regulation on BPA (linked to baby bottles). In particular we see that such policy-decisions 
have been based on the full acknowledgement of ongoing scientific uncertainties and thus based 
on the invocation of the precautionary principle. One can conclude that in Denmark, the Danish 
Parliament has played the most important role in policy-decisions concerning BPA. This has 
often been described as a top-down approach, where policies have been decided at the Parliament 
and then communicated to the subordinate agency level which is then in charge of the technical 
and administrative tasks of putting such policy into practice.  
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What can be observed during the different parliamentary debates is that there are several ways of 
interpreting when the precautionary principle should be invoked and on which grounds. I will 
look into the question of how specifically has scientific uncertainty been dealt with in the 
political context. But first some few words about the precautionary principle. In Europe, 
precaution is understood as an extra element in policy decisions that can be used once a scientific 
evaluation has been conducted and concluded that there are residual uncertainties (Millstone et al., 
2004). Yet, as pointed by Stirling (2013), precaution is probably one of the most misunderstood 
concepts in the politics of risk – many times even being referred to as ‘unscientific’. The basic 
normative spirit of precaution is that “where there are threats to human health or the environment 
scientific uncertainty is not a reason for inaction” (Stirling, 2013, p. 1). However, on a more 
pragmatic level, the EU communication on the precautionary principle and the rules of the EEA 
Agreement (NOU, 2010) specify that precaution should only be used when a risk has been 
scientifically documented and when the proposed measure to deal with that risk meet the 
requirement of proportionality between the costs and the benefits.  
 
I will now turn again to the BPA case to illustrate some of point made above, namely that, what is 
precisely meant by precaution and when should it be used, is still a highly debatable topic. In 
particular, one can see that during the first two proposals (B101 and B429), the main discussion 
revolves around on which grounds and under which circumstances should the precautionary 
principle used?  
 
In section (5.4) I  have pointed that for the supporters of the precautionary principle the ongoing 
scientific disagreements and the high public health stakes were enough ground to act 
precautionary (without the need to wait for more evidence). At the same time, the supporters of 
the precautionary principle highlighted that the deliberation about whether and when to exercise 
precaution was not only a scientific question. It also involved value judgments concerning the 
‘acceptable’ level of risk and this, that is, an intrinsically political decision.  
 
For the opponents of the precautionary principle on the other hand, it was required that well-
documented scientific evidence of BPA risk (preferably in the form of a quantifiable risk 
assessment) was available and at the same time, that precautionary measures were cost-effective.  
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At the end, one can observe that in order to get a majority in the Parliament, final policy-
decisions become a mix of symbolic politics (willingness to meet society’s concerns), real 
politics (pragmatic solutions) and all other sorts of political strategies and compromises. For 
proposals B101 and B42, one can observe that it is possible to gather a majority in the Parliament 
to act against BPA, the political compromise being to protect only those aged between 0 and 3 
years. Yet, the fact that Parliamentary decision depend on political compromises means that, as 
suggested by proposal B17, policy solutions are not always coherent. Namely, if that if the aim 
was to protect the most vulnerable, then policies to protect pregnant women and their unborn 
babies should have also been implemented.  
 
Yet, vis-à-vis scientific uncertainty, the precautionary approach reaches its true limits when 
confronted with questions of proportionality and cost-efficiency. As explained in Funtowicz 
(2006), precautionary model (theory 3.3.2.). This is evident during proposals B17 and B68. In 
proposal B17, the proponents of a BPA ban on all food contact materials, point to the need to 
protect pregnant women and their fetuses from BPA exposures. They point to the many 
unresolved scientific questions concerning the safety of BPA and argue that a more extensive 
(and expensive) ban would needs to be introduced.  Although some political parties agreed with 
the need to protect this vulnerable group, most of them are not willing to support the proposal.  
 
For the opponent of the proposal, the decision is much easier, such a broad ban was impossible 
because it would be disproportionate to the level of uncertainty. The opponents argue that the 
impact on the food industry would substantial and at the same time there would be no evidence of 
increased health protection for the population. As opposed to the more limited ban that was 
implemented for food contact material for the 0-3 years old, which they stressed, covered a well-
defined range of products and was proportional to the level of uncertainty. 
 
However, it is not until the debate on proposal B68, that we see the limitations of the 
precautionary principle in its full extent. In this proposal (concerning following the 
recommendations of DTU-Food’s 2015 assessment on the safety of BPA) some regulations 
would have to be introduced to reduce the dietary BPA intake of the population. Even if this time 
there is ‘scientific evidence’ of a potential risk (namely, DTU-Food's recommendation), the 
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precautionary principle cannot be used because there are no available alternatives to substitute 
BPA in several products and one could risk using replacements that turn out to be more 
dangerous. When faced with this type of ‘unknown’ future risk, Danish politicians have argued, it 
is unsuitable to use the precautionary model because one might end up with an equally 
problematic situation. At the same time, it was highlighted the excessive price of such a 
precautionary measure (which had already been quantified). The majority in the Parliament is 
thus more supportive for working together with the industry to find ‘suitable’ substitutes in the 
future.   
 
As noted by Funtowicz and Strand (2007), in order to overcome such a limitation, a new 
reformulation of the principle would be needed where precaution “would not be contingent upon 
what will happen in the future, because this cannot be known. It would have to be framed by 
what is at stake today.” (Funtowicz & Strand, 2007, p. 7). This means that when the 
precautionary principle is contingent to proportionality between the cost and the benefits, it is 
unable to provide a real alternative in the face of uncertainty. The last Danish proposal for 
parliamentary resolution (B68) shows precisely that there are many BPA-policy questions that 
involve uncertain outcomes – like, how toxic will a new BPA-substitute turn out to be? The 
uncertainty here is related to the fact that we don’t know the answer for that question yet. When 
faced with such uncertainties, it is impossible to estimate the potential health benefits of BPA's 
regulation (to be able to compared them to the already quantified cost of regulation). A 
precautionary approach would have to be detached from this, to provide a real alternative 
approach for decision-making under uncertainty.  
 
9.2 Norway 
In the Norwegian case I have argued that the ED-issue has mainly been the responsibility of the 
environmental authorities. In Norway, EDs have historically been referred to as hazardous 
substances (miljøgifter) and the specific term EDs has not be used so much until very recently. 
This emphasis can be understandable given Norway’s position as a clear importer of 
transboundary pollution (in particular in the Arctic regions) where traditional hazardous 
substances are an environmental problem. In chapter 7, I argued that using the term ‘hazardous 
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substance’ instead of ED has had several significant implications among which that more 
emphasis has been placed in chemical properties such as persistency and that the problem has 
been mainly understood as an environmental problem rather than a health-related problem like in 
Denmark. This has also meant that regulatory efforts (in terms of research and expertise) have 
been focused on typical hazardous substances in the High North which means that research on 
non-persistence chemicals like BPA have not been prioritized.  
 
I have argued that in the absence of a national action plan on chemicals, white paper no.14 has 
been the document guiding Norway’s chemical policy in the last decade. National chemical 
policy in Norway has been based on a precautionary thinking – particularly so when it comes to 
hazardous substances. At the same time, the white paper specifies clear regulatory objectives for 
all sectors with respect to hazardous substances listed in the national priority list (including EDs) 
– namely that their use is going to be reduced as much as possible by 2020, according to the 
generation goal. It is further specified that the risk associated with this particular type of 
chemicals calls for a hazard (precautionary) approach, where risk does not have to be quantified 
but is instead based on the intrinsic properties of these chemicals. This is justified given that it 
would be hard to establish safe limits for chemicals that keep accumulating in the environment, 
which at the same time can have substantial and irreversible effects and where the posterior costs 
of remediation can be very high.   
 
I have also pointed to the fact that there has not been much political attention on the topic, and 
that in general, political parties have not included chemicals (even less so endocrine disruptors) in 
their overall environmental policy objectives (with the exception of the Liberal Party of Norway 
and the Green Party which have some policy objectives for hazardous substances)
156
. On the 
NGO side, there is a current effort to put chemicals back into the environmental agenda, but the 
work is rather limited in economic and manpower resources (personal communication with 
representative of Bellona). The Norwegian Consumer council has maybe been one of the most 
active players when it comes to chemicals in the last years. In general it can be said that there is 
little public awareness and political interests on the topic in Norway.  
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 Venstre being the only one that used the word EDs 
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This means that, as opposed to Denmark, we cannot really talk about a ‘governance’ of EDs in 
Norway (understood as the collective and coordinated common steering of ED-management). In 
Norway, as reported by several official documents much of the work takes place at a fragmented 
administrative level. The report from the Statskonsult from 2001 especially mentions that each of 
these public bodies have developed particular ways of defining chemical risk that depends on 
their particular expertise, their particular regulatory traditions, the interest that they are meant to 
protect and the resources they have to act on it. And that as a result of this, it is not uncommon 
that these public bodies end up having different management preferences when it comes to 
chemicals. In the case of bisphenol A, the main actors have been the health, the food and the 
environmental authorities.  
 
In chapter 7 I have also commented on the particular roles of the food agency, when it comes to 
chemical management. Namely that NFSA is the subordinate agency of three different ministries 
and that it is in charge of administrating several pieces of legislation for the Ministry of Health 
and Care Services in connection to chemicals. Among these pieces of legislation we have the 
legislation on food contact materials which regulates the usage of BPA in food-related products. 
In particular, the food agency is in charge of taking care of the human health dimension, while 
the environmental agency regulates those same chemicals in the terms of their possible 
environmental effects. However, as explained in chapter 7, the environmental agency is also in 
charge of assessing human health implications of chemicals in consumer products, many of 
which are also used in food contact materials. Given that the environmental authorities has 
recently highlighted that, when it comes to EDs, their focus is on environmental effects, it 
become really ambiguous who has the ultimate responsibility of the health dimension. At the 
same time, it has also been mentioned that chemicals do not rank very high in the list of priorities 
of the Ministry of Health and Care Services, which adds to the uncertainty of who is ultimately 
accountable for the health dimension of those chemicals that are covered at the same time by the 
legislation administered by the food agency and by the environmental agency (namely cosmetics, 
food contact materials and pesticides). Furthermore, the fact that each agency has its own group 
of advising experts, further increases the chances of a diverging health evaluation.
157
  It  has been 
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 In Denmark for example, the Danish EPA has responsibility for most of the legislation on chemicals (including 
cosmetics and pesticides), while the DVFA is in charge of the legislation on food contact materials. However, given 
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impossible for me (with the scope of my thesis) to figure out how much autonomy – or discretion 
to make more or less independent decisions - these agencies have when it comes to deciding on 
regulation. The way I understand it from the documents that I have analyzed and my interviews is 
that the agencies prepare a “technical recommendation” and it is up to the ministry to endorse the 
recommendations. Yet, the regulation of chemicals, both in the environmental and in the food 
sector, is a field that requires expert advice (from science) and professional competence (from the 
agencies), meaning that the ministries are dependent on that technical input, and although it is 
recognized that the different parental ministries can intervene on professional considerations as 
well when deciding on regulation, it is unclear what is the threshold to call for such an 
intervention.  
 
In chapter 8 the different preferences between the food agency and the environmental agency 
concerning the regulation of BPA were further analyzed using an institutional theory perspective. 
I concluded that much in line with the work of March and Olsen (2008) and Vatn (2005), these 
two agencies can be said to belong to two very well defined and different institutional settings - 
represented by two distinct administrative cultures based on different rules of appropriate 
behavior. These rules are based on specific ways of processing information, best practices, key 
interpretative traditions, previous experience and I will add different ways of dealing with 
scientific uncertainty. As pointed in the theory, those institutionalized rules facilitate 
interpretation of ambiguous situations and prescribe what the appropriate thing to do.  As a result 
of this, these two agencies understand the problem at hand and its possible solutions very 
differently. Their main characteristics are presented below.  
 
For the environmental agency, BPA is seen as an endocrine disruptor of regulatory significance 
(it is included in the national priority list and covered by the national generation goal) and has to 
be regulated using a hazard-based approach without a need to conduct a quantitative risk 
assessment. At the same time, low-dose effects, non-standard studies and combination effects 
should be taken into consideration when deciding on the safety of this chemical. At the normative 
                                                                                                                                                                            
that both agencies get their scientific advice from the same experts, ensures some consistency in their health 
evaluations.   
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level, the interests of the consumers (and the environment) are actively protected, and in case of 
scientific uncertainty, the precautionary principle should be used.  
 
For the food agency on the other hand, BPA regulation has to be based on the results of a 
quantitative risk assessment – where standard studies are still the most reliable evidence to assess 
the safety of this chemical. At the same time, it is understood that it is sufficient to assess the 
safety of one chemical at the time and that scientific uncertainties could ultimately be quantified 
and addressed through the traditional risk approach.
158
 According to this way of evaluating the 
evidence, BPA is to be classified as an endocrine active substance (and not an ED). At the 
normative level it is hard to say how the opposing interests that NFSA is supposed to protect are 
weighted (namely, to ensure that food is safe for consumers and to contribute to value creation in 
the food sector), in particular in situations when the agency has to take a stance – such as when 
participating in regulatory processes at the EU level.  
 
These particular preferences can be explained by different factors. In the food field for example 
(as explained in theory section 2.3.3), after a series of food crises in the late 1990s, many 
European food safety institutions (including NFSA) were subjected to review and reform in order 
to restore public confidence in expert advice and in European risk management. The main feature 
of the reform was the strict separation of risk assessment and risk management activities and 
responsibilities (something that was codified in the European Food Law). At the same time, 
EFSA became the eminent scientific risk-assessment authority for food policy issues in Europe 
(Lofstedt, 2011). In this respect, we can say that risk assessment is the basis for food safety in 
Europe – and this 'culture' is something that is share among most food agencies in Europe 
(including NFSA).  
The environmental authorities, on the other hand, are more familiar with the concept of 
precaution (which actually originated in the environmental field) and hazard based approaches 
which are commonly used in today’s environmental regulatory system. In particular when there 
are considerable scientific uncertainties - such as information gaps, complexity of biological 
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precautionary principle, including some sort of risk assessment and respecting the clause for cost effectiveness. 
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effects, difficulty to estimate exposure scenarios, and many more - and concern about significant 
effects. 
At the same time, these two authorities have different overall responsibilities. While the 
environmental agency is usually in charge of protecting the environment and consumer from 
unnecessary chemicals (chemicals that one could as well live without), the food agency is in 
charge of finding the safest way of dealing with chemicals that are unavoidable (given that they 
are food contaminants and food is something that is needed). 
 
Furthermore, food regulators usually have a narrower mandate than their environmental 
counterparts in that they just have to assess chemical safety in relation to the diet, while the 
environmental authorities have to relate to a broader field ranging from assessment of chemicals 
in consumer products to impacts in whole ecosystems. One could also argue that there are also 
differences in terms of money and influence, with the food authorities historically having more of 
these resources (Lofstedt, 2011).  
 
However, perhaps their main difference relates to the much larger debate of whether chemicals 
should be regulated using a risk or a hazard based approach.
159
 In Europe, this is still an 
unresolved discussion and it has been noted that these two approaches represent the two souls of 
the EU risk regulation system: the rational, risk and evidence-base technocratic soul and the 
messier, more human and pluralistic precautionary-oriented soul (Alemanno, 2011).  
 
The fact that in Norway policy-decisions concerning BPA are taken at the administrative level 
and in particular based on the conclusions of a risk assessment, means that in this country it is the 
rational, technocratic, evidence-based soul that has been responsible for managing the risk related 
to BPA. At the same time, the fact that such risk assessment conclusions are challenged by 
different expert groups complicates the legitimacy of this decision. If we go back to the risk 
governance literature (section 2.2.1), in particular to it normative dimension, risk scholars warn 
about this precise type of situations: when uncertain risks are managed as if they were simple 
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 Where regulation based on hazard refers to “the potential for a substance, activity or process to cause harm or 
adverse effects” and the risk-based approach refers to “a combination of the likelihood and the severity of a 
substance, activity or process to cause harm”.  
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uncontroversial risk. A failure to take the ongoing uncertainties into consideration could lead to 
Beck’s famous “organized irresponsibility”.   
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Appendix 
Can you explain me what is your work with respect to BPA? 
What are the specific guidelines, internal rules, practices that are relevant for your work with 
BPA?  (look for ways of process information, best practices, interpretative traditions, previous 
experience)  
Can you explain me what is the ED-issue about?  
Is there a scientific controversy with respect of EDs? Or can we talk about consensus? 
How are the regulatory processes at the different levels: agency, ministry, EU, other? 
Is the ED issue a national or an international problem? 
Are there enough economic means to deal with EDs? 
How are the responsibilities organized? 
Who has the ultimate decision on BPA regulation in the country? 
Are EDs high on the political agenda? 
What is the best way of dealing with scientific uncertainty? Who decides? 
Who defines the policy-ambitions? Who defines the desired level of protection? 
Which factors should drive decision-making: scientific, environmental, social, ethic, economic? 
Who are the relevant actors for EDs policy-making? 
Is there any established cooperation/collaboration between the different actors? 
Are there some stakeholders that are more influential than others? 
Which is the best way to influence EDs policy-making at EU level? Is there any room for 
national regulation? 
Who gets to disseminate information on EDs? How? 
Where do you get your scientific information from? Is there enough research/competence on the 
topic? 
Are EDs a media topic? Are they depicted accurately? 
After so 15 years of intense research on BPA, can we say that the main scientific uncertainties are 
overcome? 
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